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ABSTRACT
This thesis considers whether, and under what conditions, a fledgling
developer without substantial financial resources can realistically make its
debut on a large project owned and/or controlled by a multiplicity of public
and private institutions and instrumentalities. A co-equal theme is what
requirements must be met to make housing the central focus of such a
project. A series of major constraints and obstacles is catalogued and
analyzed; and a strategy proposed to cope with all of them. We conclude
that the site constraints can be overcome, and the housing potential of the
site realized, by a careful attention to the buffering of undesirable
adjacancies and a brilliantly implemented orientation toward both distant
views and desirable site amenities. Financial analysis suggests a
preference for condominiums over rentals but without forecasting entirely
the rental option. Our strategy for implementing this development idea
exploits the advantages of priority, access and time which will permit us to
compete seriously for the development designation, but with no assurance of
a successful outcome.
Thesis Supervisor: Bernard Frieden
Title: Professor of City Planning
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SANTE HARBOR: A PROPOSED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT
FOR THE NORTH STATION AREA
Introduction
This thesis analyzes the feasibility of developing a new residential
community, to be called Sante Harbor, in the North Station area. The
specific site has not been definitively determined because the existing
context will have to be altered to create development parcels of sufficient
size and appropriate relationship to surrounding uses. Nevertheless, we
have identified a use - housing - and an area to accommodate that use with
specificity adequate to permit meaningful discussion.
A lack of precision is unavoidable given the fact that, in truth, there
is no development opportunity at all at the present time. One of the
underlying themes of this thesis is that worthwhile development activity
need not wait for a willing seller and a coherent, buildable site to be
identified in advance. Creative, even visionary, development may often
begin with no more than an idea and a location. The developer must then
labor to fit the idea to the location, sometimes over a period of years,
before his vision comes to fruition.
We would like to suggest that there is a useful distinction between a
"location" and a "site." The former refers simply to an area which may be
identified by coordinates. The latter, by contrast, describes a location
which is ready to accommodate development of a defined scope and nature. In
that sense, we have an idea and a location; and this thesis considers how
the location may be transformed into a site to accommodate our idea.
The four principal challenges we have addressed correspond to the
chapter headings which set off the components of our analysis. The first
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challenge is planning and design. Our location has considerable appeal, but
also a significant number of constraints which must be overcome to fully
realize its potential. The challenge is, therefore, to describe both
verbally and graphically all of the opportunities and constraints and to
generate a site and design program which together will frame the issues for
the design professionals we intend to hire and will help to guide them in
their resolution.
We next confront the challenge of implementation. This challenge has
two parts: we must comprehensively identify the parties who are likely to
play a role in the process by which the location becomes one or more sites
and explain in what ways they are likely to interact and why. Once the
political interests have been catalogued and analyzed, a further challenge
is to explain how a fledgling development entity (hereafter sometimes the
C-G Sante Harbor Partnership) can put itself in the middle of what is sure
to be a lengthy and contentious pre-development planning effort. The goal
is to fashion a strategy that affords us the best chance of obtaining the
right to develop the site essentially as we wish.
These two challenges constitute the central issues of this thesis. If
the contextual constraints can be minimized and controlled and the
attributes of the location highlighted and emphasized, a part of Boston that
has lain virtually dormant for many years can be dramatically brought to
life. No one ought to mistake the enormity of the challenge - Sante Harbor
absolutely demands brilliant design to realize its hidden potential. The
"solution" to the location's multiple constraints cannot reasonably be
expected from us. Rather, as developers, our role will be to guide and even
inspire our architect/planner to produce and implement a solution that
optimally meshes the requirements of imageability, livability, efficiency
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and beauty. The developer/architect team which meets this challenge will
justly win the plaudits of professionals, commentators and users alike. Our
objective here is to outline how we propose to go about the process of
selecting and interacting with an architect so as to help him produce his
best work. It is our conviction that although brilliant design cannot be
produced on command, there is much that the developer can do to nurture and
encourage it.
The challenge of implementation is central to this thesis because the
Sante Harbor site does not exist at all today. Helping to shape it is
itself a tall order; but the challenge is made infinitely greater because
when the site does come together, it will without question constitute the
largest, high-FAR parcel which may be developed largely without demolition
(only the Registry Building at 100 Nashua Street must be demolished) within
a mile of the CBD. We are picking up the gauntlet at a point considerably
earlier than most developers are inclined to do. At this stage, both the
process and its result are hard to anticipate with any confidence; however,
we are confident that our willingness to enter the fray at this early date
is precisely the edge that makes our prospects credible.
The real challenges of this thesis are, then, to help identify the
opportunity, create the site, secure development rights, and shape and
inspire the design. Next to those challenges, market analysis and financial
structuring are relatively straightforward. Everything we know and read
about Boston suggests that there is a strong and growing demand for
upper-income housing. Except for condominium conversions, the range of
choices for the prospective upper-income resident is remarkably thin. Those
two widely recognized facts establish the contours of the opportunity. They
do not, of course, constitute a sufficient underpinning for a large,
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multiple phase, ownership/rental project in a pioneering location. Although
we have answered a priori the marketing questions "what" and "where," much
more must be done to provide useful guidance on "how many," "for whom (how
much)," which amenities," and "when."
But we cannot hope to answer the marketing issues on a micro level, as
applied to Sante Harbor. This will require a professionally designed
marketing study. At an appropriate time (probably during the search for
financing) we intend to commission such a study. Here, we must be content
to outline the questions we expect the study to address, and the methodology
we expect it to employ. This is done in the Appendix chapter on marketing.
Financial analysis is an on-going process in any development effort.
Before a developer gets too infatuated with a location or a possible use, he
should subject his enthusiasm to the discipline of basic feasibility
analysis. That analysis will set forth a development budget and a
projection of stabilized year income and expenses. If the return on the
total asset is comfortably above the current threshold of long term
financability, the developer may know enough to continue with the overall
planning effort. A more detailed financial analysis, incorporating
discounted cash flow principles, sensitivity of the returns to varying
assumptions, and the risk-return tradeoffs which flow from alternative
debt/equity structures, should logically await a better definition of the
program, the timing, the market absorption, and the cost than we have at
present. We will perform the basic feasibility analysis, we will compare in
simplified form the financial consequences of developing rental vs.
condominium housing, and we will explain the issues we expect to have to
address in the search for Sante Harbor financing. The financial analysis is
not central to this thesis because the project's life cycle financial
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analysis cannot occur until its nature, scope, timing, and cost have been
clarified.
The authors understand that their choice of topic does not lend itself
readily to tight, cogent analysis. There is a temptation to be overly
discursive and descriptive, to lay out as comprehensively as possible all of
the many elements - physical, political, economic, financial, even
historical - which will together determine the fate of Sante Harbor.
Although contextual detail is not unimportant, it cannot be more than a
backdrop for analysis. Of crucial importance is the ability to draw a
coherent picture from the morass of accumulated detail. Analysis and
synthesis, understanding, judgment and conclusions must follow the
scrupulous amassing of background information.
Effective analysis must begin with an appreciation of the thematic
underpinnings of one's investigation. This thesis has two core themes. On
the one hand, we are studying the process of "getting started." One classic
way to begin is with a business plan which moves from a modest investment
opportunity through progressively larger or more complex undertakings to the
entrepreneur's goal. Our focus, by contrast, is on a project instead of a
plan. And not just any project, but one of broad scope and multi-layered
obstacles. In essence, we are asking whether and under what conditions a
fledgling developer can hope to make his debut with a "page one" project.
Our second thematic underpinning is more substantive. We are
attempting to catalogue the issues that must be addressed in establishing
the feasibility of a multi-phase, mid-to-high-rise, ownership/rental housing
project in a pioneering downtown location. Under this broad umbrella, we
will ask whether: the site can physically accommodate the program in a way
which will appeal to the identified market; the market will absorb the
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program, at the forecast rents/prices and times; the project can be built
and rented/sold so as to achieve economic returns sufficient to satisfy both
debt and equity investors; the site can be acquired and approved for the
programmed use; and lastly, whether "the case for housing" will have to be
based on other than a highest and best use analysis.
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A NOTE OF THE NATURE OF THE DEVELOPMENT PLANNING PROCESS
The development partnership began with a back-of-the-envelope
determination that a major housing project on the Sante Harbor site would be
financable and profitable. As we progressed beyond an initial intuitive
flush of excitement, it became apparent that success would necessarily
depend on the solution to a number of interlocking, mutually dependent
problems and opportunities; and that each of these problems and
opportunities in turn posed multi-faceted, complex issues for thought and
action. The way in which one set of issues was resolved would inevitably
affect the context within which all the others had to be approached. The
number of ways in which the pieces might fall together is daunting in
itself, separate and apart from thinking through all their implications.
Sensible planning can do no more at the predevelopment stage than set
forth a credible, realistic scenario linking the stages of the development
process. The developer can have no doubt that the development effort will
not proceed in precise conformity with the outlined scenario; but the very
act of committing one possible scenario to paper will help to clarify the
many ways in which each stage of the development process affects and is
affected by, all the others. When, as will surely occur, the development
effort goes off the track or takes an unanticipated detour, the developer
must reassess his position. The objective at that point is to rethink the
original scenario so that the desired goal can still be reached, albeit by a
different route.
In the course of the development process, there will be many such
changes in course. If the process were retrospectively mapped, it would
resemble more a drunken rat's path through a devilishly convoluted maze,
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than a laser beam richocheting smartly off a communications satellite. If a
developer truly appreciates that he cannot realistically hope ever to walk
the straight and narrow, he will be far less likely to lose his way entirely
when circumstances force him off the preferred path. The process of
thinking through all of the steps involved in getting from the first flush
of enthusiasm to closing the permanent loan will of necessity be lengthy and
circuitous. If the developer has planned carefully and well, however, he
will have armed himself with a mental "homing device". When forced to
depart from the original flight path, he will mentally reset his bearings
and plot the most direct new course to the desired landing area. If the
craft is soundly engineered, and the navigational equipment up to the task
of performing in turbulent weather, no possible succession of mid-course
corrections will ultimately block the attainment of the original
destination.
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SITE HISTORY
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The North Station District
The North Station district, defined as the triangular area in Boston
bounded by the Charles River to the north, North Washington Street to the
east, and Merrimac Street, Lomasney Way, and Martha Road to the southwest,
is a complex urban fabric containing threads of residential, institutional,
commercial, industrial, retail, office and parking uses. Major automotive
and public transportation nodes and a major sports arena dominate the area
and to a large degree define its character.
The district includes three distinct areas; the Bulfinch Triangle,
North Station, and the Nashua Street institutional area north of the Storrow
Drive Ramps to the Charles River. It is directly abutted by Charles River
Park, Government Center, and the North End (See Maps 1-5).
To best understand the area's complexities, it is helpful to briefly
review the history of the North Station district.
Historical
It is the transportation systems which have had the greatest impact in
shaping the area's physical characteristics and uses. From the early 1800's
until now, the North Station district has experienced both economic vitality
and decline due in both cases to the transportation systems.
Most of the land was originally a tidal marsh. In 1643 a dam was
constructed across the mouth of the marsh, creating a pond which could be
flooded at high tide. Additionally, a canal was dug connecting the pond
with Boston Harbor. The flooding and receding waters powered a water mill
on the dam, as well as saw and grist mills along the canal (See Maps 6,7,8).
In the early 1800's, the mill pond was filled to create the area now
known as the "Bulfinch Triangle," bounded by Causeway, North Washington, and
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Merrimac Streets. The triangular street pattern (See Map 9) was planned and
designed by Charles Bulfinch, the noted Federal-style designer of Boston
residences and institutions (most notably, the Harrison Gray Otis houses,
the original portion of the State House, and the reconstruction and
expansion of Fanueil Hall). The landfill development, which housed
warehousing and manufacturing uses, was created using fill cut from the top
of Beacon Hill. The canal was widened to provide improved access for goods
shipped between the Middlesex Canal and Dock Square. The causeway across
the pond was widened and became Causeway Street.
Rail use began rather modestly in Boston in 1826. Planning of the
Bunker Hill Monument led to the construction of a four mile, horse-drawn
railroad to simplify moving the granite, quarried in Quincy, to the water
and then by barge to Charlestown. Four years later the Boston and Lowell
Railroad was incorporated, followed a year later by the Boston and Worcester
and the Boston and Providence lines. All three opened for travel in 1835.
The Lowell Railroad brought its tracks across the Charles River to a
station created by filling further into the river than the original Bulfinch
Triangle. The Boston and Maine Railroad and the Boston and Fitchburg
Railroad came into Boston in 1844 (See Maps 10 and 11). The Boston and
Maine station was in Haymarket Square. Several lines merged, and the
remaining Railroads were consolidated into the Union Station (predecessor of
North Station) by 1894. At that time, Union Station was the largest
railroad station in the country, serving nearly 500 trains daily. Thus all
of the northern and western railroads eventually came into the old Mill Pond
region and early gave Causeway Street the railroad terminal character that
it has today.
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The new North Station and Boston Garden Building, the Madison Hotel,
and the Analex Building were constructed in 1928 by the Boston and Maine
Railroad. The canal had long since been filled in, as had the mill pond.
The new building created a new wave of activity in the area, and began a
period of revitalization of the North Station district. Excellent
transportation connections served the area with North Station providing
commuter and long haul rail to points in the north. The elevated Green and
Orange lines provided transit connections to all other subway lines and
further developed what was by then a major transportation node for both the
manufacturing/wholesaling businesses and suburban commuters (See Maps 12 and
13). In 1953 the Central Artery was completed, easing traffic congestion in
the area, improving the regional automobile highway system and establishing
the present form and character of the North Station area.
The elevated transit and Central Artery structures created visual and
environmental barriers at pedestrian level, blocking sunlight, creating
noise, and rendering the area bleak and inhospitable. The area experienced
nearly two decades of decline in the mid-fifties and sixties, a result
influenced both by the construction of the transit structures and the
concurrent decline of the West End residential neighborhood. Manufacturing
companies moved out of the area, reflecting the more general trend of
manufacturing companies prefering suburban locations.
There remained the traditional mix of uses in the area including
institutional, office, furniture manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers,
and scattered residential. There was an increase in low-end entertainment
and restaurant activities. The Madison Hotel closed and was later
demolished, along with several lounges and rooming houses, to clear the site
for the present GSA Building. The area still houses several fast food
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restaurants, adult theatres, branch banks, liquor stores, an electrical
supply house, a hardware store, and other assorted shops. The predominance
of grade-level parking largely dedicated to government and institutional
employees has had a negative effect on the area, as have the deterioration
of the Boston Garden and the adult theatres and lounges that serve the
area's most frequent patrons (See Maps 14 and 15).
Urban renewal efforts in the area began in the early sixties. The West
End was leveled for what is now Charles River Park, a residential complex
originally built as rental housing and currently being converted to
condominiums.
During the 1950-1970 urban renewal programs, areas surrounding North
Station changed uses. The Charles River Complex introduced high-end
residential uses to the West End, the Massachusetts General Hospital
expanded, and Scollay Square became Government Center to the south. In
addition to the declining rail and increasing automotive traffic at North
Station, the long period of redevelopment of the West End and Scollay Square
areas tended to isolate the Bulfinch Triangle area, contributing to a
pattern of disinvestment, neglect, and gradual deterioration in the 1970's.
In 1975, the Orange Line elevated structure was removed and replaced by
a subway running under the Charles River. The Charles River Dam project was
recently completed, and the Federal government's 850,000 square foot GSA
building is presently reaching completion. These projects represent the
public investment in the North Station area to date.
The BRA revitalization plan entitled "New Directions for North
Station," produced in 1977, identified conflicts and issues for the area and
proposed a three phase strategy for turning the area around. Several of the
Phase I and II proposals for street improvements and land-use changes have
-18-
been implemented and have contributed to the gradual reinvestment in the
Bulfinch Triangle.
Many of the older loft buildings in the Bulfinch Triangle have been or
are being converted to office uses with private investments, the result of
the pressures of increased demand in the Boston market for mid-priced office
space and the public improvements in the area. With a generally low-rise
building pattern, the dominant physical image at street level in the area is
one of enclosing walls and barriers. The Bulfinch Triangle is the only
sub-area with a sense of place, based on the scale, density, detailing and
homogeneity of 19th century buildings.
The North Station area is now one of contrasts. It is discontinuous
with some clearly defined sectors. The area has a rich and varied history
as a transportation terminus and a manufacturing/wholesaling district, and
is a gateway for those entering Boston from the north. There are pockets of
artist's lofts still in the area, but most are being displaced in favor of
office use. Causeway Street remains the most deteriorated area, especially
below the elevated Green Line structure.
Land use north of the Storrow Drive ramps has been effectively
landbanked until rail, highway, and riverfront improvement plans are
finalized. The grade-level parking seems large in area and impenetrable.
The area seems isolated from the Bulfinch Triangle because of barriers
created by the elevated Green Line and highway structures, as well as the
discontinuity of the street system. Activity patterns for the North Station
area will become clearer when the GSA Building opens and the transportation
issues are resolved. The GSA was attracted to the site contingent upon a
City and MBTA commitment to remove the elevated line. This project is the
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key focus of an overall urban renewal strategy for the area as promoted by
the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA).
The zoning for the area remained inconsistent and was generally lower
than other downtown areas with Floor Area Ratios (FAR) ranging from 2 to 4
(See Map 20) was compared with more prevalent FARs of 8, 10, and higher in
other downtown areas.
Current Context
The North Station District has been the subject of considerable
attention recently, focusing on three issues: depression of the Central
Artery; relocation and depression of the Green Line; and a new/refurbished
arena.
Central Artery Project; Timing and Impact (See Maps 16 and 17)
The City of Boston, together with the State, has requested funds from
the Federal government to depress the Central Artery. The State Executive
Office of Transportation and Construction (EOTC) has been conducting major
planning efforts aimed at widening and depressing the Central Artery. The
plan includes removing the ramps immediately behind the Boston Garden,
replacing the southern connector ramp with a tunnel and the northern
connector with a new ramp. This would greatly improve the characteristics
of the area, as well as some of the traffic congestion everpresent at
Leverett Circle. The impact of this project on the elevated ramp system and
effects on other structures in the North Station area must be included in
the site analysis. Approval of funding of this project is still pending in
the U.S. Congress, and the timing of its implementation is still uncertain.
There are two major aspects of the Central Artery reconstruction
project that will impact development of the site. First, the project itself
is not a certainty. Design development will necessarily be different under
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an existing site condition scenario than it would be if the Artery project
is funded and implemented. Similarly, if only a portion of the Artery
project is funded, the issues raised in the design process will change.
For example, under existing site conditions the designers will have to
incorporate the connector ramps as they are, the Registry Building, the
Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital, and the commuter rail tracks. Under a
partial funding scenario, one or both of the connector ramps will remain,
changing the site context very little. However, under a fully-funded
project the ramping system would be completely changed, the Registry
Building would be demolished, and construction of an air-rights garage over
the commuter rail tracks would be probable. As one can see, the uncertainty
of the Artery project presents major design and siting problems.
Resolution of the design issues may demand postponement of design
development until the Artery's fate is known. This does not preclude other
development planning and coordination, as is suggested later in the design
and politics sections, but the significance of the project and its impact on
development in the area are central to the overall success of a major
redevelopment of the North Station and cannot be overlooked or avoided. A
decision on the funding of the Artery project is expected in 1985.
The timing of the Artery project adds another level of uncertainty to
the redevelopment of the area. As proposed, the relocation of the connector
ramps would take approximately 10-15 years from the date the Central Artery
project commences. The North Station area will basically be a construction
site for that period, hardly the best setting for a residential development.
However, other redevelopment could take place during the reconstruction
of the Artery. Office development, parking, and transportation improvements
could take place simultaneously with the Artery project if staging and
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implementation of the various redevelopment projects is done logically.
Coordinating these various projects will require governmental oversight.
The most likely agency to oversee the initial redevelopment process is the
BRA.
Therefore, the final designs and implementation of any redevelopment
plan for the area should be closely coordinated with the timing and final
design process of the Central Artery reconstruction.
The funding for the project rests on appropriation by the Federal
government of highway improvement funds. These funds are generated by the
federal gasoline excise tax, levied locally and theoretically reinvested in
the on-going maintenance and improvement of the federal highway system.
Taxes generated in each state are applied to improvements in that state.
The funds for the project are available in Massachusetts' share of those
federal highway funds. Application has been made for the funds and awaits
final federal approval.
Green Line Project; Timing and Impact (See Map 18)
The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) has plans for
removing the elevated section of the Green Line in the North Station area.
The MBTA has under contract a design and engineering team for a major
alteration of the North Station Transit Complex, including relocation of the
elevated Green Line and a redeveloped commuter rail terminal. Its plans
call for a tunnel under Accolon Way and behind the present Garden to a
bulkhead beginning southeast of Leverett Circle, where the Green Line would
surface and continue, elevated, to the Lechmere Station. The Green and
Orange lines would share a below-grade station, dubbed the "Super Platform,"
which would connect to the commuter rail. Again, this project will
dramatically improve the area by reducing the noise, increasing the
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sunlight, and improving the aesthetics of the pedestrian levels below the
tracks.
The prospect of major transit system changes at and under the proposed
development site adds a set of complex planning and design issues which must
be evaluated.
Removal of the elevated structure and construction of the tunnel could
be accomplished within five years of the start of construction. A temporary
bus service between Lechmere and North Station will be utilized until
project completion, as will a turnaround system for the Green Line trolleys
at the North Station/Canal Street station.
Federal funding earmarked for urban mass transportation as well as
State transportation funds will be used for this project. Although funds
have not been appropriated, the MBTA has completed plans for the
reconstruction, an Environmental Impact Report has been submitted, and those
whom we talked with at the MBTA and the state transportation agencies were
confident that the funding would be approved this year. The GSA building
was located in the North Station district only after city officials promised
to actively pursue removal of the elevated structure. It appears likely
that the funding for the project will be approved, given the substantial
commitment in the GSA building by the federal government and the MBTA's
extensive planning, design, and approval efforts.
Removal of the elevated structure could be accomplished by 1988, if
funding is approved this year. It would positively impact the North Station
district and remove one of the major barriers between Government Center and
the river area. The area to the north of the connector ramps will not be
directly impacted, as the Green Line reconstruction does not involve it.
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Indirectly, the area will benefit from the improvement of the district and
of the area.
Redevelopment plans for the area should capitalize on the site's access
to all major transportation modes - public transportation, commuter rail,
and the interstate highway system - and should emphasize connections to
downtown. Improvement of the Green Line and removal of the elevated
structure will do much to improve the district and attract additional
investment.
Our assessment of the projects' probability of funding is 90%, based on
our discussions with city and state transportation officials and the
observance of federal investment in the district.
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SITE CONTEXT
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We began by looking at the site and the surrounding areas, trying to
determine what opportunities and constraints to development were presented
by the site itself in context with its' surroundings. We present these
below, together with a brief discussion of the potential impact of these
externalities on a residential development in the North Station area.
It is surrounded by several distinct neighborhoods and institutional/
governmental complexes including: the Cambridge/Science Park/Industrial
Park to the north across the Charles River; Charlestown to the northeast;
the North End to the east; the Bulfinch Triangle/Arena area and Government
Center to the south; and the Charles River Park Complex, Beacon Hill, and
the MGH campus to the west. The evolving land uses in the area are still
very much impacted by the complex of transportation systems converging on
the site.
Neighboring Districts (See Map 19)
Cambridge/Science Park/Industrial Park (A)
Cambridge's southeast sector supports a variety of industrial uses
along the northern river edge which, combined with the rail yards and the
Boston Sand and Gravel Co., establishes poor visual quality for a
development immediately across the river. The city is in the midst of a
major redevelopment of the Lechmere Canal and a new Lechmere Green Line
station located on the northeast side of the McGrath-O'Brien Highway. The
city intends to support industrial activity in the foreseeable future;
however, the Community Development Office recently began a major study of
the area, expected to take approximately six months, and the MDC is hoping
to improve the river's edge as a linear park directly opposite North Station.
This will do little to improve the area, given the tremendous negative
impact of the operating gravel pit and truck terminals. Interstate 95 and
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the major connector ramps leading to the Mystic River Bridge separate the
Industrial Park/Gravel Pit area of the north riverfront from Charlestown and
further limit aesthetic improvement to the northern river edge.
Charlestown (B)
Charlestown is largely a residential neighborhood. The area has
experienced significant upgrading recently, as young professionals and real
estate developers have been drawn to the area for its proximity to downtown
Boston and the relatively lower property values.
This community hosts several famous and well-attended historic
attractions, namely the USS Constitution, Paul Revere Park, and Bunker Hill.
A Freedom Trail spur has been proposed by the BRA to more closely tie the
Charlestown neighborhood with the center city.
The area is primarily 4 and 5-story brick rowhouses constructed in the
1800's. Many of the buildings in Charlestown have historic significance.
The Bunker Hill Monument stands at the crest of the hill that defines most
of Charlestown, a tribute to the famous "don't shoot until you see the
whites of their eyes" revolutionary Battle of Bunker Hill.
The U.S. Navy maintained a large complex of buildings on Charlestown's
waterfront. The Charlestown Navy Yard has strongly influenced the overall
development and character of Charlestown.
The shipping terminal on Charlestown's Mystic River waterfront is a
major cargo distribution point for the Boston area.
The North End (C)
Historically, the North End has been a residential area for immigrants
new to America and Boston. Primarily of four to six story brick rowhouse
buildings in a very tight building and street pattern, the North End has
been heavily Italian in character for many years. The North End is one of
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the most physically and socially close-knit residential neighborhoods in
Boston. It has a long tradition of ethnic foods, festivals, and
friendliness. Long time residents of the area have recently become
concerned by the pressures of condominium conversions and development in the
area forcing out many families.
The auto traffic on North Washington Street acts as a barrier for
pedestrian activity to North Station, with Causeway Street as the only
connector between the two areas. Rehabilitation, renovation, and new
construction along North Washington Street have improved the streetscape,
and more can be expected as the area improves.
Government Center/Quincy Market (D)
Government Center and Quincy Market are major destination points for
pedestrians and automobiles. Characterized by a mixture of low-rise,
historic buildings, mid-rise brick and stone 19th and 20th century
buildings, and modern, high-rise towers, the area houses the State and City
Offices as well as numerous retail and office uses.
The Government Center Garage visually cut off the North Station area
from the City Hall Plaza and the financial district. Many employees pass
through the North Station area to and from work, primarily along Canal and
Portland Streets.
Quincy Market and the waterfront act as prime commercial attractions
for downtown activity. The proposed extension of the Freedom Trail along
New Congress Street, through Canal Street and to Charlestown across the new
MDC Dam will help reinforce the pedestrian connection between the Government
Center/Quincy Market area and North Station.
Charles River Park (E)
Charles River Park is a residential complex consisting of approximately
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2,250 units in 15-35 story buildings. The residential towers are relatively
disconnected and placed in a seemingly random pattern. An important design
issue regarding the redevelopment of the area north of the connector ramps
is the location and type of pedestrian connector between the Charles River
Park and the new development.
Beacon Hill (F)
Beacon Hill is predominantly a residential district consisting of 18th
and 19th century brick townhouses. Considered to be one of the premier
residential neighborhoods in Boston, Beacon Hill real estate commands some
of the highest residential values.
Massachusetts General Hospital (G)
The MGH is located immediately adjacent to Charles River Park. The
world-renowned teaching hospital occupies over 2,000,000 s.f. in 20
buildings 10 to 15 stories high and densely packed onto approximately
450,000 s.f. of land between Cambridge Street and Charles River Park.
MGH has made it clear that any development needing MGH land will have
to include MGH expansion facilities as well as substantial hospital parking
requirements. The hospital has projected institutional needs of between
100,000 and 486,000 s.f. of office and institutional space, including
general services space and a specialized, 160 bed Alzheimer's Disease
Clinic, and parking needs ranging from 2,500 to 5,000 parking spaces.
Existing Conditions
In principle, the mixture of activities in the North Station area serve
the objectives of sound urban design goals. The mixture of arena,
transportation, retail, office, institutional, and governmental uses should
ensure continuous activity rather than the sterility of a single-use urban
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zone. However, the physical structures supporting each of these uses have
deteriorated badly, and the elevated Green Line and the connector ramps do
little to improve the ambience of the area.
The BRA has been actively pushing removal of the Green Line structure
and the connector ramps. The MDC has plans for the waterfront, the Mass.
General Hospital is planning for new structures on its land, and the MBTA
has plans to completely rebuild the commuter rail station. These
improvements, as well as a renovated or newly-built arena, will change
completely the tenor and character of the North Station district.
Additionally, the guidelines for improvements to the Boston Garden property,
as viewed by the BRA, will include improved pedestrian access from Causeway
Street to the river's edge. Consequently, pedestrian access to the site
will improve from the south.
The two BRA plans for the area, the 1977 "New Directions" and 1980
"District" both contain important policy directions for the whole district.
They emphasize retaining the historical character of the Triangle,
increasing development around North Station, and developing the area between
the ramps and the riverfront for medium density mixed use. Both plans
suggest the need for revised zoning of the area north of Causeway Street.
The BRA has suggested the area be redeveloped in two phases. The first
phase includes the area south of the connector ramps, and phase two includes
the area north of the ramps. (See Map 20)
The "Change and Growth in Central Boston" report published in May, 1984
by the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce continues to highlight the
development opportunities for the North Station area. The report designates
four "priority growth areas," including the North Station area, where "major
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growth will be encouraged, even if departing from existing bulk and density
patterns."
"The City should designate such areas [as the North Station area] as
its highest priority for encouraging major, higher-intensity growth and
development of a scale that cannot be adequately supported elsewhere. The
City should then back that designation with actions: scheduling public
facilities investments to support new growth, actively soliciting
appropriate development, revising codes to allow the growth to occur, and
adopting careful guidelines for its shaping, including preservation plans
where appropriate."
A major factor in the future of both the North Station site and the
area north of the ramps is the expansion plan being developed by Mass.
General Hospital (MGH). This internationally renowned institution projects
the need for more office space and substantial additional parking. Because
MGH owns a majority of the land north of the ramps and smaller portions of
the area south of the ramps, it will be essential to coordinate any
redevelopment with the hospital.
Ownership and Use
The current land uses in the North Station area are shown in Map 14.
Present ownership patterns vary within the North Station area. The
Bulfinch Triangle is characterized by small parcels and multiple private
ownership for all portions except the state and city-owned highway and
transit corridors which bisect the site. The North Station zone consists of
larger parcels owned privately (the Boston Garden and Analex buildings), the
City (parking area), and the Federal Government (GSA building), with smaller
parcels controlled by MGH and the BRA. The area north of the ramps, the
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proposed site, consists of larger parcels owned by MGH, the State, and the
MBTA.
Site Access
Access to the site is excellent. Rail and public transportation
services include: the Commuter Rail, serving the north and northeast
suburbs as far away as Gardner, Lowell, Haverhill, and Ipswich as well as
service to New Hampshire and Maine; the Green Line, which runs from Lechmere
Station through the North Station area, and the Orange Line which runs from
Oak Grove to Forest Hills; and the Central Artery which connects Routes 1,
2, 3, 28, and Interstate 93 at North Station.
Under favorable traffic conditions automobile access to the site is
excellent from the north and west; congestion on the Central Artery can
negatively impact accessibility from the south.
The proposed widening and depression of the Central Artery, as well as
the proposed Third Harbor Tunnel, will greatly improve automobile access
from the south. Completion of the Southwest Corridor Project will increase
commuter access from the south, and the possible extension of the Green Line
beyond Lechmere will generate still more commuter trips through the North
Station district.
Local depestrian and automobile access to the site is limited and
confused. The Boston Garden, the GSA Building, the connector ramps, and the
parking lots presently create a barrier to southern access, the commuter
rail tracks eliminate ground-level access from the east, and to the north is
the Charles River, leaving only the western edge access.
For pedestrians, the site is only a short walk to the North End,
Government Center, Quincy Market, the waterfront, and only slightly further
away, the downtown financial district.
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Circulation Patterns
A discontinuity of streets and pathways characterizes the district. A
basic collector pattern exists around the perimeter of the site, and
east-west on Causeway Street. Secondary streets are generally short and
discontinuous. The interaction between existing modes of transportation and
the North Station district is instructive, though inconclusive by itself,
for projecting patterns for any redevelopment. The existing pattern is
shown in Map 21.
Traffic
The hierarchy of highways and roads provides excellent local and
regional access to the site, as mentioned previously. Historically,
Causeway Street has always been a terminus for the street network because of
the extensive rail yards to the north side. As rail use declined, other
land uses filled in but the street network remained subordinate to the
Storrow Drive ramps and the Leverett Circle connections. Presence of the
commuter rail tracks has precluded east-west connections on the river side
of the ramps. Hence, all traffic from the west to Charlestown or the North
End has been routed along Causeway Street. Causeway Street carries a
variety of auto, truck, and bus traffic because it is the only east-west
connection through the North Station district between Government Center and
the Charles River.
Vehicular access to the district occurs at Leverett Circle from the
west on Storrow Drive and at Causeway Street from the south. Access from
the north artery occurs at Haymarket. Access back to the highway network is
somewhat different, with west access remaining at Leverett Circle, north
access at Leverett Circle, and south access to Causeway Street.
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The local street network is tied into these connections as well as the
surrounding downtown circulation. The complex system, however, is presently
clear only to regular users. Narrow streets, parking lots, construction,
and inadequate stacking space for highway ramps cause traffic jams at peak
hours.
Mass Transit
The excellent transit access provided by the Green Line, Orange Line,
and commuter rail is clearly a major asset of the area and site. The
interface between the lines is awkward but relatively convenient because of
the physical proximity. Presence of the two lines along Canal Street on the
east side compounds the barrier effect of the transit corridor. The
elevated Green Line structure on Causeway Street has long limited
redevelopment of the south side and created a dark, unpleasant pedestrian
environment at street level.
The commuter rail system remains as the only vestige of North Station,
which in its prime was one of the busiest rail terminals in the country.
What remains of long haul passenger rail has largely been transferred to
South Station, as northbound passenger service has all but ceased (excepting
the commuter rail services).
Parking
The parking context in the North Station area is currently in conflict
between: State transportation policy which tends to discourage parking
around a major transit terminal; City policy which places a lid on downtown
parking; and private demand generated by the Boston Garden and MGH which,
according to MGH officials, could fill as many as 5,000 spaces. The
conflict centers around the coincidence of excellent automotive access at
the intersection of west and north/south highways and transit access. The
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North Station area would appear to be a logical place for a downtown
perimeter parking terminus if ramp connections could be designed to
withstand the additional loading. However, State and City planning policies
recommend suburban locations for major automobile parking facilities,
encouraging commuters and shoppers to leave their cars at the suburban
locations and travel to Boston via public transportation (See Map 22).
City Services
Water, sewer, and steam services are available along Nashua Street.
Boston Edison maintains a steam plant adjacent to the Registry Building,
with main feeds along Nashua Street. Plans are to continue using this plant
for the next 5-10 years. A major overflow sewer runs down Nashua Street and
over the Charles to Somerville, and an interceptor sewer follows Causeway
Street and Lomasney Way. High and low pressure water runs throughout the
area, fed from a main 30 inch line in Traverse Street. In short, there
appears to be adequate service in the area for major development (See Map
23).
Pedestrian
The pedestrian network reflects the local street system and follows
several major patterns of movement. North Station serves as a destination
for commuters at morning and evening peaks. They filter through the
Bulfinch Triangle from downtown primarily, and secondarily from MGH through
the Charles River Park complex and along Nashua Street. The area also
provides inexpensive and dedicated parking areas for downtown and
institutional office workers. The Boston Garden generates similar surges
for events, with many patrons walking from downtown jobs, parking, or
transit stops. In addition, there is a more random pattern of movement
within the Triangle to retail and entertainment functions, and to the DPW
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building (also known as the Registry building) on Nashua Street. Pedestrian
paths are well-defined since the limited through connections north/south and
east/west usually dictate a single, efficient path. Canal Street is the
dominant north/south path, and Causeway Street the east/west walkway.
Canal Street sidewalk improvements have improved the North
Station/Haymarket connection and have catalyzed revitalization of the
Bulfinch Triangle. Causeway Street remains a dismal pedestrian environment
with only the south-lighted Garden arcade providing some relief as a covered
access to the entrances of the building. The elevated structure is the
primary negative element on what would otherwise be a pleasant, broad
collector street for the North Station area (See Map 24).
Open Space
The usable open space in Boston is concentrated along the Esplanade in
Back Bay, the Common and Public Garden, and Waterfront Park. The North
Station riverfront breaks the Charles River open space system in half, with
the Esplanade currently ending at the Museum of Science and then continuing
as a pedestrian way from the Charlestown Bridge to Waterfront Park. The
Metropolitan District Commission, owner of the two riverfront parcels at
either end of the water frontage, would like to expand its esplanade green
belt riverfront park to include a linkage, presumably along the site's
Charles River frontage. (See Map 25)
The district is conspicuously lacking in open space and greenery.
Amenities are few, with the Canal Street improvements providing the only
open-space attraction to pedestrians. Pedestrian paths are discontinuous
and generally lead to North Station as a destination. The GSA building has
eliminated the path along Nashua Street which used to connect the Bulfinch
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Triangle with the riverfront. Perception of the river is virtually
nonexistent to pedestrians.
Linear park-like treatments such as those on Canal Street could be
applied to Causeway Street, Nashua Street, Merrimac Street, North Washington
Street, and other pedestrian connectors. Such measures would dramatically
improve the street environment and provide a sense of more open space.
Proposed Transit, Highway, and Parking Changes
Circulation, access, and pedestrian activities will be improved if
either or both of the transportation projects is implemented. The State and
City are actively promoting depression of the Central Artery which will
improve vehicular access to and through downtown. These measures will
improve access to the North Station area as well.
Transit
The multi-faceted transit project proposes to depress the Green Line
under and behind the Garden with a new stop under Accolon Way and remove the
elevated structure on Causeway Street as far as Leverett Circle. The
project is proposed to be a phased, cut-and-cover relocation. The new
tunnel would be constructed first and the elevated structure removed upon
completion. The new "Super Platform" would connect the Green and Orange
lines and would offer an easy transfer point to the North Station commuter
trains.
Another proposed improvement is the extension of the commuter rail
tracks to the back of the Garden, providing more direct patron service to
North Station. While the City has questioned the necessity of this
extension, the MBTA has indicated that it is required for the operation of
10 car trains, given the location of switches to the north. This detail
will affect the final designs of a new train station to be built as part of
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a new or renovated arena. All these measures would improve access to the
area and reduce negative transportation impacts on surrounding land uses.
Highway
The preliminary plans for depressing the Central Artery submitted by
the State in the "June 1983 Supplement to the Draft EIS for the Third Harbor
Tunnel, Interstate 90/Central Artery, Interstate 93" include replacement of
the Storrow/Leverett Circle connections to the Artery with a combination of
tunnels and elevated roadways, depression of the artery southward under
Causeway Street, and alteration of access points to and from the artery.
Such measures would be accompanied by local street improvements including
extension of the east/west Traverse Street. The depressed artery would
provide air rights and joint development opportunities to help restore the
Triangle plan and eliminate the present barrier to the North End.
Current plans have not been finalized on the Leverett Circle ramp
connections. These will have a major impact on the proposed River esplanade
extension and the redevelopment of the BRA phase II site. The construction
period for the DPW project is projected to be 8 to 12 years.
Parking
There are already two preliminary proposals for new parking facilities
in locations in the North Station area. The first proposes an interim lot
for North End residents between Canal Street and the Central Artery during
the Central Artery construction process. The second is an air rights
structure over the commuter rail tracks north of the Artery ramps combined
with other development by MGH. The MCCA, in its' "Multi-Purpose Arena
Feasibility Study: Final Report" prepared by Howard Needles Tammen and
Bergendoff in November, 1984, concluded that the "incremental parking demand
in the North Station area . . . is best met by development by the private
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sector, specifically the Massachusetts General Hospital, at a site north of
the Storrow Drive ramps." State and City policies for the North Station
district are potentially in disagreement with construction of parking
terminals at a major, multi-mode transportation nexus.
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HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF ARENA PROPOSALS
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In 1973, the Bruins and Celtics owners agreed to build an $18.5
million, 18,000-seat arena in the center of a city-planned redevelopment
project in the South Station area. In 1974, Boston Garden owners withdrew
their support after a dispute over projected operating costs. In 1975,
Delaware North purchased the Boston Garden.
Real estate developer Mortimer Zuckerman announced an agreement for an
arena facility among the Bruins, Celtics and Boston Lobsters. The
agreement, which outlined plans to create an independent arena authority to
build, own, and operate a $35 million facility, was defeated in 1977 when
the Legislature refused to back the $17.5 million bond issue needed to begin
construction.
In 1979, the BRA released the "Development Plan for North Station
District," prepared for the BRA by Moshe Safdie and Associates, Inc., which
called for comprehensive development in the North Station area. The Plan
also called for a renovation of the Boston Garden.
In 1980, the Boston Celtics, in cooperation with Ogden Leisure Co., the
owners of Suffolk Downs, studied a privately-funded arena to be located on
the grounds of Suffolk Downs in Revere. After spending approximately
$400,000 on surveys, plans, and permits to create a 20,000-seat arena, the
project was cancelled.
Early in 1981, the Delaware North Companies, Inc., parent company of
the New Boston Garden Corp. and the Boston Bruins, announced plans for a
publicly-supported redevelopment of the fire-damaged Rockingham Park complex
in Salem, New Hampshire. In addition to revitalizing the horse racing
program and adding a greyhound racing program, the promoters proposed a
multi-purpose sports and entertainment complex which would house the
relocated Bruins hockey team. The New Hampshire State Legislature voted
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down the state-funded incentives sought by Delaware North, and the proposal
was dropped.
In response to the prospect of the Boston Bruins moving to New
Hampshire, an "Arena Committee" was organized by U.S. Senator Paul Tsongas
and other community leaders to develop a proposal for a new arena in the
Boston area. The Committee's report, prepared with the assistance of the
BRA, was issued in August, 1981.
The report recommended the construction of a new arena facility to the
rear of the present Boston Garden, including some associated parking
capacity. The Committee also called for the establishment of an
independent, State-level "Bay State Arena Authority" to oversee construction
and subsequent operation of the facility. Revenue bonding capability of the
approximately $50 million construction cost was recommended for the proposed
Authority. Finally, the Committee recommended that the State hotel tax be
increased from 5.7% to 8%, with the increased taxes within the Interstate
495 Loop pledged to cover debt service on the proposed Arena Authority
bonds.
In 1982, the State Legislature, focusing on the fiscal crisis in the
City of Boston, enacted the "Tregor Bill." Included in this act was the
creation of the Massachusetts Convention Center Authority (MCCA). Among the
MCCA's initial legislative mandates was the authority to take over
management of the Boston Common Parking Garage and the construction of a
convention center. The enabling legislation also authorized a feasibility
study of a multi-purpose arena for the Boston area.
In 1984, the MCCA presented its feasibility study for the construction
of a multi-purpose arena. The study concluded that a new 17,300 seat arena
at North Station is the preferred alternative to renovating the existing
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Boston Garden structure. The project would be funded by a 2.3% increase in
rooms tax and include office and retail space.
Current Proposals
There are three groups contending for the right to build/rebuild the
Boston Garden: the Massachusetts Convention Center Authority (MCCA); a
joint partnership between Delaware North, which owns the Garden and the
Boston Bruins, and Lincoln Property Co., a Dallas-based development-firm;
and H.N. Gorin Associates, Inc., a Boston-based management/development firm.
MCCA
The MCCA has requested Legislative approval of a $141 million bond
issue to be funded by increasing the hotel/motel tax, proceeds to be used
for site acquisition and construction costs of the new arena. The MCAA's
preferred site is the land immediately north of the existing Boston Garden
on land owned by the City of Boston with air rights development over the
commuter rail tracks.
The MCCA would purchase the Boston Garden and demolish it once the new
arena was completed, selling the development rights for two office towers to
a private developer. The MCCA would fund part of the proposed galleria
connecting the office, retail, arena, and transportation uses. Finally, the
MCCA projections show the city receiving approximately $2.4 million in
annual tax revenue and a one-time linkage payment of $2.5 million.
Delaware North
Delaware North and Lincoln Property Co. have proposed a $325 million, 2
million square feet, privately-funded development which would include an $18
million renovation of the Garden, a 30-story and a 25-story office tower,
170,000 square feet of retail space, a 15-story, 300 room hotel, and a
1500-car parking garage. Although Delaware North owns the Boston Garden
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property, their proposed development would require obtaining ownership of
the municipal parking lot behind the Garden.
This proposed development would generate approximately $8.2 million
annually in tax revenue and a one-time linkage payment of $8 million.
H.N. Gorin
H.N. Gorin Associates, Inc., in association with ex-senator Tsongas,
has proposed a $1.2 billion, 5.6 million square feet, privately-funded
development which would include a 15,500 seat arena, two 51-story and two
33-story office buildings, a 70-story tower including a 900 room hotel and
ten floors of luxury condominiums, one 38-story and two 11-story residential
buildings, and parking for 5,000 cars.
The proposed development requires obtaining ownership of the Boston
Garden property, the municipal parking lot, air rights over the commuter
rail on both sides of the Central Artery ramps, and approximately 5 acres of
land owned by the Massachusetts General Hospital, a total requirement of
approximately 18 acres of land.
The development would generate $24 million in annual taxes, and a
one-time linkage payment of $19.2 million.
Current Status
The arena proposals have received a great deal of attention recently.
Significant developments occurring in June and July, 1985 have all but
assured Delaware North victory. Several key development issues have been
highlighted in the context of the decision-making. These are presented in
the following discussion of the most likely scenario for the arena property.
The Gorin plan has been all but defeated for two reasons; first, they
did not control any of the land they proposed to develop and second, their
plan was not in keeping with the current thinking of the BRA. The
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development issues raised here are obvious. Without site control (or, at a
minimum, holdings within the proposed development parcel) the proponents had
very little chance of success. Add to this the fact that MGH has made it
clear, on several occasions, that they were not in support of the proposal,
which included a substantial amount of development on land owned by MGH, and
that they would consider any attempt to secure possession of their property
hostile.
Any successful land taking would necessitate public taking by eminent
domain. The BRA did not publicly support the Gorin plan, and thus would be
unlikely to agree to support eminent domain takings. Any development,
especially one as comprehensive, ambitious, massive, and costly as the Gorin
proposal must secure the necessary support and approvals from the public
planning agencies. In an area that has been targeted as one of three or
four in the city where intensive development will be allowed, Gorin was
extremely presumptuous in its development planning, strategy, and publicity.
The Massachusetts Convention Center Authority proposal, thought by many
to be the strongest candidate until late in May, has apparently been
abandoned for two reasons; present, on-going negotiations with the major
tenants (the Celtics and the Bruins) and lack of legislative support for the
necessary public funding. The development issues raised here are the
economic and financial feasibility of the development.
As described earlier, the MCCA was created in part to evaluate the
potential of a publicly-owned and operated arena/convention facility in
Boston. Several sites were considered, but the Boston Garden property was
recommended for access and competition reasons. The site provided superior
automotive and transit access, and any public arena/convention development
on alternate sites would have to compete with the Boston Garden. For these
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reasons, a public taking of the Boston Garden property combined with related
adjacent development was recommended.
Recent developments have rendered the MCCA powerless to pursue the
public arena proposal. Delaware North, owner of the Bruins (one of the
prime tenants), announced in June that negotiations between the Celtics
owners and Delaware North of a long term lease guaranteeing Celtics tenancy
at Boston Garden were nearing completion. Without the Bruins and the
Celtics, the public arena would have no tenants. Without prime tenants, the
feasibility of the arena became very doubtful.
The funding for the public arena was widely expected to be included in
the 1986 State Budget. However, when the State Budget was passed on June
29, 1985, the necessary funding approval was not included. In fact, an
amendment was offered earlier in the House which would have allowed funding
by splitting the hotel-motel tax, and was overwhelmingly defeated by a vote
of 154-0 (Boston Globe - July 2, 1985). Apparently Senate President Bulger,
a strong supporter of the public arena proposal, had not secured the
necessary legislative approval, and the arena idea died.
Apparent winner by virtue of their patient involvement and tenant and
property control, Delaware North has publicly agreed to a substantial
renovation of the Boston Garden and, in partnership with Lincoln Property,
construction of office, retail, hotel, and parking structures. By carefully
playing their control and additional development cards, Delaware North has
been able to out last the other players in the bidding-up-the-pot arena game
and appears to be the player that will ultimately claim the public approvals
kitty.
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PREVIOUS PLANNING EFFORTS
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Safdie Master Plan
"A Development Plan for North Station District" was prepared for the
BRA by Moshe Safdie and Associates in 1979. The plan, as described by
Boston Mayor Kevin H. White in the foreward, "is dramatic, exciting, and
ambitious." In the plans preface, BRA Director Robert Ryan suggested that,
"because of the market forces building in this area, we can expect
development that will include new residential, commercial, office, hotel,
and retail space, as well as significant new access to the waterfront for
the people of Boston."
It is the residential component of the Safdie Master Plan that we first
chose to explore in our thesis. It was our belief that a residential
community could be successful on the site, and we were initially intrigued
both by the plan's ambitiousness and the idea of creating a residential
island. We present the Safdie Plan as a backdrop to our thinking. The
residential component, sans island, is a loose model for what we would hope
to achieve in the ultimate development. We will present the Safdie Master
Plan, outlining the overall plan for the district and highlighting the
residential component.
Combining private and public funding initiatives, the plan included
extensive transportation improvements, increased commercial and retail
activity, and more innovative riverfront development, principally creating
an island in the Charles River for over 1,000 new housing units.
Safdie looked at the entire North Station area and proposed development
of the three sub-areas, the Bulfinch Triangle, the Garden/North Station
complex, and the land north of the connector ramps, to include the
following (See Maps 26 and 27):
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Bulfinch Triangle
Mixed commercial, wholesale and office uses are located in renovated
structures (500,000 square feet) and in new construction (150,000 s.f.)
matching the existing character of the Triangle.
Garden/North Station Complex
Safdie envisioned reconstructing the area, combining the train, transit
and Garden activities on the north side of the building and major new office
and commercial uses, totalling 1,400,000 s.f., surrounding a central space,
establishing a Rockefeller Center-type of open space. The new development
would include 1,500 parking spaces, replacing those in existing surface
parking lots.
Residential Island
Safdie proposed dredging a 180 ft. wide canal north of the connector
ramps (and under the railroad tracks), creating an island on which would be
built 875 to 1,100 residential units in mid and high rise buildings.
Safdie proposed a phased development of the area over a fifteen year
period. The plan also required that several public initiatives be taken to
ensure the success of the plan, as presented below;
Public Initiatives
Immediate (1-3 years):
* - Canal Street improvements (implemented by Fall 1980)
- Green Line structure on Causeway Street removed, and interim bus
service between Lechmere and North Station (30 months).
- Lomasney Way and Merrimac Street widened from Leverett Circle to
Government Center garage (24-36 months).
* - Billerica Street block cleared and prepared for development (36 months)
- Commuter Rail Station improved including possible extension of the
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tracks and connections to the Green and Orange Line (36 months).
Short Term (4-7 years):
* - Nashua Street closed to arterial traffic (4 years)
- Permanent relocation of the Green Line to Lechmere (4-7 years)
Long Term (8-15 years):
- Northbound Storrow connector relocated to connect with 195/93 (8-10
years).
- Southbound Storrow connector to the elevated artery rebuilt on grade or
via tunnel (10-12 years).
- Existing Storrow connector is removed, either totally or in part
depending upon the completion of new southbound connector (8-12 years).
- Refurbish or reconstruct below-grade central section of artery (12-15
years).
- Relocate on grade or depress the commuter rails.
Although some of these recommended public initiatives have been or are
in the process of being completed (identified with an asterisk, *) a number
of the seemingly most important recommendations have yet to reach the
implementation stage. Emphasis must be placed here on the uncertainty of
the proposed arterial reconstruction plans. Any development of the site
must include the present system as part of the overall site plan, allowing
for worst case site analysis. Subsequent implementation of the proposed
plans will only improve the characteristics of the development but must not
be relied upon in site analysis and design.
Wallace, Floyd Report (See Map 28)
Initial discussion of an air-rights parking structure have recently
focused more generally on the planning of the entire area north of the
ramps. Wallace, Floyd and Associates prepared a report for the Executive
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Office of Transportation and Construction (EOTC) recommending a realigned
Nashua Street bisecting the area from the rear of the GSA building to 100
feet from the river's edge, and then running parallel with the riverbank to
Leverett Circle.
Two development parcels, approximately 5 acres each, would be created
on the east and west side of the realigned Nashua Street, as well as
sufficient access, queing and ramping space for a major air-rights parking
garage completely covering the commuter rail tracks to the railroad bridge.
A pedestrian link over the tracks, via the new garage would be constructed
which would complete the connection of the Charles River Esplanade system
with the Harbor Waterfront Park.
This plan would involve substantial negotiations with the MGH, the DPW,
the MDC, the MBTA and the City of Boston. In discussions with Brian
Thompson, a Boston architect familiar with the MGH's needs and the Wallace
Floyd report, several attractive options possible within the report were
raised. MGH would lose some of its land, which totals approximately 306,000
s.f. However, a land swap might be arranged between MGH, the DPW, and the
City which would effectively add developable area for MGH (40%-60%) and the
City. The 100 feet wide strip north of the realigned Nashua Street from
Leverett Circle to the railroad bridge would become an MDC park, continuing
the present Esplanade system toward the harbor.
The plan would further necessitate negotiation between the MBTA, an
air-rights garage developer, and the MGH, which has a substantial parking as
well as institutional requirement in the area. Finally, negotiations for
control of the DPW property will be necessary for the development
assemblage. Under the Wallace, Floyd plan, the "Registry" building would be
demolished and the site cleared for development.
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The proposed Central Artery project would impact this plan in a number
of ways. If the connector ramps are reconstructed, it would involve several
temporary and long-term takings. Approximately 24,000 s.f. of MGH land
adjacent to the present ramp structure would be temporarily taken for a
cut-and-cover southern artery/Leverett Circle connector tunnel.
Additionally, the land immediately behind the "Registry" building would be
taken permanently for the new ramping system between Leverett Circle and the
northern artery. This would eliminate the present loading locks on the rear
of the Registry building and seriously impair the building's useability.
Although demolition of the building seems more probable under the artery
reconstruction scenario, the DPW currently has plans to renovate the
building.
Clearly, the various Federal, State and local planning agencies do not
have totally congruent ideas regarding the long term land uses in the North
Station area, as evidenced by the radically different plans submitted to the
BRA (The Safdie Plan) and the EOTC (The Wallace, Floyd Report). Undertaking
a development within this complex environment presents many planning and
design complications. Coordinating the various interests of the present and
potential landowners in the area adds many levels of negotiating,
coordinating, compromising, and cajoling toward a mutually-acceptable
overall development plan for the area. This is especially true of this
plan, which adds the additional complexity of land swaps.
The North Station district remains a highly complex area of the
downtown with a rich past and promising future. The basic framework for
land use has been set and needs to be fine-tuned as state and MBTA
transportation projects and implementation procedures are finalized.
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The general image of the North Station area is one of small, discrete,
and legible sub-areas. Taken together, they lack continuity of pathway,
scale, pattern, land-use, building style and vehicular access. The overall
impression is one of confusion and fragmentation with some concerns for
public safety.
The area continues to be dominated by transportation uses and their
various positive and negative impacts. A clear understanding of the
existing and proposed circulation in and around the site is essential for a
functional and feasible redevelopment of the area. The two transportation
projects must be considered as options until federal funding is assured, and
will have critical impacts on the site design.
As identified by the MCCA, the following land use issues should be
considered in the ongoing redevelopment of the area.
- The two transportation projects will have significant implications for
redevelopment potential and plans. Any project in the area will have
to contend with long-term (8-15 years) disruption in the area caused by
potential artery reconstruction. District plans will have to be
refined pending funding and schedules of these projects.
- The status of the Central Business District office market and related
planning will have to be carefully coordinated with the BRA's Phase I
guidelines.
- MGH plans will have to be coordinated with the BRA phase I and II
plans.
- Rezoning should be considered by the City in parallel with phase I and
II plan finalization.
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- The existing Garden site has substantial redevelopment potential with
the removal of the elevated Green Line structure and construction of a
new arena immediately behind the present Garden.
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THE SANTE HARBOR SITE
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The larger site location is considered to be the land bounded by the
Storrow ramps, the Charles River bank, and the MDC Dam. This site includes
the "Registry" Building, the Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital, parking for
MGH and DPW, and the commuter rail tracks. Although this thesis focuses on
an individual component (residential) of an overall mixed-use plan for the
area, obvious consideration must be paid to the ultimate, overall plan for
the area.
The Sante Harbor site is part of the parcel north of the connector
ramps. Because of the complexities involved in the multiple ownerships, we
purposefully have not chosen a specific piece within the parcel. There are
several possible scenarios to ultimate development of the area, each
requiring a different approach by C-G Sante Harbor Partnership. It is for
this reason that we have not anchored our residential community.
We have, however, established clear development guidelines, analyzed
the impacts of varying Floor Area Ratios (FAR), unit sizes, and number of
units to the amount of land necessary for development, and proposed a
well-developed idea of what, where, why, and for whom this development is
intended.
Ownership and Intended Uses
Ownership of the site is shown in Map 29. As is apparent from the map,
MGH is the only private landowner north of the Storrow ramps. Other
landowners are the Commonwealth of Massachusetts' Department of Public Works
and Metropolitan District Commission, the City of Boston, the Massachusetts
Bay Transportation Authority, the B & M Railroad, and the Trustees of 140
Trust. Public-held land north of the ramps comprise nearly 70% of the total
area.
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The MGH and the MBTA have discussed a major development including air
rights construction over the tracks. The hospital forsees substantial
internal office and parking needs and would like to develop most of the area
immediately adjacent to the connector ramps. Because MGH owns most of the
land in this area, including the Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital, any
development proposed for the riverfront must coordinate plans and design to
integrate the total area.
The Department of Public Works owns the majority of the land on which
our proposed development would be built. Its' primary use is parking for
the government employees working in the "Registry" Building. The Department
does not have any plans for the land.
The anticipated changes in the land-use, redevelopment and
transportation systems in the North Station area place constraints on the
site design as well as the present opportunities for revitalization of the
area and its principal activities. The fact that a comprehensive,
coordinated North Station development policy has not yet been formulated by
the City, State, and Federal governments presents additional complexities
for any development in the area, be they privately-sponsored by the MGH or
publically by any one of the various public agencies in the area. However,
the lack of an overall plan for the area is also a significant advantage to
the partnership. We can and will endeavor to incorporate objectives
previously expressed by these various players concerning urban renewal goals
and criteria in our development planning and strategizing.
Proposed Development
The C-G Sante Harbor Partnership believes that there is a market, that
the North Station location is viable for housing, and that we have the
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capabilities to assemble the development team necessary to accomplish the
project.
It is our intention to secure control of the residential portion of any
redevelopment occurring in the site area. Our program will depend in part
on the final land area and FAR allowed for residential development. For the
purposes of the thesis, we will present several alternatives and their
impact on the overall project.
Compare, for example, a 3, 4, or 5 acre site with FARs of 4, 6, 8, and
10. The following table summarizes the maximum allowable gross building
square feet under each of these possible scenarios.
FARs/Allowable SF
Acres 4 6 8 10
3 522,000 784,000 1,045,000 1,300,000
4 700,000 1,045,000 1,400,000 1,750,000
5 870,000 1,300,000 1,700,000 2,200,000
As is readily apparent, the potential gross building area allowable
varies greatly with area and FAR changes. We are faced with the possibility
of a similar range of allowable area and FAR, namely a development ranging
in size from 522,000 square feet to 2,200,000 square feet.
The development will be significantly different at 522,000 s.f. than at
2,200,000. It is our intention to involve ourselves in the on-going
planning in an attempt to guide the final planning guidelines in the
direction of an allowable gross area of 1,300,000 s.f. This will allow us
to include in the development elements which would not be possible at
522,000.
We want to include different types of units to appeal to different
segments of the residential market. We surmise that there are three to four
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different sub-markets likely to be attracted to our development; "Yuppies,"
two wage earning households anxious to live in the city; "Empty-nesters,"
both working and retired, who would like to be closer to the cultural and
social attractions of the city; and "Mingles," young professionals choosing
to share living expenses who would like to live close to where they work.
There may even be a market of young families wishing to live in the city but
unable to find housing large enough for a growing family, yet affordable.
Our program is necessarily vague at this point. Without knowing who
the ultimate user(s) will be and therefore which of the virtually limitless
possible amenities to offer, what the square footage of each unit will be,
whether the units will be rental, rental/sale, or sale, and without knowing
exactly where the development will be on the site it is fruitless to develop
a specific program. Rather, the program should not be finalized until the
site and marketing questions are answered.
By process of derivation we can take a first cut at what the
hypothetical development program would look like. If we determine that the
average unit size should be targeted at approximately 1,000 s.f., that the
average efficiency of apartment and condominium buildings is 85%, that we
are targeting a development of approximately 1,000 units, and that there
will be a structured parking requirement of 1.5 spaces per unit (at
approximately 350 s.f./space) the mathematics suggest 1,176,470 s.f. of
residential construction (1000/85% * 1000) and 525,000 s.f. of structured
parking (5 * 1000 * 350). Referencing the FAR Table, a development of
approximately 1,200,000 s.f. is possible on 5 acres with an FAR of 6, on 4
acres with an FAR of 8, and on 3 acres with an FAR of 10 (or densities of
200, 250, and 333 units per acre, respectively) if parking is not included
in FAR calculations, and on a 5 acre site with an FAR of 8 and on 4 acres
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with an FAR of 10 (densities of 200 and 250 units per acre) if parking is
included in FAR calculations.
We hope to persuade the BRA and MGH to include a 5 acre site with an
FAR of 6 (excluding parking), a density of 200 units per acre, in the
redevelopment plans for the area north of the ramps. Our recommendation
will be to place the residential development in the 5 acre parcel to the
west of the realigned Nashua Street created in the Wallace, Floyd report.
The overall impact of the varying site size and FAR on the character of
the development will be minimal, given the necessary minimum FAR of 6-7.
For example, a 13 story, elevatored, approximately 40-unit, apartment
building with on grade parking for sixty cars in an urban location
represents an FAR approximately 2. Once the density increases beyond this
type of high-rise density, the impact on the urban fabric and character is
considerably less than the impact of going from a single-family
neighborhood, whose FAR might reach .2, to a rowhouse density of
approximately .5, to a 6 story elevator apartment density of approximately
1.4, to the 13 story density of approximately 2. Alternatively, an FAR of 6
allows construction of 6 times the number of square feet of land on the
site; a six-story structure covering the whole site or a twelve-story
structure covering half the site. Similarly, an FAR of 10 implies a
ten-story structure covering the entire site or a twenty-story structure
covering half the site. The difference between six and ten stories and
twelve and twenty stories makes little difference to the general character
of the development. FAR is simply a measure of the allowable density of
development. When FARs of 6 to 10 are initially called for, a dense, urban
development is implied. They require mid-to-high rise construction with
little open space and virtually no private open space. Structured parking
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becomes necessary and virtually all of the site is taken up by the
development structures.
The real measure of the relative, qualitative impact of projects which
vary in size and density (FAR) is gained after the project is completed from
the end users and critics. A magnificent design can make a project with an
FAR of 10 seem intimate while another project with a much lower density may
seem exposed, crowded, and unfriendly.
Once the density has been determined for the development the next
critical question is; how much housing, on what size parcel, and in what
location is needed (either in each phase or the whole project, if no phasing
is involved) to achieve the elusive "critical mass" necessary for a
successful project?
There are two measures of a project's success; financial return and
market acceptance. Financial success, crucial to the development entity,
may be measured by financial analysis. Generally, there are three
components to the financial returns of a project; current cash flow, tax
benefits, and residual value realized upon sale or refinancing.
Market acceptance can be assessed by measures such as vacancy rates,
competitive rental/sale prices, and user surveys. The issues involved in
market acceptance revolve around a project's livability. User surveys
generally focus on questions about the convenience of parking and services,
the safety of the project, unit size and efficiency, privacy, and "quality
of life" issues such as the open space and recreational facilities
available. Successful projects are those which are highly rated with low
vacancies.
Successfully developing a site with the characteristics of the Sante
Harbor site will require extensive analysis of other similar projects. We
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recognize that the site is a pioneering location with significant
constraints. It is surrounded by 40 feet high arterial ramps on three
sides, major rail activities occur on site, the soil conditions are
unfavorable, and it is separated from the rest of downtown Boston by severe
psychological and physical barriers. A successful development will have to
create its environment completely, as there is no present pedestrian or
residential fabric at all to the site. Further, the development will have
to overcome the constraints of the site. The uncertainty of the Central
Artery and the elevated Green Line projects add yet another set of
development timing issues.
If the DPW secures funding for the Central Artery project, the site
will be in a construction zone for 10-15 years. It will be crucially
important to track the legislative process responsible for or influential on
the artery legislation, and to formulate contingency plans for possible
legislative results. For example, if the DPW secures funding in 1985 and
begins to implement the reconstruction plans, it is unlikely that a
residential development would be successful during the course of the artery
reconstruction. The most likely result would be to postpone development
until the reconstruction of the adjacent structures is complete. This could
mean a 5-10 year postponement period.
There are examples of residential projects which have been successful
on sites similar to the Sante Harbor site. Battery Park City in New York, a
phased residential rental project, has been successful despite the phasing
and construction activities of successive phases. Initially an industrial
area with little or no residential identity or pedestrian activity, Battery
Park is an excellent example of the "critical mass" necessary to attract
tenant interest in a pioneering location, while the continuing construction
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of successive phases has generated noise and activity not usually associated
with a residential development.
The Golden Gateway Center in San Francisco is on a site with
characteristics similar to those of North Station. It is immediately
adjacent to an elevated highway structure, was primarily industrial in
character, and had no residential identity. Located on nine acres, the
Center includes 1,196 apartments, 58 single-family townhouses, and 60,000
square feet of retail space in four 20-26 story towers and three city-block
size clusters of 4-6 story buildings. It boasts an automobile-free
pedestrian environment, interior courtyards and parks, and recreational
facilities. The Center has been fully occupied since its completion,
testimony to the successful creation of a community on a once-blighted site.
Locally, redevelopment of the Charlestown Navy Yard required overcoming
significant site constraints similar to those of the site. The Yard has
numerous 4-8 story industrial-type buildings and numerous piers. It is
between the arterial structures leading to the Mystic River Bridge and the
Boston Harbor. It is a marginally-pleasant, 20-minute walk from the Yard to
Haymarket on a good day, an unpleasant, exposed walk during inclement
weather. Redevelopment to date has included a residential rehabilitation of
one of the buildings, a 500 slip marina, a waterfront restaurant, a
convenience store, some office development and some landscaping and grounds
improvement associated with the rehabilitated areas. The apartments rented
immediately and have been almost fully occupied since their completion. The
Yard has been successful by introducing enough related activity, such as the
restaurant, the store, the marina and the site improvements, to make the
residential component successful.
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These projects range in size, both in terms of land area and number of
units. They have in common, however, the initial goal of creating an urban
residential fabric where there was none in areas that were barren,
industrial wastelands. It appears that the "critical mass" can be as little
as 250 units, with substantial related improvements (the Charlestown Navy
Yard), to over 1,200 units (the Golden Gateway Center). Our initial target
project size will be a parcel of approximately 5 acres, with a potential
first phase development of 1,500 parking spaces, some retail and office
space, and 250 residential units. This "first-cut" program incorporates
enough of each of the uses to create the "critical mass" necessary for a
successful project.
However, careful analysis of other similar projects will have to be
undertaken. A fact-finding tour of 5 to 10 other projects should be made,
preferably with members of the design team, to familiarize the team with the
elements necessary to incorporate into the final design for Sante Harbor.
Particular attention should be paid to site constraint issues and how the
other projects were able to overcome the problems of development in a
pioneering location with a negative identity on a barren site adjacent to
present and future construction projects.
Careful consideration must be given to minimum set-back distances
required to mitigate the negative impacts of the artery structure,
orientation and massing of the buildings to create buffers, design and
construction of units with the ultimate users in mind, and introduction of
open space, landscaping, and related activities such as retail, restaurant,
and recreation facilities in necessary numbers to achieve the successful
'critical mass."
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It should be pointed out that the Charles River Complex is also a
large, residential development adjacent to the site. The Complex has often
been criticized for its haphazard and somewhat barren site layout and
aesthetically unimpressive building design. It has a very low vacancy rate,
however, and measures up to what some developers would call a successful
project. We do not feel that the Complex has been successful in creating a
community. There are very few residentially-related activities in the
Complex, the buildings are sited around parking areas, the pedestrian
circulation focuses on barren pathways, and the level of amenties is sparse.
We will approach the development of Sante Harbor partly with the attitude of
wanting to be the opposite of Charles River Park.
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DESIGN CRITERIA AND THE DEVELOPMENT TEAM
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The design for a residential complex on the site should emphasize the
water access, pedestrian circulation, open space, view corridors, and
distant views from higher floors (See photographs in Appendix). Additionally,
the varied requirements of the sub-markets anticipated must be accommodated
within the development.
Elements of both the Safdie Plan and the Wallace, Floyd report should
be incorporated in the final plan for the area. Safdie's vision of an
875-1,100 unit residential component mixed with office and retail
development is essentially our's as well. His vision of an automobile-free
environment focusing on pedestrian spaces and networks will be incorporated
in our design. Parking below-grade, perhaps combined with a two-story
platform which would include parking, retail, and office uses and on which
the residential community would be constructed, would emphasize the
pedestrian and minimize the pedestrian-level impact of the artery ramps.
Safdie's mixing of building heights and massing contributes to the
self-contained, pedestrian-oriented, community atmosphere aimed at, and has
promoted concern for these details in the design development. The idea of a
canal is attractive but financially unsupportable.
The realignment of Nashua Street, as suggested in the Wallace, Floyd
report, would satisfy the many interested parties in the area by creating
development parcels for MGH, for office and retail development, for
residential development, and for a major parking facility. We will actively
support this concept and include it in the design concept and development
process.
Design Goals and Criteria
One of the development team's prime responsibilities initially will be
to formulate a program for the design development process. In addition to
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the obvious necessity of design which is compatible with the future plans of
the public planning agencies, we have developed a specific list of goals to
be achieved in the design of a residential component in the larger site
redevelopment. These goals are presented below; (See Maps 30 and 31)
- To create a new, first class, waterfront residential community which
will be safe, pleasant, accessible, and flexible towards future changes
in uses. The development should provide year-round recreation
activities and facilities such as boating, a swimming pool, a health
club, playgrounds and public spaces, skating, etc.
- To develop attractive pedestrian pathways and linkages to the North
Station, Government Center, MGH, Science Park and the waterfront park
system. Pedestrian connections should maximize natural and designed
amenities. Interior open space should be provided in conjunction with
the pedestrian circulation spaces. Planting, benches, and other
amenities should be provided. Exterior landscaping, streetscaping, and
open space should compliment the buildings and their surroundings,
particularly on the riverfront and transitions to surrounding areas.
Design of the pedestrian circulation system should accommodate the
continuation of a pedestrian/service street planned between the GSA
building and the new arena, if built.
- The amenity value of the waterfront location and the spectacular views
from higher floors should be emphasized through orientation of
buildings, open spaces, and possible water activities such as boating.
Views of the Charles River Basin, Back Bay, Beacon Hill, Government
Center, the North End, Boston Harbor, and Charlestown are afforded from
the site. This suggests the introduction of residential towers as a
component of the residential development.
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- To provide a sense of tradition and continuity from the Bulfinch
Triangle area to the riverfront. The building design should respect
the historical context of the North Station district through massing,
detailing, materials, and site connections. The design should be
compatible with and compliment adjacent development, since the
development will also provide public access to the riverfront and MDC
esplanade park. Heights should respect surrounding scale and should
not exceed fourteen stories, and multiple entrances and separate
addresses should be provided and combined with separation of building
mass to accomplish a private, residential atmosphere. Supportive
retail development such as a marine supplies store, a waterfront cafe,
and a convenience store should be incorporated in all phases.
- To provide an integrated and efficient facilities and operations
management system, and to design the residential and service facilities
as compactly as possible to minimize the land area necessary and which
minimizes the negative aesthetic impact and maximizes efficiency. The
community should include a parking structure on-site, preferably below
grade. The service facilities are to be accessed at grade either on
the pedestrian/service street or near the automobile entrance to the
parking facility.
- To design and phase the construction of the infrastructure, the
residential components, and the amenities to minimize the potential
negative impacts of construction of subsequent phases.
- To incorporate rail, public transportation, and automobile access as
well as the Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital (SRH) into the site plan,
to collaborate with the MGH, the DPW, the MDC, and the MBTA on design
and phasing issues, to respect City land-use redevelopment policies and
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the design review process, and to minimize the community impacts of
design, construction, and operation management through scheduling,
planning, and community relations.
- Assessment of the site capacity and market potential suggest the
feasibility of a total development package of approximately 1,000
units, or approximately 1,300,000 square feet. This requires a
rezoning or planned unit district asignment to allow for an approximate
FAR of 7. The development parcel area totals approximately 5 acres.
Key Environmental Issues
Redevelopment of the North Station area will involve detailed analysis
of the environmental impacts associated with the final redevelopment plan.
The key environmental issues identified by the partnership are as follows:
Parking and Traffic - parking and traffic impacts will depend on trips
generated, highway and local street access, and State and City plans and
policies. Modal split analysis should be provided with respect to transit
use vs. automotive.
Open Space and Recreation - Given the limited amount of open space and
recreation land in the area, the effectiveness of the site plan will depend
on the appropriate and attractive treatment of this crucial amenity.
Topography and Soils - The topography of the area is virtually flat,
reflecting the fact that most of the area lies on fill which has been
successively added to since the original filling of the Mill Pond. A
structural engineer should complete a study of the site to determine the
impact of the high water table and filled soil conditions on the project as
well as the impact of construction on adjacent structures, proposed transit
projects, and water traffic.
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Energy Consumption - The increased site development and density would
require a thorough energy analysis and design response.
Water and Sanitary/Storm Sewage - Studies should be undertaken to
determine projected peak loading and demand levels and assess current site
capacities.
Air/Water Quality - The noise and air pollution from the Artery and
deisel train engines seriously affect the site, as does the visual
disruption of the Artery structure and the railroad bridge. Analysis of
emissions and runoff from the development based on a final design should be
undertaken.
Noise - Construction noise and vibration impact analysis based on final
design should be undertaken to determine impacts on surrounding property as
well as earlier phase construction.
Draft Environmental Impact Report Outline - Although Environmental
Impact Reports have been filed for the Artery and Green Line projects, a
report will most likely be required for this development as well. An
outline should be compiled.
The intention of these guidelines is to provide two levels of design
control for the development; design requirements and responsibilities for
the residential buildings, support and infrastructure facilities, and
recommended design guidelines for making the project compatible with
surrounding context. The contextual and urban design issues which affect
and will be impacted by a residential development on the site must be
carefully examined. Particular attention should be focused on the
relationship between major transportation projects and development
opportunities currently under discussion as they relate to the proposed
residential development.
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The concept and design development described in this section will
evolve from our analysis of the site, the program and the specific site
opportunities and constraints. The design concept and an outline set of
development guidelines were developed to a level of detail sufficient for
rough cost estimating purposes.
Development Impacts
The proposed development would have significant positive impacts on the
area and the City. Immediate benefits are many;
- On a previously unexploited waterfront parcel, the development would
turn a blighted area into an attractive, mixed-use residential
community.
- Gentrification pressure on Charlestown and the North End would be
somewhat relieved.
- The housing stock in the city would be increased.
- Construction jobs would be created during construction.
- Permanent service, retail, management, and maintenance jobs would be
created.
- Property tax revenue will be generated for the city.
- Income, sales, and excise taxes will be generated.
The revitalization and development potential of the North Station area
will be significantly affected by the completion and occupancy of the GSA
building and the outcome of the two major transportation projects currently
being advocated by the State and supported by the City.
The GSA building is expected to house approximately 3,500 employees,
which should have a tremendously positive impact on redevelopment of the
area. The pedestrian traffic in the district will increase, as will the
demand for associated retail trade such as restaurants. Combined with the
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proximity of the Massachusetts General Hospital employees, estimated to
number 8,000 to 10,000, excellent redevelopment potential exists for the
Sante Harbor site. Attractive linkages between the GSA, MGH, North Station,
and the site should be integrated in the site plan.
The proposed depression of the Central Artery will substantially impact
the area north of the ramps by relocating and depressing the connector
ramps.
The MBTA plans to relocate and depress the Green Line, combined with
the proposed extension of the commuter rail tracks to a new station linked
to the Green and Orange Lines will greatly improve the efficiency of the
transit system. Additionally, removal of the elevated structure will have a
dramatic, positive effect on Causeway Street. Funding for this project is
almost certain, and the MBTA is currently completing its planning.
Architect Selection
Choosing the architect and design consultants will be one of the key
decisions made by the partnership, one which must be made quite early in the
development process. The design team will be responsible for translating,
refining, and developing the preliminary program into a financable,
marketable, and politically acceptable development plan and design and must,
therefore, be chosen carefully.
The architect will be responsible for overseeing other design specialty
sub-consultants in several disciplines including structural, electrical,
mechanical, geotechnical, acoustical, and environmental engineering, as well
as building and zoning code analysis.
Selection of the architectural firm should rest on the following
positive characteristics:
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- Experience - The successful firm should have had specific experience in
residential projects of the type proposed. Specifically, a phased,
approximately 1,000 unit, mid-to-high rise, mixed-use, residential
community on a highly constrained site.
- Resources - This project will require an ability to commit substantial
architectural resources. Because the project will be phased, the
architectural firm will have to commit to a five year buildout.
Further, the Sante Harbor partnership will require substantial,
on-going interaction between the principal(s) of the firm, the general
partners, the various governmental approvals agencies, and the
development managers.
- Reputation - The Sante Harbor partnership will need an architectural
firm with an established and respected reputation to legitimize our
ability to get the job done. Scepticism on MGH's, the City's, and our
financial source's part will be assuaged to a certain degree with a
highly-respected architectural firm on the team.
- Relationship - Careful consideration must be given to the dynamics of
the firm as it relates both with the partnership and with the larger
public involved in the project. We must be relatively sure that a
positive working relationship can be maintained over the entire project
period.
Choice of the architectural firm should be based upon obtaining a
positive evaluative result when applying the above criteria to possible
architects. Once chosen, everything that the partnership has done to date
will be presented to the firm. Our initial discussions will be factual,
focusing mainly on the issues, players, and possible outcomes. Several
concepts will most likely emerge quickly. Initial concept development
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should focus on the three or four most likely to receive positive responses
from the MGH and the BRA. We will maintain on-going communication with the
major players who will be influential to Sante Harbor's ultimate
achievement.
Concurrent with initial concept development, the partnership intends to
retain a construction cost estimator/engineering consultant to ensure the
efficiency, flexibility, affordability, and achievability of the preliminary
architectural work.
Once we have established an internally agreed-upon concept, one that is
likely to be affordable, marketable and conceptually well-received by the
MGH and the BRA, the architectural firm will be left to refine and develop
it to a "presentation" stage. At this point, all parties involved in the
redevelopment should be independently approached for their approval.
Designation without competition is the "best case" scenario. Early in
the design process, the design team, in conjunction with the Construction
Manager, should prepare a schedule for seeking all of the approvals
necessary before construction can begin. It is essential that the approvals
process be structured in such a way that does not retard the project's
start-up and progress. Attention must be paid to the timing of lengthy
reports such as Environmental Impact Reports. These require a substantial
amount of preparation time and will be extensively reviewed after
submission, a process that can take years to complete. Although there has
been a substantial amount of environmental impact analysis work done as part
of the MBTA's and DPW's projects in the North Station area, an EIR will
likely be required of our development. An Environmental Impact Consultant
should be chosen as soon as possible following selection of the design team.
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Logical consultants would be those who've already prepared reports on the
area.
It is our opinion that the development will need brilliant design and
expert coordination to be successful. The site presents many constraints,
discussed earlier, which will tax all but the most creative and innovative
urban designers. The preliminary design concept and program will be crucial
in obtaining developer designation by the public and private entities.
Construction Management
C-G Sante Harbor Partnership will solicit interest from construction
management firms to join the development team early in the process.
The conclusion drawn by the partnership, after interviews with the
several contractors and construction management firms, favored the
construction management approach over the general contractor approach for
two reasons; time and cost savings.
Construction management firms are able to effect cost savings ranging
from 10-30%, and time savings of 20-40%, especially on complex projects
which require management of numerous contractors, sub-contractors, and
suppliers. It is the partnership's opinion that cost savings would be
realized which could be redirected to additional amenities, and the
partnership (and its investors) would have an independent expert responsible
for overseeing its financial, structural, and organizational interests.
The selection of the Construction Manager should take place
simultaneously with the final selection of the development team, but should
be based on the Construction Manager's qualitative experience, record, and
responsiveness to the project's requirements. Other selection criteria are
similar to those for selecting architects.
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THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
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Introduction
In the course of researching and writing this thesis, our thinking has
evolved through a number of distinct stages. The stages are defined by
successive hypotheses about the nature of the problem facing us as would-be
developers of a portion of this site. Using the information we possessed at
any point in time, we formulated an hypothesis about what the problem was
and how we would have to resolve it. As new information became available,
we found it necessary first to question, and then to reformulate, our
previous hypothesis. At a certain point, we were compelled to arbitrarily
cut off further fact-gathering and to commit what we had learned to paper.
We decided to recapitulate faithfully the stages through which our thinking
evolved, rather than to focus exclusively upon what we now believe to be a
correct reading of the site's politics. We are doing this because we
believe that change, and the attitudes toward it, are of the essence of the
development process; and because the process by which our eyes were opened
to realities that were once obscure, has some intrinsic, substantive
interest, particularly with regard to our "getting started" theme.
Why Sante Harbor
The sequence of events that has brought the development partnership to
the present moment is worth recounting. We began with an interest in the
much-discussed Boston Garden problem. Certain civic elements expressed the
view that Boston's place in the top rank of American cities, its status as a
"world class" city, would not be secure until it had a state-of-the-art
sports and entertainment facility. The issue of how best to effect what
seemed to be a civic consensus - albeit one that did not reflect unanimity
about the renovation versus new construction options -- seemed to afford a
wide birth for a dispassionate, analytical comparison of the three
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alternatives that had surfaced. The original hope was that this analysis
would be of use to the municipal and state officials whose actions would
ultimately determine which of the proposals, if any, got built.
When we considered the matter more closely, however, we decided to move
in a different direction. Rather than focus on helping the public sector to
make a decision about someone else's proposals, our entrepreneurial
instincts suggested that there might be opportunities here for those nimble
enough to seize them.
It is a commonplace that major development in an area will, in and of
itself, increase land values in the immediate vicinity. We did not know
which of the contending forces would survive the public combat for the right
to build a new, or rebuild the existing, arena; but we felt that this time,
after so many earlier, false starts, the odds strongly favored the selection
of someone who would move ahead to complete the job. The first step was to
consider where near the proposed new or renovated Garden, additional
development could be accommodated.
The Bulfinch Triangle was to a large extent "spoken for" by investors
and developers who had anticipated the value - enhancing potential of the
new GSA Building and the planned demolition of the elevated Green Line.
Furthermore, we believed that the opportunities for substantial new
construction in this area were slight. New construction would depend upon
demolition; and the uniform low-rise scale and common historic origins of
the district made that seem an extremely unlikely prospect.
The area that seemed to hold the greatest promise was all of the land
from the Storrow Drive ramps north to the Charles River. The area had no
image to speak of, and certainly no positive image. And yet that very fact
perhaps had caused other developers to ignore it entirely in the
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highly-competitive search for buildable downtown sites. The site did not
impinge directly on any existing neighborhoods. Of course that meant that
the urban fabric was "thin" at best and the location would inevitably be
perceived by lenders and by future users as pioneering. On the positive
side, however, the absence of a dense, urban context would surely calm the
political waters and help to smooth the passage through the necessary
permitting process.
Rarely, if ever, could an urban developer hope to come upon such a
large site so close to the downtown core by time and distance, and, most
importantly, so lacking in existing, high-value uses. The developer's
natural disposition to "think big" was here joined to a site that demanded
an unfettered imagination. The fact that MGH was the major private player
was surely not an unmixed advantage; but the scales seemed to tip in favor
of that as well. One owner was to be preferred to many, since it obviated
the need for a land assemblage, a task in which a thinly capitalized,
first-time developer would be greatly disadvantaged. Moreover, we felt
confident that the hospital could be expected to understand that it would
have to join forces with a developer to produce anything on the site not for
its own use. In sum, the Sante Harbor site was large, well-located,
seemingly wide open in the sense that no one appeared to have the inside
track, close enough to the Boston Garden redevelopment to be economically
benefitted by it and apparently not constrained by any factors that
precluded a major development effort within a reasonably short time horizon.
We decided to make it the focus of our attention.
Understanding the Hurdles
Any strategy for shepherding a development idea through site control
and the local approvals process must start with a clear-eyed perception of
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all aspects of what the game is likely to entail. The developer must know
who all the players are, must understand their needs and motivations, the
laws and customs which will help to shape their perception of how much
discretion they have, and how to exercise it. Most sites will have a
history and a context: together these will help to define the limits of the
possible. Politics, defined as the playing out of the interests of
land-owners and office-holders, their would-be successors and their
respective agents and supporters, will inevitably play a role as well. Each
of these must be accorded a proper degree of attention and respect. The
strategy the developer ultimately formulates must be an expression of
everything he has come to understand about his site, its context and all
those who have or assert an interest in its development.
Before turning to the specifics of the Sante Harbor site control and
approvals strategy, we think it essential to underline a philosophical point
of view which will color everything we say and do as developers. In
approaching the infinitude of development possibilities, a developer should
have a well-conceived methodology for identifying those things on which he
will spend his time. Every developmenL possibility can theoretically be
located on a continuum measuring the ease or difficulty with which site
control and building approvals are likely to be attained. In a world in
which time is a scarce and ever dwindling resource, a developer who chooses
to pursue sites and/or ideas that are positioned on the problematic end of
the spectrum, should have very clear and definite reasons for doing so.
Typically, those reasons might encompass a perceived potential for earning
very high investment returns (due in part to the difficulty factor itself)
or a desire to accomplish something commendable and praiseworthy against
what is perceived to be great odds. The important point is that there be
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one or more clear, well-conceived and explicitly articulated reasons for
choosing a difficult site or project, where an easier one might surely be
identified and pursued. If a developer goes after something tough without
understanding that he is doing so and why, he is not likely to persevere -
and will surely fail -- or, alternatively, he will pursue the prize in a
dogged, "I'll-kill-them-before-they-kill-me" fashion, which is equally
unlikely to produce results. The C-G Sante Harbor Partnership has no doubt
that its idea is located somewhere toward the problematic end of the
continuum but is resolute in its determination to persevere out of our
conviction that great profits and notoriety will come to those who pull this
off.
Engineering versus Design
A developer should understand that the soundness of his strategy will
ultimately depend upon the appropriateness of its central premises - all of
which should be able to be stated simply and without excessive adornment --
and, as a necessary corollary, the complete avoidance of any temptation to
lay out the steps to be followed in a rigid, "manual-like" fashion. He
should strive, to borrow a metaphor from the building process, to lay a
solid and durable foundation based upon correct engineering principles,
rather than to erect an edifice with virtuosic architectonic detailing.
"Engineering" rather than "design" is the appropriate goal because while the
essentials of the strategy must be correct the details, the step-by-step,
will inevitably prove far different in actuality than they may have been
imagined in planning.
Note that two different things are being said here. First, as
previously discussed, no developer can hope to anticipate accurately the
tortuous path that his idea will follow from conception to acceptance.
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Thus, any effort to fine tune the development strategy will have no positive
value because the fine tuning will have to be discarded as irrelevant as
events begin to unfold. The second point is that the effort to produce a
finely nuanced, carefully detailed step-by-step battle plan will not merely
waste the developer's time, but very likely prove his undoing as well. The
reason is that the developer may have a very hard time overcoming the
all-too-human temptation to become wedded to handiwork on which he has
lavished so much care and attention; and this inflexibility is precisely the
opposite of the nimbleness and ready adaptability which must characterize
the successful developer's approach to the implementation of his strategy.
Background: The Site Context
The Boston Garden was constructed in 1928, the same year as the Boston
and Maine railroad tracks and terminal. The MBTA Green and Orange Lines
were routed through North Station in the 1940s. The Garden has been home to
the National Hockey League's Bruins since its inception, and to the Celtics
since their entry into the National Basketball Association in 1946. The
on-and-off ramps to the Central Artery from Causeway Street were constructed
in 1953. The adjacent Bulfinch Triangle District, which contains a
preponderance of nineteenth century four to six story buildings in various
architectural styles, was for many years the furniture wholesaling district
of Boston. When North Station was at its peak as a commuter facility, the
surrounding area had a certain unmistakable downscale vitality, with a wide
variety of retail merchants located along Causeway Street to serve the needs
of homebound commuters and Garden events patrons. North Station, however,
began to decline as a transportation nexus.
At the same time, the rest of Boston had begun to emerge from a forty
year hibernation, and through the 1960s and 70s decisively emerged into the
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front page rank of American cities in terms of investment attraction, job
and income growth. By comparison to the glamorous investment magnets of the
city -- the waterfront, the financial district, Beacon Hill, Back Bay and
the Copley Square/South End area -- North Station seemed a seedy and vaguely
discomfiting cousin, whose occasional forays from the attic to the drawing
room are palpably unpopular with the rest of the family. Causeway Street
became a satellite "adult entertainment district," considerably more compact
than the Combat Zone but only slightly less disreputable.
Sometime in the mid 1970s, the city woke up to the fact that the North
Station/Bulfinch Triangle area was stagnating, if not dying; and that the
decay would become irreversible unless steps were taken to spur interest and
investment. Sentiment was building in Washington for the development by the
General Services Administration of a new federal building in Boston. The
need for such a building was objectively debatable, but the city,
specifically Mayor White, saw a significant opportunity to influence the
location of the GSA building and, at little initial cost to the city, begin
the process of salvaging the North Station district.
The city believed that the long-term prospects of this gateway area
would be greatly enhanced by locating the federal building here and by
relocating the Green Line Station, which would permit the demolition of the
blighting elevated tracks. The city further understood that getting federal
funding for the Green Line relocation would be far more likely once the GSA
had committed to the area, since they would then have a vested interest in
improving the image and appearances of the area. The challenge was to get
the GSA to commit to North Station.
The principal mechanism that was used was a well-orchestrated publicity
campaign built around a planning effort carried out under the aegis of the
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professional planning staff of the BRA. The BRA engaged the renowned
architectural and planning firm of Moshe Safdie and Associates, Inc. to
produce "A Development Plan For: North Station District". Safdie and his
staff understood their primary mission very well -- to create a strong,
positive image of what the North Station District could become, to offset
the powerful, negative image of what the District was. Their principal
insight was that, properly understood, the North Station District was a
nexus between the Charles River (albeit a distinctly unprepossesing stretch
of it) and the city's hugely successful Quincy Market-Waterfront area. The
residential island was a very alluring and "imageable" perception of what
imaginative city planning could conceive; and the Safdie plan was
instrumental in persuading the GSA to choose North Station at its home.
Having achieved its true mission, the plan thereafter languished. The city
did not move decisively to create the conditions that would allow the plan
to be effectuated. No land takings occurred. Nothing was done to encourage
land-owners (principally MGH) to seek the joint venture development of their
land in ways that would meet the plan's goals. The existing industrial
zoning for the land, with an FAR of 2, was maintained. If the city had
genuinely been interested in fostering development of the kind envisioned by
Safdie, there is much that it could have done to make it more likely. The
city's silence and inactivity spoke volumes. Development in this area was
not a priority, despite the ringing rhetoric with which the Safdie Plan had
been introduced. Developers interested in pursuing portions of it would be
'on their own" and would not receive any advance encouragement from the BRA.
RIP: Gateway Center
The Gorin-Tsongas Gateway Center proposal had a number of similarities
to the present proposal, and was on that account well worth studying. It
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too saw immense economic potential in the area north of the Storrow Drive
ramps. Like us, the Gateway Center partners had to evolve a strategy for
securing the participation in some form of MGH. If their proposal
prevailed, our thesis would ipso facto become moot. But we anticipated that
Gateway Center would lose the Garden competition; and that an analysis of
its failure would prove a treasure trove of insight for someone quietly
stalking the same prey.
Gateway Center had so many things working against it that the
intriguing question was why it was proposed at all. Cynics suggested that
Roz Gorin's real aim was publicity. The enormous scale and scope of her
project insured that, for the cost of a few renderings and a model, she
would travel the immense distance from obscurity to notoriety overnight.
This she has done; but we believe much more is to be gained by taking her at
her word: she entered the competition to win it, with the confident
expectation of doing so.
Gateway Center was much more grandiose than the other proposals for a
new or renovated Garden, at a time when the grandiosity of projects like
International Place and New England Life (500 Boylston Street) was causing
some observers to question whether Boston was losing the very qualities --
of scale, respect for history and livability -- that had helped to fuel its
investment renaissance. But Gorin evidently discerned a different reality.
Preservationists and no-growth advocates might be horrified by the immensity
of a Gateway Center. But they are a small minority, have little impact on
the political process (although they can, and do, use the courts to slow a
project down) and will never align themselves with a developer in any event.
A developer must know who his/her potential allies are, and shape his
proposal to secure their active support. They will support a project if
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they see something in it for them. In this context, the use of the
(overblown) figure "2 billion dollars" as an estimate of the project's
build-out cost, was probably no accident. As a highly placed former city
official observed, when a number like that is used (four times the cost of
Copley Place) every person who is in or near municipal government thinks
"There's got to be something in there for me." By this theory, the
unprecedented scope of the Gateway Center was intended to convey the message
that this proposal was large enough to make everyone happy. We do not know,
of course, if considerations such as these explain the scale of Gateway
Center. But if they do, its fate suggests that quality, appropriateness and
merit can sometimes prevail against a narrow and crass self-interest.
Gateway Center was proposed to be built on land that was entirely owned
by entities other than the proposers. The decision by the would-be
developer to "go public" with a massive PR blitz probably reflected the
failure of an earlier, behind-the-scenes, effort at land assemblage or
partnership structuring. Indeed we know that Roz Gorin met with the MGH
Trustees' Planning and Building Committee on February 7, 1985, to present in
outline form a version of the Gateway Center proposal that was later
unveiled to the world. We also know that it was rebuffed rather decisively.
Lacking the land or any reasonable prospect of obtaining it through
negotiation, Gorin conceived a strategy that contains several lessons for
those, like us, who expect to be dealing with some of the same players.
Having failed to secure the cooperation of the hospital, and having
been rebuffed as well when she approached Delaware North, the Bruins' owner,
Gorin decided that if the BRA could be successfully romanced, all of the
dominoes would fall in due course. The goal was to persuade the BRA to sell
to the Gateway Center partnership the surface parking lot being operated on
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the north side of the present Garden. Ownership or control of that parcel
would, she reasoned, force all of the reluctant parties to deal with her on
her terms. And why should the BRA ceremoniously place the crown upon her
head? Because it was indisputable, so she said, that the public preferred a
new privately financed arena to the drab old dowager on Causeway Street.
The problems with this strategy were many. First, assuming that a
strong, public preference could indeed be substantiated for a new, private
arena, Gorin grossly misjudged the BRA. The agency is in the business of
professional city planning. It likes to think that it is above politics;
and although the agency's self-image of virginal innocence has been
frequently compromised, the political pressures that it does respond to are
never of the "straw poll" variety. If one hopes to have an impact on the
agency, one must assiduously, patiently and respectfully court it in
private. So far as we have been able to determine, Gorin made no effort to
do this. And the BRA responded to a proposal that it had played no part in
helping to shape precisely as a dispassionate observer could have
anticipated. It quickly determined that the proposal was without allies and
that it would not have to expend any of its institutional capital to inflict
a mortal wound. Accordingly, it remained silent as the death throes ran
their course.
The second problem would have been fatal even if the first had not.
Gateway Center's chief appeal was in its promise to build a state-of-the-art
arena without public subsidies of any kind. That promise was dependent on
the intensive development of a variety of other uses, a good deal of it on
MGH land. Here, too, Gorin badly misread the needs and desires, both
substantive and procedural, of a key player. Gorin evidently believed that
MGH's earlier rejection of her plans for Gateway Center was no more than a
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negotiating ploy. She deluded herself into thinking that the hospital was
not really rejecting the substance of her ideas, but instead was simply
requiring her to prove the appeal and staying power of her plan in the
public domain. If she managed to topple that crucial first domino, then the
hospital would be prepared to deal.
In the classic (and sometimes effective) manner of a developer who
refuses to take no for an answer, Gorin interpreted the hospital's "no" as a
"not yet". As Gorin played with the pieces of the puzzle in her mind, the
hospital - whose Planning and Building Committee was chaired by the renowned
real estate deal-maker Ferdinand Colloredo-Mansfeld -- was seeking to be the
last piece of the required assemblage, rather than the first. Gorin could
understand and even admire that -- the last holdout always gets the best
terms; and this deal was big enough to satisfy the hospital's financial
requirements, as they would be made known to her at the appropriate time.
This is how we surmise that Gorin "read" the hospital's rebuff. If you
began with the assumption that the hospital was angling for the highest
price or the best deal, its behavior could plausibly be seen in that light.
But the starting point was wrong. Gorin was defeated at the starting gate
because she failed to understand, failed even to try to understand, the
other horses. MGH, though it is not immune to the blandishments of high
finance, is not fundamentally a high-rolling, fast-stepping, deal-maker at
all. It is rather an immensely prestigious, self-aware, proud and ponderous
institution whose strongest animating principle is its own growth. While
others may fear the hospital's propensity to swallow everything in its
considerable domain, the hospital views its own growth as essential to the
fulfillment of the dual mission to attend to the afflicted while extending
the boundaries of knowledge.
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We learned a great deal from observing the fiery descent of the Gateway
Center streamer. Gorin had a brilliant insight, that the coming-to-fruition
of the decades-long struggle to create a modern arena would herald a new era
of real estate excitement in the area north of the Garden site, stretching
to the river. What she failed to perceive was that the battle for the
Garden opportunity was a sideshow. The real potential lay elsewhere, north
of Storrow Drive ramps. No one else had yet perceived the opportunity, so a
clear field might be possible. Since the required land was mostly in the
hands of the hospital, a public bid process could perhaps be avoided. And
finally, if one checked carefully, it would become apparent that the
hospital's own needs and the city's could be jointly accommodated in a plan
that combined housing, offices (institutional) and parking. We decided that
the core Gorin insight was as valid as ever; and that an entirely different
approach could meet with an infinitely happier fate.
Awakening the Slumbering Giant
A major challenge for the Caner-Geller partnership (hereafter sometimes
C-G) will be to secure the cooperation and active involvement in the
development effort of Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH). MGH is one of
the most significant and important institutions in the region. It is the
oldest voluntary, non-profit hospital in New England. It was chartered in
1811 and admitted its first patient in 1821. It employs 9700 persons, has
1082 beds, is a major teaching arm of the Harvard Medical School (415
interns and residents, 426 clinical and research fellows), has an annual
operating budget of more than 350 million dollars (audited statement, year
ending 9/30/83), of which some 83 million is devoted to the study of the
causes, prevention and treatment of the many maladies of man.
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The importance of the hospital to the city of Boston is even greater.
A major export product of Boston is medical care and services. Every time
someone is cared for at MGH who lives outside the city, every time an MGH
physician is engaged in consulting or research for an institution or
instrumentality located elsewhere, fresh money, the fuel for local growth,
is injected into the City's economy. The centrality of MGH in the life of
the city and the region has long since been established beyond dispute; and
any strategy for securing site control and ultimately municipal endorsement
of the project's plans must take full cognizance of that fact.
Our position is that acknowledgement of MGH's institutional role and
legitimate concerns for expansion and growth, is not merely a necessity but
in some sense a moral imperative as well. MGH is too important to New
England and to Boston, and its vital role in preserving and enhancing the
lives of many thousands of persons each year too clear, to justify a posture
on the developer's part that is in the least patronizing or adversarial. If
C-G's plans for the Sante Harbor property required the hospital to retreat
from its determination to remain the preeminent treatment and research
facility in the region, we would not only be doomed to fail but would
deserve to as well. Unlike others in the development fraternity who have
advanced plans for this site as if MGH would in time have no choice but to
accommodate to them, the C-G strategy is to involve the relevant
decision-makers at MGH from an early date, in the genesis and elaboration of
plans for Sante Harbor.
When the Sante Harbor partnership conducted its first reconaissance of
the site, it appeared that the "no build" option was firmly entrenched. The
principal owners were two: MGH held over 300,000 square feet of land, most
- except for the Spaulding Rehab. Hospital -- acquired about 40 years ago;
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and various instrumentalities of the state owned the preponderance of what
remained. The state actors were in fact a witches' brew; but at this early
stage, they appeared to comprise an undifferentiated mass, which we saw no
need to attempt to disentangle. For the record, the state actors included
the Department of Public Works (DPW), the Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA), which owned the commuter rail tracks, the Massachusetts
District Commission (MDC), which owned a strip of future parkland along the
Charles River, the Division of Capital Operations and Planning (DCOP), under
Administration and Finance, which controlled 100 Nashua Street, and the
Executive Office of Transportation and Construction (EOTC), which though not
a landowner was in control of the design and engineering for the Central
Artery Reconstruction, a process that could not be accomplished without land
takings in the Sante Harbor site. EOTC also had a great deal of influence
over DPW. The other player was the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA).
Any development of the Sante Harbor property would certainly involve zoning
variances or a Planned Development Area (PDA) designation, in either of
which the BRA would play a large role.
In sum, therefore, we saw a large, private institutional landowner
which had been land-banking its holdings for some four decades, an array of
state bureaucracies not known for their ability to initiate complex
development efforts, and the city planning agency. As we saw it, the
question was how to determine whether anything was going on; and if not, how
best to get something started.
Our first move was direct and unsubtle. We contacted MGH's General
Counsel who we were given to understand was responsible for all of the
hospital's real estate. We explained that we were doing a thesis that
involved analysis of the feasibility of mixed-use (with housing emphasis)
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development on a site that included all of MGH's North Station property. We
further explained that our purpose was academic, that we assumed that the
hospital hoped to use the land to accommodate institutional expansion, that
we thought such a use could be effectively integrated with housing and
ancillary uses, and finally that if MGH shared its plans with us, we would
freely share with them our thinking and conclusions on a basis which left
both parties free to pursue their interests as they saw them. The response
was sobering and disheartening. We were advised that the chance that the
hospital would cooperate with us was remote at best, that if we had any
thought of attempting to effectuate any part of our development idea, we
should so state clearly at the outset, or leave ourselves open to
unspecified retaliation, that the hospital needed this land for its own
purposes sometime in the 1990s, and that the hospital would strenuously
resist any effort, no matter what the source, to interfere with its rights
as property owner. All of this was stated staccato-like, by someone who was
plainly used to questions of this sort and felt that leaving any ambiguity
whatsoever about the hospital's posture and intentions could only be
productive of mischief and unpleasantness. After this avalanche of
negativism, we were invited to send a letter, if we felt we must, and
assured that it would be promptly conveyed to the proper authority for
decision. We thought about sending a letter but decided that since the door
had been firmly and unambiguously slammed shut, there was nothing to be
gained by putting our request "on the record".
At this point, it appeared that our analysis would have to proceed
without any reliable information about the hospital's plans and thoughts.
Accepting at face value the hospital's stated determination to retain its
land purely for institutional purposes, it appeared that nothing at all
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would happen until it decided, on its own schedule, to apply for zoning
approvals and permits. We began to think that we were facing a two-fold
challenge: how to get MGH to think that the time to move was "now" or at
least "soon", rather than continuing to think in terms of the distant
future; and if the first objective could be attained, how to shape the
development program so that it accommodated a significant non-institutional
component, principally housing.
At this juncture, we felt that the hospital was in complete control of
the timetable. The only way the giant could be coaxed into action was via
the blunt instrument of a public taking which would carry with it the
implicit threat of additional takings. To salvage any substantial part of
its own plans, the hospital might then be compelled to step on the
accelerator. However, we saw a taking as the dimmest of possibilities when
the city was itself facing a severe revenue shortfall and no public purpose
was apparent to justify the use of the most drastic weapon in a city's
land-use armory.
There appeared to be no means of influencing the timetable directly.
If a developer cannot obtain what he seeks by frontal assault, he should
consider more subtle strategies. Was there any way to obtain movement on
the timetable by seeking to shape the program first? If the BRA saw, or
could be made to see, the housing potential of this site, perhaps another
approach to the hospital would be met with a better reception. As we
searched for an opening, a way of moving the issue forward, a fairly
uncomplicated, albeit indirect, strategy came to mind. If the hospital saw
that its plans for the Sante Harbor site would never be any more than a
starting point for administrative review and regulation, and that in fact
those plans were sharply at variance with what the city had in mind for the
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site, and so could not be viewed as promising, then perhaps it would
understand that there was nothing to be gained by a posture of regal
aloofness.
Moreover, we would argue, a clear-eyed comprehension of the city's
present and prospective political center of gravity pointed to the
advisability of moving now to help shape the process by which the nature and
density of development at Sante Harbor, would be determined. The Flynn
Administration, we would point out, had a certain radical, or populist,
disposition. It had already, in the first year of its term, confronted
Boston University over the sale to it of the Commonwealth Avenue Armory. In
return for dropping its challenge to the sale, it was able to force Boston
University to agree to sell certain property that it had acquired for
student housing in the Audubon Circle neighborhood. We would suggest that
the Administration had otherwise behaved in a fashion that surprised and
delighted the development community. It was likely that, over time, its
populist soul would come to the fore more frequently, perhaps more
unpredictably; and that therefore, confronting the issue now afforded the
greatest potential for helping to shape its resolution.
The next step was to assess the sentiment of the BRA. A developer
seeking to assess the sentiment of an institution as diffuse, and even
byzantine, as the BRA, should clearly understand what he is about. The BRA
is an instrumentality whose mission is defined by statute, history and
massive, daily interaction with present and future developers. In its
present incarnation, it seems (at least rhetorically) to be defining itself
in opposition or in contrast to the role that it played under Mayor White.
Development was White's consuming interest and the BRA was accordingly on a
short leash. Flynn came to office vowing to appoint a strong director who
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would then function independently, but with a general mandate to channel
development pressure toward the long-neglected neighborhoods and to push the
development of new housing, using linkage payments to supplement other forms
of housing subsidy. At certain times and on certain issues, the planning
side of the BRA will be in the forefront. When that occurs, a developer's
interests are best served if he sees where and when the horse is going and
figures out a way to help him get there. When the policy is being drafted,
there may be some opportunity to advise on its general content. After all,
the BRA does not want to produce a planning document whose recommendations
for development are ignored. But once a plan takes shape and is published,
the quick-footed developer will try to develop ways of fulfilling its goals.
When we began to think of the politics of Sante Harbor, we saw the
problem as getting MGH to alter its "no build" and "institutional only"
mind-set. Further investigation revealed that a maelstrom was churning
beneath the superficially calm surface. MGH had already come to grips with
the inescapable reality that, although no one could compel it to move
forward, when it finally decided to do so, it would have to play by the same
rules as other landowners. It had begun, ever so deliberately, to cultivate
a non-adversarial relationship with the BRA.
In 1984, it signed a Co-operation Agreement with the BRA which set
forth the rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect to the
approved Planned Development Area (PDA) for the hospital's main campus,
which called for Phase I facilities to be operational by March, 1990 and
Phase II by March, 1997; and declared for the first time the hospital's
support for the "intent of . . . the North Station Urban Redevelopment
Project . . . to produce mixed use development which includes institutional
uses and tax producing real estate." (Co-operation Agreement, paragraph 12)
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The hospital's support was to be demonstrated in its agreement "to cooperate
with the Authority to formulate a unified development plan for the project
area, with particular focus on Sub-Area II of the project." The Agreement
anticipated that by its second anniversary the unified development plan
would be completed.
Nothing has been done by the BRA to carry out the goal of formulating,
with MGH's cooperation, any such unified development plan. Bureaucratic
inertia may be partly to blame, but we believe that the unified development
plan has been temporarily put aside to await the formulation of Downtown by
Design, the master planning document on which director Coyle himself has
lavished so much attention. It is an open secret that one of the districts
in which Downtown by Design will propose to permit high-intensity, high-rise
development is North Station. The BRA staff undoubtedly feels that the
Sub-Area II unified development plan should follow, rather than feed,
Downtown by Design.
The parties, in short, have committed to cooperating on paper, but have
not cooperated in fact. MGH, no longer the slumbering giant, is not
passively awaiting events. In March of this year the hospital sent Coyle a
curt missive. It reminded him of the Co-operation Agreement (which he had
signed), made reference to the flurry of activity surrounding the proposals
for a new Boston arena, and submitted a summary of the hospital Master Plan
for the land on Nashua Street. The Master Plan calls for development at an
FAR of nearly 11 (existing zoning allows an FAR of 2) and includes a program
calling for two massive structures containing a preponderance of
non-taxpaying uses (assuming that most of the more than 2000 proposed
parking spaces are intended for the hospital's own use). One hopeful
element is that the plan calls for 200-250 units of housing.
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That letter, and the Master Plan Summary which accompanies it, cannot
have done much to endear the hospital to Coyle. First, it betrays no
evidence of having been carefully thought out or planned. It is poorly
written, poorly presented and substantively highly objectionable. Its
release to Coyle, at a time when he was probably in an advanced stage of
drafting Downtown by Design, may be viewed by him - even if it is not so
intended -- as a "declaration of war" of sorts, especially since the
hospital chose to include in its transmission to Coyle a copy of the letter
declaring its rejection of Roz Gorin's Gateway Center proposal. Even if one
is not inclined to be contentious, it is hard not to read the hospital's
message as: "we shot Roz Gorin down when she tried to mess with our land,
and we'll do the same to you." The ingredients for a stand-off, in which
the BRA and the MGH resolutely block the achievement of the other's
objectives, without advancing their own, would seem to be in place.
Yet we have a somewhat different view of what is really happening.
Coyle and Colloredo-Mansfeld may not have gotten off on the right foot but
their respective institutions are moving toward a common, or at least
similar, understanding of the proper use of Sante Harbor. We were informed
by persons in a position to know that Downtown by Design would permit
high-FAR, high height development in this area. Similarly, the hospital's
planning no longer regards its prior master planning efforts as sacrosanct.
Recently, a Boston architect was engaged by Colloredo-Mansfeld to review the
hospital's real needs for the Nashua Street property. He was commissioned
to produce a plan that would allow those needs to be met, perhaps on an
accelerated timetable, in a manner that created one or more sites on which
high-intensity tax-producing uses could be developed. We spoke to this
architect at length and learned what he proposed to Colloredo-Mansfeld when
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he presented his recommendations on June 28. Those recommendations were
well-received and although we cannot know, we do anticipate that the
hospital will at some early date take action toward effecting the substance
of the plan.
The hospital's true needs for this property are much more modest than
it has acknowledged in the past. They require approximately 100,000 SF of
back-office space, a new 160 bed hospital specializing in the treatment of
Alzheimer's disease and a very substantial quantity of parking, estimated at
2500-5000 spaces. These institutional needs should be sited near each
other, but there is no need for them to be located on the portion of the
Nashua Street property nearest the MGH main campus.
The planning solution advanced by MGH's consultant borrowed heavily
from a study done in the early 1980s by Wallace, Floyd, the engineering and
transportation consulting firm. The basic organizing principle of the new
plan is a new Nashua Street, to be created by making the street run
"straight" through the MGH property toward the river, where it would then
turn left and connect with Leverett Circle. The plan calls for an air
rights garage to be erected above the North Station commuter tracks. It
calls for various land swaps to create coherent, developable parcels. And
it demands the demolition of the Registry Building at 100 Nashua Street. If
all this occurred, the hospital's institutional requirements could be
comfortably met on one side of the new Nashua Street, in the area adjacent
to the present Rehab. Hospital. The other side of Nashua Street would
constitute a newly minted, immensely valuable development corridor of
between five and six acres. The breakthrough is that the hospital appears
to be moving toward a posture where it will facilitate, rather than block,
an intense, non-institutional development of its land.
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Getting on the Train before it leaves the Station
Our thinking about the politics of Sante Harbor has shifted
dramatically within a few short weeks. It appears that we are no longer
confronted by a slumbering giant. The giant has slimmed down considerably
and appears determined to be taken for a species of gazelle. (Shamelessly
shifting metaphors), the train is about to leave the station and we would
like very much to be aboard.
Note that we are now confronting a very different set of problems. As
we see it, our new goals must be: to influence events in the short-term so
that nothing is done to preclude our long-range objectives; to put ourselves
in a position where we are assured of serious consideration when a choice of
developer(s) is made; and to "angle for an edge" to reduce the likelihood
that, as our outside reader forecast, we would "lose in the finals".
The playing field has shifted and we should understand how the game is
likely to be played from here. First, all of the state instrumentalities
are assured of a vital role in the genesis and implementation of a final
development plan for the site. This cannot be avoided, given the hospital's
probable intent to call for the realignment of Nashua Street, for land swaps
to create coherent development parcels, and for the development (by it and
others) of an air rights garage. The obvious consequence is that the
process has been made immensely more complicated. We cannot foresee what
mechanisms may be created, whether formal or otherwise, to mediate the
interests of the several parties; but it is likely that a quick and elegant
solution will not be forthcoming. In short, although the race is likely to
begin soon, the finish line is not in sight.
Second, Colloredo-Mansfeld is head of CC & F as well as Chairman of
MGH's Planning and Building Committee. The potential for him to advocate a
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solution to the hospital's expansion needs that would also benefit CC & F
was always present, and appears now to be occurring. Colloredo-Mansfeld
would like the Nashua Street corridor to be developed in a way that
emphasizes high-rise office uses. We are guessing, but we expect him to try
to get CC & F designated as developer without bidding; and if that goal
proves unattainable, to do what he can to assure that the competition
attracts few qualified bidders.
We are now at a point where we can recall with nostalgia that set of
problems which appeared to confront us when we thought we had to rouse the
slumbering giant. Admittedly, we were facing long odds but if we succeeded,
the potential payoff was a negotiated development opportunity between our
team and the hospital. Now, if anyone is to negotiate a deal it appears
that it will be MGH and CC & F. Assuming that disaster does not occur, we
are looking at a protracted planning process, followed by some sort of
competitive submission against a field that is likely, if Boston's golden
era continues, to involve some of the largest and most highly reputed
developers in the pantheon.
First, let us frankly acknowledge that this new set of problems may be
more than a first time developer can hope to handle. A significant part of
successful development is choosing opportunities wisely; and it may be that
we will be forced to conclude at some point that the odds are so unfavorable
as to make the effort pointless. But we are not at that point. Consider
International Place. When Don Chiofaro began to compete for that
opportunity he had never done a development in his own name. Undaunted by
his own short list of credits, he conceived a strategy and pursued it with a
single-mindedness that the competition was unable or unwilling to duplicate.
Consider Copley Place. UIDC, though clearly a major national developer,
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chose Copley Place as its first Boston venture. Its strategy was to pursue
the project, from a research and design point of view, as if it had been
designated to do it; and at an appropriate time, to argue that the
opportunity should be given to it without a competition. This was a bold
and risky plan, especially considering that the determination whether to
proceed by negotiation or bid would be thrashed out among three mutually
disputatious individuals - Fred Salvucci (Transportation Department), Frank
Keefe (The Office of State Planning) and John Driscoll (The Turnpike
Authority). No claim is made that the analogies to International Place or
Copley Place are precisely in point. Our position is simply that it is
possible at this early date to conceive a strategy that will appear no less
credible - or no more incredible -- than the strategies devised by Chiofaro
and Ken Himmel. If the strategy can be stated in a way that does not leave
the reader hopelessly at sea, and if objective checkpoints can be
articulated by which to measure its success, then the C-G partnership can
set sail with a reasonable expectation of dropping anchor, someday, at Sante
Harbor.
Angling for an Edge
As first-time developers considering where to make our debut, it would
not be difficult to make a strong, even an overwhelming, case in favor of
some other site. From today's perspective, it would appear that: housing
is not in a strong position to become a major component of the final plan;
the Cooperation Agreement between MGH and the BRA will eventually be
extended and expanded to include all of the various state instrumentalities
in the effort to generate a unified development plan for the project area;
this will assuredly push back the choice of a developer by several years;
that choice will in all likelihood be made by means of some form of national
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design competition in which several deep-pocket teams can be expected to
compete. If the planning and selection process in fact proceeds in this
fashion, the C-G partnership would face very long odds indeed and would have
to justify its involvement by pointing to the favorable exposure it could
expect to receive. A sober-minded decision to select another ship on which
to make our maiden voyage may eventually be forced upon us; but this ship is
sturdy and bids fair to look ravishing under sail. If we make certain minor
modifications to the hull and the rigging, we think it will do fine on the
open water.
To decide what "minor modifications" are needed, we should first be
clear about any advantages we may possess. In sum, they are not negligible.
We appear to be the first development entity to have identified this site as
having substantial, realistic potential as a focus for luxury housing.
Although the Safdie Plan proposed this use some six years ago, no serious
planning or feasibility analyses were ever done to go beyond the basic
conceptual outline of that plan. No other developer has talked to the staff
of the BRA about the site. It is of course impossible to know whether other
Boston developers are analyzing the same site and use behind closed doors;
but in a city and business in which "leaks" and "rumors" afford a frequent
and surprisingly well-founded hint of future possibilities, there is no
indication that anyone else is covetously eyeing the same dirt.
Second, between us we probably have a range of local contacts that
could win us an audience with many of the key players. We would expect to
be able to see, in private, Robert Buchanan (General Director of MGH),
Charles Haar and Sidney Rabb (Trustee and Honorary Trustee of MGH,
respectively), Frank Keefe, State Secretary of Administration and Finance,
Tunney Lee (MIT Professor, on leave, and Director of the Department of
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Capital Operations and Planning), and William Geary, Chairman of the
Metropolitan District Commission. In addition, as we have already
discovered in this and previous efforts, the staff of the BRA is quite
accessible and generally willing to speak candidly and freely to developers.
I hasten to add that we are not in a position to ask favors of any of these
persons, nor that they would be inclined to grant them if we asked.
However, access can be of significant value in at least two ways: one can
gain insight not obtainable by any other means into the hidden agendas of
bureaucracies and individuals, which may sometimes be decisive in their
deliberations; and one can "make an impression" and thereby exert a
powerful, though subtle, influence on the decision-making process. Ex parte
contacts are greatly frowned upon when a formal competition is underway:
all the more reason to pursue them assiduously in advance of the
competition.
Our third advantage is time. One of us will be going to work in
September but his employer has explicitly agreed that he is not prohibited
or discouraged from pursuing development opportunities on his own. The
other intends to support himself by reactivating an income and investment
property brokerage business that he had successfully begun before entering
MIT. One of the principal benefits of this business is precisely that it
will enable him to pursue projects of this sort. Since both of us are
confident that we will be able to support ourselves in jobs that will not
demand all of our available hours, we expect to be able to handle the
demands of the Sante Harbor project "on the side". At some point, of
course, if we are successful, we will have to relegate our other activities
to a subordinate position.
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Our advantages are priority, access and time. These advantages are not
substantive: that is, in and of themselves, they will have no meaning when
the selection of one or more housing developers is made. Rather, they are
tools with which to overcome the substantive weaknesses of the inchoate C-G
partnership. If we use all of those tools sedulously and with a sense of
real commitment, the C-G partnership can put itself in a position to contend
seriously for the prize.
Anticipating the day when a formal response to a Request for Proposals
is due, we must with unsparing honesty identify our weaknesses and develop a
strategy for minimizing or eliminating them. Putting the bad news all
together, we lack nothing except experience (a successful track record),
reputation (a recognized and respected name), influence (one large step
beyond access, the ability to get favors without having to ask for them) and
financial credibility (the ability to convince the decision-maker that one
has the capacity to make the pretty picture happen). Clearly these are all
substantive. They are the criteria by which the developers will be
selected.
How then to proceed? Our strategy has four elements to be pursued in
sequence.
1) Use our advantages to their fullest. We expect to use our priority,
time and access to acquire a comprehensive and intimate understanding of all
aspects of this development opportunity. We will state that we are
interested in developing housing on the Sante Harbor site (we intend to
create a partnership or other ownership entity called the Sante Harbor
Housing Partnership. The frequent repetition of the name will help to give
us an identity and create a subtle momentum in favor of housing as a major
component of the unified development plan); and would like to produce a
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proposal that gives due regard to the goals and objectives of whichever
agency or entity we happen to be addressing. If that kind of guileless
directness does not produce a reciprocal openness, we will volunteer our
thoughts and plans in sufficient detail to demonstrate our seriousness and
the care with which we have approached our task. We will be shameless
name-droppers and will use every appropriate opportunity to demonstrate that
we have been around, that others at least as important and crucially
positioned as our present audience (without our saying so), have judged us
worthy of their time and attention. Our notion is that access builds upon
itself, and that each time a new door is opened, other doors - previously
locked -- become penetrable. We further believe that access and influence
are on a continuum and that the ability to see and talk to people, in
private, in time helps to create a perception of influence, which either is
metamorphosed into the real thing or may sometimes serve as an effective
surrogate for it.
The product of all of these meetings, interviews and discussions will
be a far better understanding of the political context than anyone else has
or is likely to have. No less important than our knowledge is the knowledge
of us that significant players will now have. If we sell ourselves well in
these private tete-a-tetes, we will have begun to overcome the disadvantages
of experience, reputation and influence.
2) We will approach MGH, either through Colloredo-Mansfeld or our contacts
on the Board. In our view, MGH is coming to understand that the time for
development of Sante Harbor, after four decades of land-banking, is near at
hand, but that they are not particularly well-positioned to shape the
process or the result.
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Colloredo-Mansfeld appears to be taking the lead, and although no one
should doubt his skill or determination, the hospital's performance to date
leaves great doubt that he knows where he wants to take it or how to get
there. The hiring of a local architect as a consultant suggests that the
hospital is open to new ideas and that its own goals are still somewhat in
flux. Furthermore, the program that he was given to work with is
predominantly non-institutional in character. Assuming that this program
represents the hospital's true agenda - as distinguished from
Colloredo-Mansfeld's -- it suggests that an income stream is becoming an
important consideration in the hospital's future financial planning. That
too is a favorable signal of the hospital's growing receptivity - despite
all of its vociferous protestations to the contrary -- to some sort of joint
venture with a real estate developer.
We will in some fashion approach MGH with an offer to act as their
development consultant. We will acknowledge "up front" our wish to be
considered as the developer of at least a portion of the site; but will
state that we will perform our advisory role in a professional and unbiased
manner. We will offer to produce a completely integrated feasibility
analysis of the non-institutional development potential of the site
(including possibly the air rights garage) and will outline several
approaches to effectuating the recommendations of the study. We will
emphasize our ability to help educate the hospital on the opportunities and
pitfalls of what is likely to be a protracted and highly complex
public-private interaction. As part of the contract, we will offer to
represent the hospital in the elaboration and emendation of the Cooperation
Agreement signed in 1984 with the BRA.
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We think this strategy is a "no-lose" proposition. If we are rebuffed,
we will at least win points for boldness and integrity. We will also have
called attention to ourselves in a way that is likely to be remembered. If
our offer is accepted, we can expect a multitude of benefits to flow from
the engagement. Most optimistically, there is a chance that our efforts
will be so well-received that we can begin to think about the potential for
a negotiated designation, in joint venture with the hospital, on the model
of UIDC and Copley Place. More realistically, the contract will assure us
of access to all of the decision-makers both in and out of the hospital. As
MGH's representative, no door is likely to be closed to us. We may have an
opportunity to influence the substance of the hospital's thinking about the
role that housing should play in the final Sante Harbor plan. We will be
prepared with a number of arguments in favor of housing, including the
"goodwill" value of associating the hospital with the provision of so vital
a need and the labor relations and competitive value of providing a
desirable place to live for hospital employees, particularly at the senior
level. In performing this service, we expect to leave all of those with
whom and for whom we labored with a strongly positive view of our
competence, political sensitivity, professional comportment and personal
qualities. We will then have one more advantage and a considerably less
daunting set of disadvantages with which to confront the competitive hurdles
in front of us.
One risk of this strategy is that we may at some point have to face the
'no win" choice of endorsing or working for a program that puts housing in a
distinctly subordinate role or terminating our contract. The "bad feelings"
that walking out on the contract are likely to produce would be so
destructive of any future hope of obtaining a development designation, that
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we should resolve at the outset to complete the job no matter what. We
think that housing is reasonably well-positioned to make it into the final
unified plan, and that our functioning as insiders in the planning process
cannot but improve its prospects.
3) We will approach a number of individuals and firms in an attempt to put
a development team in place and ready to go "when the gun goes off". This
team will be chosen with three ends in mind: every member should add
something to the overall strength and image of the group; the people we
recruit should be "stars" in their own right whose unavailability to other
groups may thin out or at least discourage the competition; and by putting
the group together, we expect to enuiance our own credibility when we move to
step number four. The team will include a deal-maker, finance expert; an
architect-planner with a demonstrated facility for designing luxury housing
on difficult urban sites; a marketing firm with a successful history in both
market analysis and sales or rentals; a law firm specializing in complex
real estate ventures; an array of engineering experts, including
geotechnical, structural and mechanical engineers; and a skilled asset
management firm with a particular strength in managing luxury condominium
and rental housing.
We have already discussed several specific names as possible team
members. John Fowler of Fowler, Goedecke, Ellis, and O'Connor is our
probable choice as money source. In putting him on the team we would
frankly be borrowing his good name and reputation. His long-standing
involvement with Charles Square, the Fan Piers, Arlington-Hadassah and
International Place attests both to his "nose for success" and his bulldog
persistance, his willingness to stay with complicated but worthy projects
for years if necessary to get them going. The financing challenge for C-G
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will be to carry the project to step four without any dilution of
"ownership". This may require a considerable investment of risk capital on
our part.
Another prospective team member is the west coast planning and design
firm Fisher-Friedman. We had occasion this year to spend the better part of
an afternoon with Rod Friedman and he made a very strong impression. He is
a brilliant architect who has spent his entire life in housing. Among his
many credits is Golden Gateway Common which we have identified as a worthy
antecedent for Sante Harbor. The Common is a mixed rental/ownership
project, of similar scale, with a number of undesirable adjacencies and a
brilliantly conceived and executed interior, above-grade focus. We feel
confident that Friedman would welcome the opportunity to do a major project
in Boston.
4) The final step is to approach a major housing developer as a joint
venture partner. We take this step reluctantly because we would prefer to
do the project ourselves. However, unless a negotiated designation appears
possible - and perhaps not even then -- we cannot win the competition unless
the first name on the development proposal belongs to someone who has
successfully done this sort of thing before. No amount of access, no
brilliantly completed consulting contract, no illustrious roster of team
members, can entirely overcome the disadvantage of being a rookie on a
project that demands a veteran. We know that it will be necessary to hitch
our horse to someone else's wagon, and it is necessary to begin thinking now
about who that partner should be.
First, we understand clearly that this is the last step in the process.
If we sought out a partner without having painstakingly ploughed through
steps 1 through 3, we would have nothing to put on the table and so could
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expect to be thanked for our information and politely but firmly shown to
the door. If, however, we have done everything described here, and can
distill our knowledge into a snappy, graphically impressive half-hour
presentation, our reception is likely to be highly solicitous and
respectful. We can expect an even better reception if we arrange to make
our pitch to at least three housing developers and inform each of them that
others are getting the same opportunity. We want a developer who will fund
the competition in a first-class manner and who will agree to employ us as
project manager-partner if our submission is successful. We would expect to
retain a minority interest in all of the financial benefits of the
development (perhaps 33-40% between us of the amount retained by the
development partner), but we would want to be "out front" as project manager
so that, like Ken Himmel after Copley Place, we would be in a position to go
it alone the next time.
We have identified three potential developer partners. As we move
through steps 1 through 3, we will be giving careful consideration to these
partners, and to others, looking for the one that will afford the best
combination of competitive enhancement and a favorable compensation package.
The partners we are considering include:
1) Housing Innovations, Inc. This minority-owned firm (Denis Blackett),
originally based in Boston and now in Oakland, has been around the track
many times, is developing part of Battery Park City in New York, has
excellent connections with both the city and state, and does not have a
Boston project at present (advantageous from a control point of view). We
do not know whether it has the dollars to fund in the proper manner a
national design competition.
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2) Perini Development. This firm is most active on the west coast,
although its headquarters are in a Boston suburb. The firm is extremely
well-connected locally, having won several major public works type jobs
(like the Red Line subway extension). They also own Golden Gateway Commons.
We do not know whether they would be receptive to the kind of partnership we
propose; but we surmise that they might be willing to take a back seat on
the development side to get the contract to build the job.
3) Olympia & York. We know the firm is looking for additional Boston
opportunities to follow up on 53 State Street. We also know that they have
entered into deal-oriented partnerships with local developers (like the
Chase family in Hartford). We do not know how much housing they have
developed nor whether they have an appetite for more.
Of course, we cannot be certain that this vital last step will produce
its intended result - the creation of a development partnership in which
Caner-Geller are development managers sharing a significant ownership
position. If, as we conclude elsewhere, Sante Harbor meets the feasibility
test, the opportunity is likely to interest our prospective partner; but
they are likely to be skeptical that Caner-Geller will add significant value
to their submission. The question is so obvious and so crucial that we must
raise it ourselves. Our argument, which must be presented with just the
right mixture of self-confidence and humility, is two-fold.
First, we will assert that our work to date has put us way ahead of the
field with respect to knowledge of the site and all of the factors which
impinge upon it. We will review the cast of characters who will affect the
selection of a developer and will explain our connection to each of them.
Under the former city administration, all power with regard to development
resided with the mayor, unless he chose to take a passive role. Mastery of
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the political process depended on but one thing: access to the corner
office. Under the present mayor, politics is again taking on a byzantine
flavor. Power is fragmented and shifting. It is impossible to read the
political winds without patiently cultivating a wide-ranging network of
sources and contacts. Anyone coming in from outside without an experienced
local guide would be at a great disadvantage. We would argue that no one is
better positioned to act as a guide on the Sante Harbor opportunity; and
that the odds in favor of designation would materially improve if our names
were on the submission. The argument is a delicate one and potentially
self-defeating. We have to guard against being understood as saying that
Boston is a jungle. The reluctance of some developers to participate in
municipally-sponsored design competitions is in part the result of a
perception that politics is ultimately decisive. Our argument is not that
politics will determine the choice of the Sante Harbor developer; but that a
superior understanding of the multifarious influences impinging on the
choice, will permit the shaping of the winning submission.
The second argument is that after the selection is made, the same
steady hand is needed to bring Sante Harbor on line as quickly, painlessly
and economically as possible. It is not enough to win the opportunity. One
must act thereafter to make the most of it. We must be prepared to
demonstrate, and not merely assert, our project management skills, by
preparing and presenting a development plan, a financing proposal and the
elements of the project team.
The Case for Housing
The case for housing at Sante Harbor is not premised on a "highest and
best use" analysis. We have not compared housing to a range of other uses
-- office, hotel, retail, institutional, civic - which might be sited there.
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Instead, we have asked whether housing is itself feasible; and since it is,
have concluded that it ought to be the preferred use because of the
well-documented need for it, both currently and prospectively. The case for
housing therefore consists of two elements: first, a demonstration of its
feasibility; and second, a summary of the arguments that will be used to
persuade those who will affect the determination of a program for the site,
that they should support it.
Housing Feasibility
To establish the feasibility of housing at Sante Harbor it is necessary
to demonstrate: that the use can be physically accommodated; that it can
secure the required approvals and permits; that the market will absorb it,
at the forecast prices and times; and that the development of the project is
financable. We will address these items consecutively.
The appeal of the Sante Harbor site from a physical standpoint is based
on its location and its size. The site is within one mile of Boston's
Central Business District; has better access - by automobile, commuter rail,
MBTA rail and buses, or on foot -- that any other location that we know of,
with the possible exception of South Station; has a "long edge" abutting the
Charles River, which has the further appeal of an MDC linear park which,
though not explicitly part of Harborpark, can be effectively linked to it;
and is arguably large enough - at 5-6 acres - to make possible a project of
sufficient scope to overcome the location's principal current deficiency -
the lack of a dense urban fabric and desirable image. We have considered a
number of other projects, such as the Golden Gateway Project in San
Francisco, which were successfully developed for luxury housing despite
constraints that were no less serious, from a design and marketing
perspective, than those we confront. Although their success cannot be
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viewed as determinative, we believe that the antecedents support our
judgment that Sante Harbor can become, over time, not merely an appropriate
-- but an excellent -- site for housing.
The political case for housing at Sante Harbor is considered
separately.
A market analysis has not been performed, although the appendix
contains a discussion of the design and scope of such an analysis. We are
both long-time Bostonians (one of us is a native) and we have followed the
development and maturation of the real estate market in Boston, and its
housing component in particular, with keen interest. Since 1980, luxury
condominiums have been added to the city's housing stock at a rate of nearly
2500 units per year. Absorption has outpaced supply and prices have
therefore soared. In 1984 the increase was 23% in Boston, and was certainly
higher in the better neighborhoods, closer to the city's urban core. Our
judgment is that demand will continue strong throughout the rest of the
decade. The city's population has begun to reverse a decades long decline
and is projected to increase by over 10% before 1990. In addition, the
trend toward smaller households is expected to continue and even intensify.
Finally, job growth is expected to add many thousands of new, highly paid
workers to the city's labor force and many of them will prefer to live in
close proximity to their jobs. Based on our general knowledge, our reading
of BRA research reports, and our awareness of the market prices being
achieved on condo sales ($225/square foot seems to be about the current
median in the neighborhoods we regard as attractive to our target market),
we believe that Sante Harbor would have high market acceptance at
$200/square foot.
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As discussed in the chapter on financing, Sante Harbor would be
financable under current market conditions as a condominium and might be
financable as a rental project if certain agreements or concessions could be
secured.
Having established the preliminary feasibility of Sante Harbor, we must
be prepared to answer a different question: given the other economic uses
which might be developed on the site, why should those who have the power to
determine a program choose housing? Our case for housing rests in the main
upon what might be called urban planning considerations. The fundamental
notion is that Boston will be a better city if this major area for
development is not given over entirely to uses which are already adequately
supplied elsewhere. We will make the argument first to the BRA, where,
based upon our "soundings"to date, we expect a favorable reception. Next,
as outlined in the implementation strategy, we will attempt to work with the
hospital, as an insider, in helping to formulate their position on the
unified development plan they have committed to produce with the BRA. At
some point in this process, we expect to encounter significant input from
the state instrumentalities which, as abutters or landowners, will
inevitably influence the shape of the final plan.
The "urban planning" arguments we intend to make in support of a
substantial housing component at Sante Harbor will inclue:
1) No displacement. The great advantage of Sante Harbor in helping to
meet the city's great need for additional housing supply is that no one will
be displaced in developing it. This means that politicians and civil
servants will not experience pressure from citizens concerned about
preserving the quality of life in their neighborhoods. Mayor Flynn has a
long-standing antipathy to condominium conversions because he believes that
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low-to-moderate income renters are displaced when units are converted.
Whatever the merits of that argument, it has no applicability whatever to
new condominium construction. As part of our coalition-building effort, we
intend to contact the Mayor's development advisors - John Connally, Peter
Dreier (of Tufts University, and a strong advocate of the anti-conversion
position) and Kevin Phelan (a Meredith and Grew Vice President, and liaison
to the "real estate establishment") -- and make the argument that major new
construction, by meeting the demand for in-town condominiums, will help to
moderate the values of convertible properties, and thereby reduce the
incentive to convert them.
2) Limited Negative Impact on Abutters. The isolation of Sante Harbor
from contact with existing neighborhoods is a planning challenge but a
politically favorable circumstance. Almost anywhere else in the city a
project of this magnitude would be regarded as potentially disruptive over
an area much wider than its immediate environs. The "politics of approval"
would accordingly be greatly complicated as interest groups jockeyed for
influence in producing a development plan that most nearly reflected their
own agendas. Here, the citizen input can be expected to be slight.
3) Deflects Gentrification. There is some potential for persuading groups
in the North End and perhaps Charlestown that Sante Harbor will help to
deflect the insistent gentrification pressures they are facing. By creating
a new neighborhood aimed at the high-end market, we should prove attractive
to significant numbers of people who would otherwise direct their search for
housing at these hard-pressed areas. The argument may have particular force
because our target market - $200/square foot - more closely parallels the
condo market in the North End and Charlestown, than it does the market in
Back Bay, Beacon Hill or the waterfront.
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4) Extension of City's Urban Fabric. Sante Harbor can be viewed as major
in-fill development which extends the city's urban fabric to an area which
has lain dormant for more than 40 years. In-fill is generally viewed
positively by those with a planning perspective. It is seen as helping to
"complete" the city by eliminating unsightly holes or gaps. It allows the
city to resist pressures to extend outward or upward. Moreover, this
project may have the additional benefit of helping to link the North End and
the West End, thus helping to make the city more cohesive and perhaps
marginally less turf-conscious.
5) Reducing the Pressure of Commuters. To the extent that Sante Harbor is
able to appeal to families who work in the city, but would otherwise live in
its outlying neighborhoods or suburbs, the commuting pressures on the city's
highways and streets may be somewhat relieved. More generally, we would
expect that very few of Sante Harbor's residents would use their automobiles
for getting to work.
6) 24 Hour Use. One advantage that housing has over offices or any other
use which emphasizes employment, is its ability to bring people to the site,
and keep them there, around the clock and through the entire week. In the
drafts of the Downtown by Design planning document which have been
circulated and summarized in news accounts, great emphasis has been placed
upon balanced development which assures that the city's business areas do
not become unpopulated, lifeless canyons after dark. If Sante Harbor did not
contain a substantial residential community, a major planning goal of the
city would be needlessly sacrificed.
7) River Constituency. The MDC may be persuaded that the Sante Harbor
residential community would constitute the best possible guardian for any
linear park that they may envision for the area. The community may be
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expected to have a possessive and protective attitude toward both the park
and the river. Sante Harbor as envisioned will be a densely developed area;
and the strip of green and blue planned by the MDC will surely come to be
regarded fondly. The MDC's parks more than occasionally fall into
disrepair, and the commission is understandably sensitive to suggestions
that its park management effort is deficient. Because of the vital
importance of the linear park to Sante Harbor's desirability, there is ample
reason to believe that it will remain a jewel long after the designers have
left the scene.
8) Cleaning Up Causeway Street. The city, the owners of Boston Garden and
the GSA are all vitally concerned with the future of Causeway Street and of
the Bulfinch Triangle which it abutts. Since the residents of Sante Harbor
will have to travel along or across Causeway Street en route to almost
anywhere they might want to go, we expect that they will become a vocal and
potent interest group in favor of the redevelopment of the street along
lines more compatible with a residential neighborhood. Sante Harbor is
sufficiently isolated so that the civic uses of Causeway Street will not
substantially disrupt its residential character; but the street is the most
logical place - other than the new Nashua Street - on which to locate
service oriented retail. In time, we expect the entire Bulfinch Triangle
area to be improved in ways that serve the interests of the new or renovated
Garden, the GSA and Sante Harbor alike.
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A PRIMER ON GETTING STARTED
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The C-G Sante Harbor Partnership has a strong bias toward
self-examination. This is a product of personal predilection; but it is
also derived from a carefully considered judgment that long-term success in
development depends in part on a determination to eschew the unreflective,
reactive, seats-of-the-pants modus operandi which has characterized so much
of the business in the past.
In our view, each development effort is a real-world laboratory in
which the developer mixes the elements of development in varying
proportions, much as a chemist uses the materials of his trade, in hopes of
producing just that combination which, when subjected to the "laws" of the
competitive marketplace, will prove both durable and appropriate. We do not
assert that the laws of the marketplace are like the laws of chemistry. If,
however, the developer fails to use each development effort as an
opportunity -to test and refine his notions about which "elements" are
superior, and in what proportions, he is wasting a valuable opportunity.
Over time, a developer who truly understands that even his failures can be
the building blocks of future success, will have a much better time of it
that a developer who views failure as a contagion, to be isolated and
avoided at any cost. Successful or not, each development effort is an
opportunity to distill and extend the wisdom of experience. What is desired
is an expandable compendium of knowledge, in which patterns of behavior are
recognized, effective strategies identified, common issues or problems noted
and alternative approaches compared. Such a storehouse will never assure
that all one's strategies are sound and effective, but it will help to guard
against the egregious error which can not only deflect a particular
development, but sometimes unhorse an organization entirely.
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Sante Harbor, thematically, is about "getting started" in two distinct
senses. Our first concern is the debut development; but we are also greatly
interested in learning how any development effort can be most appropriately
begun. We have not carried Sante Harbor far enough to be able confidently
to distill its lessons, but our implementation strategy reflects a set of
hypotheses about the peculiarities of the debut development as well as the
more general requirements of nurturing any idea through the early stages of
pre-development. It would seem appropriate to advance these hypotheses
explicitly.
1) Reconnaissance or fact-gathering should be as objective and open as
possible.
Very early in any development effort it will be necessary to
investigate the site, its ownership, abutting owners and interested parties,
the neighborhood or community, the relevant political sub-division and the
history, laws and practices of the approvals bureaucracy. This
investigation should be done by the developer himself (in a small
organization). The investigation should be conducted in the manner of a
historian and not a lawyer. The objective is not to make a case or fit the
facts to a preconceived hypothesis, but to obtain as much information as
possible, almost without discrimination. If the fact-gathering effort is
polluted by premature strategizing, important facts will be overlooked or
their significance misconstrued. The developer should state that he is
thinking about doing a development in the community, that he has not decided
on a site or a use, but that he wants to find out everything about the
community, much as if he were thinking of moving there, which in a sense he
is. Like the historian, the developer should be careful about his sources.
Certain matters, like zoning, can be considered only be a careful perusal of
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the official sources. Statements about what the sources contain and how
they should be interpreted should be duly noted, but cannot be a substitute
for the text itself. Where a fact is stated, but cannot be confirmed by
reliable documentation, multiple sources should be sought. If the matter is
in doubt, great care should be taken in building a strategy around its
assumed truth.
The developer should understand that the interests of individuals and
institutions are the keys to understanding and predicting their behavior;
but that those interests will not always be what they appear and will
sometimes remain maddeningly obscure. At various times in the Sante Harbor
effort, we have identified MGH's interests as: land-banking their Nashua
Street property for institutional purposes in the 1990s; studying the
options for near-term joint development of the Nashua Street property in a
way that permits the integration of institutional and other uses; and
planning for the joint development of the Nashua Street property so as to
maximize the monetary return to the hospital (particularly in terms of an
income stream) from its prescient land investment. It is possible that the
hospital does not have a single, unvarying interest at all, but is instead
responding by fits and starts to its own perception of the shifting
political and development climate. At any rate, there is little doubt that
the developer would be well-served by a thorough understanding of the
interests, both latent and patent, fundamental and evanescent, of all
parties who have or are likely to assert an interest in his development
idea. The frame of mind he must cultivate to aid in the apprehension of
those interests is skeptical, open, receptive, self-questioning, persistent.
2) Be very observant and very attentive. Leave no stone unturned.
As first-time developers who are also first on the scene, C-G is in a
-123-
position, over time, to make ourselves more knowledgeable about this
opportunity than anyone else. We must not squander this potential
advantage. That means, among other things, that we must pursue hints, or
rumors, or suggestions with the bulldog tenancity of a cub reporter who
senses that he's on to a "Pulitzer" story. When the hospital asserted with
no equivocation that it intended to hold the Nashua Street property for its
own needs to the 1990s, we could have spent a lot of time generating a
strategy for overcoming their supposed "no build" and "institutional only"
mind-set. Fortunately, we discovered soon thereafter, through an offhand
remark by a BRA staffer, that the hospital had engaged a local architect to
do a mixed-use planning study. It took some considerable digging, but we
located this individual and he proved as open and willing to talk as his
client was aloof and uncooperative. Our meeting with him was a revelation.
It opened our eyes to the hospital's true state of mind: fluid, uncertain,
receptive to mixed use and early development. The point is that valuable,
even crucial, information may be found in the unlikeliest places or in the
most roundabout way. The journalism analogy is apt. Official sources and
spokesman have their place but the world view they expound is narrow,
partial, self-serving and sometimes deliberately misleading. They should
always be supplemented by sources - like "our" architect - who are
relatively unconstrained by real or perceived bureaucratic muzzling. The
easy path is to accept what one hears at face value. It is much harder -
but also more productive - to understand that truth has to be pursued,
because it does not yield itself easily.
3) Recognize your natural allies and make them your allies in fact.
Any developer, particularly a beginner, is apt to feel on occasion that
he is swimming upstream against a floodtide, or flying solo through a storm.
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An iron will and a steely determination to persevere will come in handy; but
a frank acknowledgement of the need for support and assistance is even more
important.
When the development effort begins, you will have no committed allies.
But your reconnaissance will have surely revealed a range of possible
supporters. Understand that some will merely support the need for
development (which they see as serving growth and jobs) while others can be
viewed as potential advocates for the specific project you are proposing.
The nature of their interest will determine the degree to which they will be
willing to use their influence on your behalf. At the pre-development
stage, the developer should identify his potential backers and begin to
cultivate them. He should determine what their interests are, where they
may overlap his, and how together they can act to further their shared aims.
The developer's search for allies, to be maximally effective, should
cover not only those who are certain to play a role in the evolution of the
process, but as well those who may not perceive that they have an interest
in its outcome. In Sante Harbor, obvious potential allies include the BRA,
by virtue of its preference for dense mixed-use development on this site,
and its concern for the inadequacy of new housing production in the city,
and the building trades organizations, who are interested in fostering large
projects that promise years of employment for their members.
But other potential allies may be discerned, lurking in the shadows.
It may be possible to secure the support of the hospital's medical staff
which may have an interest in the development of high-quality housing within
walking (or shuttle-bus) distance of their jobs. C-G should consider
setting up a meeting with interested physicians, either directly or through
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any association which can be identified as representing them in some
capacity. If this is done, great care should be taken to avoid the
implication that C-G desires the physicians to put pressure on the hospital
administration to act in furtherance of housing development. That is in
fact precisely what C-G desires; but the physicians must be trusted to
decide for themselves whether and how such pressure should be applied. The
coalition-building effort should not obtain a new ally only at the cost of
alienating a larger, more significant entity whose ultimate support for the
project is probably essential to its success. But the MGH doctors can be an
important part of the effort to win the hospital to our side. We should
seek the formation of a liaison committee to represent the interests of the
hospital's physicians in the elaboration and implementation of the plans for
Sante Harbor. In time, the committee could evolve into an interest group
with genuine influence on the hospital's posture toward Sante Harbor.
We believe that the Sante Harbor proposal is one that would be
enthusiastically endorsed by the commercial developers of the new/renovated
Garden and its immediate environs. For reasons of competitive
self-interest, they are likely to regard housing as a better use of Sante
Harbor than more office space, especially if the elevated Green Line remains
while the two developments compete in a perhaps overbuilt office market.
The fledgling developer who does not approach his debut as would a
challenger trying to unseat a long-time incumbent, is doomed to remain an
outsider, peripheral to the power games which allocate major urban
development opportunities. The beginning of wisdom is to recognize that
allies are an vital as oxygen, and potentially as ubiquitous.
4) Learn from your predecessors.
Although the Sante Harbor proposal calls for development in a
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pioneering location, it is not completely virgin territory. The ground has
been ploughed before, albeit with only a meagre harvest. The Gorin-Tsongas
Gateway Center proposal was a made-to-order "experiment" in which an
experienced developer attempted to win the right to develop Sante Harbor -
and much else as well - preemptively. We very carefully charted the
progress of this abortive effort -- its success would obviously have
rendered moot our own plans -- because in essence it was functioning as an
"advance party" for our own development expedition. We discussed elsewhere
what we learned from the Gateway Center proposal. Our point here is simply
to underscore that a previous development effort - preferably recent, in the
same area and incorporating at least some similar uses - is an unexcelled
source of useful insights into winning site control and development
approval.
5) Anticipate your weaknesses and develop a strategy for minimizing them.
Every development effort must, at an early date, "take inventory" of
its strengths and weaknesses. Because it is so hard, particular attention
must be paid to identifying and measuring the importance of weaknesses,
since competitors and opponents can be counted on to be clever and
resourceful in unearthing and exploiting them. One approach is to disarm
your critics by acknowledging in advance where you could be stronger. The
model is the trial counsel who elicits on direct examination of his witness
those items which could otherwise be used to devastating effect by the
adroit cross-examiner. On a human level, there is a certain empathetic
identification with one who humbly admits to being less than a paragon. Yet
the admission of weakness must be accompanied by taking (and loudly
trumpeting) specific and credible steps intended to vitiate the weakness.
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The Sante Harbor Partnership identified its weaknesses - all crucial, since
they are the probable criteria for developer selection -- as experience,
reputation, influence and financial credibility. Unless we could
simultaneously explain in a credible, straightforward manner how those
weaknesses could be turned into strengths before "decision time", we would
have no basis, except for the "learning experience", to stay in the hunt.
6) Adhere to the sequence of steps outlined in your strategy, avoiding
the temptation to skip intermediate steps.
If your strategy has been well-conceived, each step should accomplish
something necessary to the achievement of subsequent steps. If steps are
skipped, out of impatience or a sense that the process must be accelerated
to keep pace with an externally determined timetable, the developer may be
attempting to do something without having put down the proper foundation.
In the Sante Harbor strategy, for example, the predicates for
approaching a development partner are, in order, acquiring a comprehensive
and intimate understanding of all aspects of the development opportunity,
securing some kind of cooperative working relationship with MGH, and putting
together the working pieces of a highly reputed, committed and experienced
development team. If any of the essential predicates are omitted, we would
be at risk of having our prospective development partner reject the
opportunity entirely as too speculative; or alternatively recognize the
development opportunity as both substantial and imminent, but fail to
perceive why it would be in its interest to negotiate some form of joint
venture with C-G.
The foregoing is not to suggest that changes in the timetable, or
unanticipated events, may not require some rethinking of the tactical steps
and their interrelationships. Flexibility and nimbleness are among the few
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obvious advantages of a fledgling developer and should not be dissipated by
a slavish adherence to a meticulously articulated plan. Nevertheless,
though the plan will change, the objective should be to replace it with a
new plan to channel the developer's energies until it too has been overtaken
by events.
7) Make frequent and (free) use of available expertise.
Many kinds of experts that a developer might call upon are accustomed
to consulting widely without charge, as a way of building a name and
generating future businesses. Mortgage brokers, architects and planners,
asset managers, commercial and residential brokers, all are in very
competitive businesses in which some degree of "specing" of labor is a
well-established way of beating the competition. The experts' willingness
to talk can be even more pronounced in the case of a fledgling developer.
We have found that experts are often eager to talk to developers who are
just starting out: they know that lending a helping hand can lead to a
lifetime relationship; that their words can have a real impact on the
developer's plan; and that the rookie is far more likely to be seeking a
collegial, collaborative relationship.
The developer should identify a cross-section of the best experts in
areas that concern him; and should consult those experts frequently and in
depth. He should always send in advance of any meeting an agenda and a list
of topics or questions on which he would like the experts' judgment and
advice. It would also be helpful to include a brief project description and
any background deemed essential to an understanding of the developer's
difficulties. Of course, if the project comes together, the experts
consulted during the pre-development phase should be very well represented
on the final team.
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The Sante Harbor Partnership acknowledges the time and effort expended
on their behalf by John Fowler and his staff, and by Robert Weinberg, Esq.
Both will be invited to be part of the development team.
8) Build toward a point at which you are ready to announce that you are a
player.
A step-by-step, planned, carefully followed strategy is essential for a
first-time developer to build credibility. He must make up in energy,
precision and quality what he lacks in experience and reputation. He can be
sure that no one will give him the benefit of the doubt, so he must leave no
room for doubt. Everything that bears his signature must proclaim the
competence and professionalism of its author. Nevertheless, the developer
should act from the beginning as if he belongs, and knows it, with the fast
company he has chosen to travel with. At every turn, he should assert, with
quiet conviction, his confidence that he is equal to any challenge that
comes his way.
The C-G team will stay at the staff level only during the
fact-gathering stage of pre-development. After the contours of the
opportunity have been ascertained, we intend to address our correspondence
and our calls to the "principals": Robert Buchanan, M.D., Ernest Haddad,
Larry Martin, Ferdinand Colloredo Mansfeld (MGH); Stephen Coyle and his
staff (BRA); and the top brass at each of the relevant instrumentalities of
the Commonwealth. If the developer is not bold in going to the sources of
power, he will undercut his own insistance that he is ready to stand as an
equal with his rivals and with all those who will affect and make the
developer selection.
A simple but effective technique for building credibility is to
demonstrate that one is "in the know". This is done by subtly referencing
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persons you have seen or spoken to, whose identity would be likely to
impress the present listener with the degree to which you have penetrated
the inner sanctum. Credibility is in part merely the perception that one
has the sort of contacts and relationships that assure an audience for one's
plans and ideas. That perception is achieved by developing, and quietly but
effectively publicizing, the desired contacts and relationships.
9) Look for an "edge", and when you find it, milk it till it's bone dry.
A developer must be as cognizant of his strengths as his weaknesses. A
strength is a tool or a mechanism which may be exploited to produce an
"edge". The Sante Harbor Partnership possesses strengths of priority, time
and access. Our strategy is to build on the use of those strengths to
become the most knowledgeable player in the game, to secure a position of
trust and confidence with one of the major institutional participants
(probably MGH), and to put together a strong and credible development team.
All of this must be accomplished in advance of our adding the crucial final
ingredient - an experienced development partner with a successful track
record of luxury housing development. The knowledge we expect to acquire
will give us an edge in credibility and reputation. The hospital tie-in, or
some substitute, will assure that we are part of the process. And the
finding and meshing of the many parts of the team will, together with the
"edges" already discussed, help us persuade the development partner that
joining forces with us would be advantageous to him. Obtaining those
"edges" depends on the ability to sell ourselves to others -- the universe
of observers and participants, the key decision-makers within the essential
project - influencing organizations, the marketplace of possible team
participants. And that ability in turn requires a showing that talking to
or working with us will in some way give our interlocutors an "edge". We
-131-
are realists. Effectuating our strategy demands a showing that we are
giving something of value for what we are getting in return. Where we have
been well-received in researching this thesis, we have gotten a false
picture of the receptivity of very busy people to working with the "new boys
on the block". We know that we have been living a charmed life; and that
advancing Sante Harbor after we lose our student identity cards, will
require an ability to deal in the only currency the marketplace truly
understands - personal or organizational self-interest.
10) Generate a pre-development budget and a credible combination of sources
to meet it.
The frequent use of free expertise (lesson #7) is vitally important for
a fledgling developer; but there is no doubt that money will be necessary to
carry the project to the point at which a development partner can be
approached, and project financing sought. Unless you have clearly and
conservatively anticipated all of your pre-development expenses, you will
run out of money well short of your goal and the seed money you have
expended will be lost. There is an obvious and painful trade-off between
the sources of pre-development funds and the retention of equity. The
earlier in the process you seek a money partner for "mezzanine financing",
and the greater the magnitude of the financial partner's commitment, the
greater the dilution of ownership is likely to be. On the other hand, a
developer - particularly one whose capital is as modest as ours -- is likely
to want to limit his downside risks. The mezzanine partner will typically
enter the process after a real development opportunity has crystalized; and
will commit to funding all of the expenses incurred from that point
(sometimes including a reimbursement of the developer's expenses to date) to
project financing. Depending on the terms of the construction loan, his
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investment will be reimbursed at the first construction draw, or in stages
thereafter.
Our goal is to avoid the necessity for mezzanine financing entirely, if
possible; but more realistically, to carry the project ourselves
sufficiently far so that when the money partner does come in, his total
exposure, the time during which he will have equity in the deal, and the
degree of risk of a total loss of capital, will all be as precisely
quantifiable - and modest - as possible. We intend to use Fowler, Goedecke
to locate and structure our mezzanine financing, much as they have done for
Carpenter & Company and Don Chiofaro. We will obtain a letter from John
Fowler stating his judgment that our project will be attractive to the real
estate venture capital market; and committing to place such financing if, as
and when required.
In this context, the infeasibility of site control may be seen as an
advantage: it means that we will not have to expend the very considerable
sums that would otherwise be required to option or buy the land.
11) Avoid re-inventing the wheel by documenting everything.
Much of the learning that occurs in real estate development is "lost"
because there is no formal mechanism to capture it and pass it on. The
Sante Harbor Partnership will maintain, for this and for all future
development efforts, a looseleaf book, organized by tasks or goals, in which
the progress of our efforts can be observed and charted. This book will
faithfully record all significant activity, and will not be culled to
eliminate evidence of "false starts" or "detours". In our view, the lessons
of the Sante Harbor effort will only become clear when it has run its
course, and the tortuous path which it traveled can be studied and assessed.
Discrimination, choice and judgment should be largely deferred to the end.
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A final project debriefing is anticipated in which all those who played a
role in the development will be asked to review the development book and
respond, in writing, to the questions: what did we learn? What did we do
well? What could be done better? This process of comprehensive
documentation and debriefing should enable us to generate, over time, a C-G
Development Manual (the "bible") in which the how and why of development
tasks are spelled out in detail. When the organization grows, new employees
can learn the C-G way by reading both specific development books and the
firm bible.
This is admittedly an ambitious agenda. We are mindful that the press
of daily activities will frequently threaten to push the documentation
obligation aside. However, since we believe that the faithful performance
of one's documentation responsibilities is essential to our concept of
"learned expertise", we will insist that all employees, as a condition of
employment, document their activities within the week in which they occur.
If we succeed in inculcating a habit of contemporaneous recordation of all
development activity, the C-G partnership will have secured a valuable
competitive edge.
12) Believe in yourself, be patient but know when to quit.
The Sante Harbor effort is certain to be lengthy, circuitous and
problematic. As a fledgling developer, we anticipate a string of early
rebuffs - much like what we experienced in our first approach to the
hospital -- and few words of encouragement. There is no point in even
making the attempt unless one understands how lonely and unrewarding it is
likely to be in its early stages, and how skeptical, and even hostile, our
various audiences will appear. We will have to be sustained by our
self-regard and our belief in the project. And we will have to sustain each
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other. Moreover, even if the strategy, or some variant of it, begins to
work, the monetary gratification will not occur for several years, at best.
Developers contemplating a project like Sante Harbor should be quite
confident of their ability to work for years, if necessary, with meagre
tangible or psychic rewards. Developers rarely regard their own mental
equipment as a possible project-killing impediment, but unless the earliest
reconnaissance considers this issue, a successful project is quite unlikely.
Having launched the project and nurtured it, against all odds, to a
point where the prize appears tantalizingly close, the developer does not
want to consider the possibility of failure. Yet failure is surely more
likely than success, and becomes only marginally less so as the first
elements of the strategy fall into line. In fact, in its earliest stages,
the project may be regarded as such a long-shot that opponents do not feel
obligated to attempt to shoot it down. Only later, when success is within
view, do opponents roll out the heavy-guage artillery. The cruel reality
for the fledgling developer who has elected a "page one debut" is that his
day of reckoning is likely to come later, when the investment, in all its
forms, has reached a truly impressive level. Yet the developer must
understand that, beyond a certain point, further effort may be pointless and
even self-destructive. Since time is the only truly non-renewable resource,
great care must be taken in using it wisely. Our model here is Mort
Zuckerman, who was willing ultimately to throw in the towel on Park Plaza
despite the years of effort and millions of dollars that he had expended on
it. It was a painful and chastening experience; but it saved him and his
company for other battles, with happier results. We will keep Mort
Zuckerman's Park Plaza experience in mind as we pursue Sante Harbor.
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FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY
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Financial Feasibility Summary
Rental Rental Condo Condo
Alternative Alternative Alternative Alternative
1 2 1 2
Total Development Cost 148,544 196,398 179,977 233,615
Equity Required 20,687 73,327 - 31,000
Project Value 151,360 151,360 -
Net Operating Income 15,568 15,568 - -
Return on Asset 10.48% 7.93% 49.60% 15.25%
Net Profit on Sales - - 33.16% 13.23%
This thesis considers Sante Harbor at the earliest stage of
pre-development, before the existence of the opportunity has been widely
perceived and its scope and duration reasonably bounded. Moreover, it is
highly probable that the multiple complexities discussed in the design and
politics sections will preclude a construction start in less than two to
three years. For that reason, among others, a market analysis was not
undertaken: its results could not be more than preliminarily suggestive of
the market niches at which Sante Harbor should be aiming. Nevertheless, a
first cut at financial feasibility was deemed essential for two reasons: to
determine whether, under realistic and conservative assumptions, the project
could be financed if it could be both built and marketed at today's prices;
and to identify areas of particular significance in the ultimate
deal-structure, so that we would have a basis for focusing our energies and
attentions in the elaboration of the Sante Harbor opportunity. This
analysis will explain what we did, will evaluate the results and will
pinpoint those things which should be done, and why, as part of the
financing strategy for Sante Harbor.
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Our analysis was organized as follows. We analyzed the development of
rental and condominium housing separately, each under two basic scenarios.
Alternative 1 assumed no acquisition or site premium cost. We know that the
land will not be free and that we will have to incur significant site
premium costs (because of the poor quality of the soil and the necessity to
create a desirable living environment out of what is now an urban
wasteland). But we wanted to see how the project looked under a highly
favorable set of assumptions. If it was only marginal then, it would appear
to be difficult to negotiate a deal structure that would produce
satisfactory returns. Conversely, a very favorable return on asset would
indicate that there was "room" in the project to accommodate a significant
land payment and contribution toward site improvements. How much "room"
would be suggested by considering the sensitivity of the "return on asset"
to changes in the assumed land cost.
The second scenario is based on our best estimate of the land and site
costs under current conditions. The land unserviced cost is $25/saleable
square foot, $30,000 per unit and 12.5% of the forecast sales price for an
average unit. Some sales of new land have occurred in the last year to
condo developers at between 30 and 40 dollars per saleable foot, but we
believe that this location does not warrant a "top of the market" price.
The site premium cost is in considerable doubt but we chose a number
slightly higher on a percentage basis than what has been projected for Piers
1, 2, 3, where the developer anticipates incurring substantial expense - as
for the dredging of a canal - to create an imageable community where none
presently exists. We would expect that the infrastructure costs at Sante
Harbor - such as for building a new Nashua Street -- would be subsidized or
shared by all of the uses to be created in the immediate vicinity.
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Together, the two apartment and condominium scenarios would set parameters
or boundaries within which the economic potential of Sante Harbor could be
assessed.
You will note that the total development cost for rental alternative #2
is simply the total development cost for rental alternative #1 plus the
assumed acquisition and site premium cost. (The identical relationship
exists for the condominium alternatives except that the carrying cost is
plainly higher for the second alternative.) The financial feasibility model
derives a mortgage loan amount and a maximum equity investment based on a
realistic debt coverage ratio, mortgage constant and desired rate of return
on equity. It also produces a project value equal to the sum of the equity
investment and mortgage loan which the project will support. We have noted
with an asterisk the major return measures which indicate the project's
investment potential.
The first thing to do is to compare project value and total development
cost. Unless the value that has been created exceeds the cost of
development, the project would seem to flunk a very basic test of
feasibility. The second key criterion is the return on asset or gross yield
(net operating income divided by total development cost). Here, what you
should be looking for is a return at least one to three points higher than
current long-term interest rates for safe (U.S. Government Securities)
investments. (Thirty year bonds are currently yielding approximately
10.7%). The required equity return will vary with the level of risk.
Finally, the return on equity is the ratio of the cash flow before taxes to
the required equity, the so-called cash-on-cash return (here note that under
both rental alternatives we assumed a required equity - to be "kept in" the
project as reserves - equal to 110% of the equity amount which, when added
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to the mortgage loan amount, would equal the total development cost). The
required equity yield varies with the interest rate environment, the city
and the type of risk. Current cash-on-cash returns for first-quality, fully
occupied, credit-tenanted downtown office buildings (still considered to be
the real estate investment most resembling an investment-grade bond) are
reported to be in the 7-9% range. Considering the riskiness of a major
luxury rental project in an unproven location, we felt that an equity yield
of 12% would approximate what an investor would expect today.
The condominium analysis varied the assumptions used in the rental
analysis only in a few respects: the hard cost of construction was assumed
to be 10% higher, and 200 of the parking spaces were assumed to be held off
the market, as guest parking. No income and expense analysis was done and
the financial feasibility model, accordingly, could not be used. A line
item for "carrying cost" is essential since the condominium can not all be
assumed to be presold. The Heritage, the proposed 88 unit super-luxury
condominium at Arlington Street and Hadassah Way, anticipates a 14 month
sell-out with 50% presales and an average 35% of the units unsold for the
entire marketing period. Those assumptions produced a carrying cost equal
to almost 6% of total condominium development costs. We used a more
conservative 8% because we anticipate a more modest level of presales.
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Evaluation of Results
Rental Alternative 1: Sensitivity of ROA and
Rent
$2,500
$2,600
$2,700
$2,800
$2,900
ROE to Monthly Rents
ROA ROE Rent ROA Rent
10.48% 12.54% $3,000 12.34% $3,500
10.85% 17.19% $3,100 12.71% $3,600
11.22% 26.30% $3,200 13.08% $3,700
11.60% 52.17% $3,300 13.45% $3,800
11.97% 672.34% $3,400 13.83% $3,900
Rental Alternative 2: Sensitivity of ROA and
ROE to Monthly Rents
ROA
14.20%
14.57%
14.94%
15.31%
15.68%
Rent ROA ROE Rent ROA Rent ROA
$2,500 7.93% 3.54% $3,000 9.33% $3,500 10.74%
$2,600 8.21% 3.94% $3,100 9.61% $3,600 11.02%
$2,700 8.49% 4.40% $3,200 9.90% $3,700 11.30%
$2,800 8.77% 4.94% $3,300 10.18% $3,800 11.58%
$2,900 9.05% 5.58% $3,400 10.46% $3,900 11.86%
Rental Alternative 2: Sensitivity of ROA
to Acquisition and Site Premium Costs
Combined Acq.
& Site Prem. Acquisition ROA
27,000,000 $10,000,000 8.93%
32,000,000 $15,000,000 8.65%
37,000,000 $20,000,000 8.40%
42,000,000 $25,000,000 8.16%
47,000,000 $30,000,000 7.93%
52,000,000 $35,000,000 7.71%
57,000,000 $40,000,000 7.51%
62,000,000 $45,000,000 7.31%
67,000,000 $50,000,000 7.13%
72,000,000 $55,000,000 6.95%
77,000,000 $60,000,000 6.79%
The Rental Alternative.
We began with the hypothesis that unsubsidized rental housing might,
contrary to the reigning consensus, be financable under prevailing
conditions in Boston. Our notion was that market rent levels were
approaching a level at which they would produce financable yields. We did
not do a rental market analysis but we did enough research to learn that
luxury rents were approaching, and in some cases exceeding, $2000 per month
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for 2 bedroom downtown apartments. We wanted to test whether those numbers
might make it possible to profitably develop rental housing.
It would seem from a perusal of the rental numbers that our intuition
was wrong. Even under the artificially favorable circumstance of no land or
site costs, the return on asset figure falls considerably short of the
desired 13% (or 3% higher than current long-term Treasury yields). The
project value is less than 2% greater than the project cost, an
uncomfortably thin margin of value creation. The equity return would appear
to be above the threshold 12% but in truth it is not. That is because we
achieved a favorable mortgage constant of 10% only by surrendering to a
project lender a full 50% of Sante Harbor's economic benefits, including
cash flow. In reality, therefore, the equity yield is only 6.27%. Finally,
we exceed the target return on asset at $3200 and achieve returns comparable
to those of condominium alternative #2 only at rents of nearly $3800 per
month.
The prospects for successful development of luxury rentals would seem
even bleaker than that. Alternative #2 imputes a realistic land and site
cost, and then tests how changes in the acquisition cost affect the gross
yield. Using the "base case" assumptions, the key parameters of feasibility
fall to truly abyssmal levels. Project value is only 77% of total
development cost; the ROA is at only 61% of the required mark: and the
equity yield falls to a nearly inconsequential 3.54%. Furthermore, the ROA
still falls short of the threshold yield when the rent is escalated to
$3900, a level that would make even some hard-boiled New Yorkers gasp in
astonishment. Lastly, the ROA seems quite insensitive to downward
modifications in the land cost. If the land cost is cut by 2/3 (to $10
million), the ROA increases only 1%.
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If a market analysis indicates that Sante Harbor would have excellent
market acceptance as a rental project, but not a condominium, does this
"first cut" feasibility study indicate that the matter is not worth further
consideration? What strategies might be pursued to produce a more
favorable, but still realistic, set of returns?
It is essential to recognize that this analysis, though adequate when a
project is in its infancy, does not consider many factors which will have a
bearing on a project's feasibility and value. It entirely omits any
reference to tax impacts; it ignores the timing of cash outflows and income,
without which one is unable to measure the discounted present value of any
real estate opportunity; and it neglects as well an analysis which would
take the project from its stabilized year through an assumed holding period
to a sale. As a result of these omissions, three of the four components of
real estate return - tax benefits, equity buildup and appreciation, which
may be "pulled out" of a project through a refinancing or a sale - are not
considered. Given these omissions, the inadequacy of the key financial
parameters under our "first cut" analysis may not be fatal.
If it become necessary to produce a financing package for the
development of luxury housing at Sante Harbor, the following possibilities
would be worth exploring:
1) Perform a 10 year discounted, after-tax, cash flow analysis concluding
with a sale. Since housing is among the most favored forms of investment
under our tax code, and is likely to remain so even after reforms are
enacted, we would expect that tax benefits would contribute a substantial
fraction of the total net present value of a Sante Harbor development. The
analysis should consider a variety of sale scenarios including the in-house
conversion of the project to condominium at various points in its life
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cycle, a sale to a condo converter, or a sale to an apartment investor. The
sale of the project could be expected to produce a significant return to the
equity investor. (Note that even under an unmodified rental alternative 2,
the financial feasibility model legitimates a mortgage loan equal to 66% of
project cost, leaving only 34% to be raised from equity sources.) In short,
a more complete analysis of the rental alternative might indicate that the
project can be made to work through an artful combination of reduced upfront
costs, mortgage interest writedowns and full utilization of available tax
benefits.
Let us consider how each of these elements of a workable Sante Harbor
financing package might be achieved.
2) Upfront costs might be reduced by persuading MGH to become a partner in
the venture. If their land were contributed "at cost" in return for a 25%
interest in all of the benefits of ownership -- except tax benefits, which
as a tax exempt institution they would not need -- they could anticipate a
first year cash flow of over $600,000 and the venture, by that single
maneuver, would approach a 10% ROA.
3) In return for obtaining inexpensive long-term mortgage financing, if it
is available at all, we would probably have to alter the exclusively luxury
appeal of Sante Harbor. The typical low-interest housing loan requires that
20% of the units be reserved for persons who earn less than 80% of the
median income in the SMSA. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that
if 200 units were rented at $750 monthly instead of $2500, the gross rental
income for the project would be reduced by 14%. That is a significant loss;
but if a long-term loan could be obtained at 2/3 to 3/4 of the prevailing
rate, with little or no surrender of equity, Sante Harbor ought to give it
very careful consideration. We are mindful, as well, that reserving 20% of
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the units for persons of low-to-moderate income would be helpful in
shepherding the project through the dicey political minefield before it. If
some way were found for giving preference to MGH staffers to satisfy the 20%
requirement, the financing strategy would dovetail nicely with the
implementation strategy. We are aware that the acceptance of this form of
low-interest debt may restrict the ability to convert the building to
condominiums for some period of time.
4) The Sante Harbor project will produce very substantial tax losses under
almost any rental scenario. If the depreciable base of the building is $150
million (nothing for land or infrastructure improvements) and the current 18
year recovery period is continued, the project will generate losses in the
range of 5.73 million dollars annually (8.33 million depreciation less cash
flow). This creates a significant syndication opportunity. At the present
time, any syndication analysis would be rank speculation; but when the issue
is ripe, and the future tax environment clarified, we intend to approach
several major apartment syndicators (like the March Company and Boston
Financial Technology Group) to solicit their advise and counsel on whether,
and how, a syndication could help to make Sante Harbor feasible as a rental
development.
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Condo Alternative 1: Sensitivity
to ROA to Sales $/SF
Sale $/SF
$150
$160
$170
$180
$190
$200
$210
$220
$230
$240
$250
of ROA
ROA
16.26%
22.93%
29.60%
36.27%
42.93%
49.60%
56.27%
62.94%
69.60%
76.27%
82.94%
Condo Alternative 2: Sensitivity of
to Sales $/SF; and Acquisition Cost
Sales $/SF ROA
$150 -10.43%
$160 -5.29%
$170 -0.16%
$180 4.98%
$190 10.12%
$200 15.25%
$210 20.39%
$220 25.53%
$230 30.66%
$240 35.80%
$250 40.94%
The Condominium Alternative
This alternative seems to "pass"
land and site premium costs of nearly
Acquisition
$10,000,000
$15,000,000
$20,000,000
$25,000,000
$30,000,000
$35,000,000
$40,000,000
$45,000,000
$50,000,000
$55,000,000
$60,000,000
ROA
28.30%
24.77%
21.43%
18.26%
15.25%
12.40%
9.60%
7.09%
4.61%
2.25%
.00%
the basic feasibility test. Assuming
50 million, we anticipate a total
development cost (exclusive of carrying charges) of some 140.60/square foot.
(That allocates 22% of total development cost to parking) The Piers 1, 2, 3
projections, which target a $300/square foot market, project a cost of
$125/square foot. Although we're not sure that the two numbers are
precisely comparable, we do take some comfort in the fact that our projected
costs in the "base case" are only 89% of a contemporaneous set of
projections for a project that is aiming at a considerably wealthier segment
ROA
-146-
of the market. Our projections for the price of a parking space are also
eminently achievable in the current market. Finally, holding 200 spaces for
guest parking represents a $3 million cost for which we have included no
return. Thus, we believe that a credible argument can be made for the
realism of the "base case".
The "base case" produces an economic return that appears to be above
the required threshold and within the range of industry expectations. The
ROA is 15.25% and the net profit on sales (profit margin) is 13.23%. By
comparison, the Druker Company's Heritage project forecasts an ROA of 16.21%
and a margin of 13.94%. A closer examination of the figures suggests,
however, that artful deal-structuring and assiduous construction management
will be necessary to keep the returns at a satisfactory level.
1) First, the returns are highly sensitive to the sales price per square
foot. A reduction of only 5% to $190/SF, causes the ROA to plummet 34%, to
10.12%. And at $180/SF, the ROA is under 5%. The improvement in ROA is no
less dramatic for increases in the forecast sales price per square foot. At
$210/SF, ROA is 20.39%; and at $220, 25.53%. Our conclusion is plain. The
market study must identify a very narrow range within which we can expect to
achieve a rapid absorption of units, and the project should not be
undertaken unless a healthy percentage of presales is recorded.
2) In contrast to what we observed in analyzing rental alternative 2, the
ROA is highly sensitive to changes in the land cost. A $10 million
reduction in acquisition cost - to $20 million - will cause the ROA to rise
6.17%, to 21.43%. We did not test the combined effect of lowering the land
cost and changing the sales per square foot, but it is intuitively obvious
that reducing the up-front exposure will diminish the sensitivity of ROA to
modest changes in sales per square foot, thus stretching the uncomfortably
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thin margin for error apparent in the base case. This analysis suggests
that a major effort should be made to persuade MGH to "joint venture" the
development of the Sante Harbor condominiums.
3) That conclusion is buttressed when one considers the practical
obstacles to a realistic Sante Harbor financing package. The sheer size of
the project makes financing problematic: few lenders would be willing, or
able, to make the loan themselves. The most that could be obtained from a
consortium of lenders would be $202 million (75% of project value). If we
were working with the base case, that would mean that equity of over $30
million would be necessary. That too is a tall order. If, however, MGH
accepted a joint venture position and looked to the profit potential of
Sante Harbor for their return, all sorts of possibilities would open up.
Not least important, it would allow the developer more flexibility in
stretching the project out over several phases if the market analysis
suggested the desirability of doing so.
Conclusion. The financability of a Sante Harbor rental project would have
to be regarded as a difficult proposition today, and could be accomplished,
if at all, only by some combination of joint venturing with MGH, reduced
finance charge and full utilization of available tax benfits. Condominiums
would be easier to finance; but since they produce no cash flows, are tax
disfavored (their gain is taxed at ordinary rates) and produce returns which
vary greatly with modest swings in sales per square foot, any mechanism that
reduces the degree of upfront exposure would greatly aid in persuading
investors that the downside risk is not incommensurate with the potential
for gain.
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Pro Forma Operating Statement
Rental Alternative 1
Income:
Gross Rental Income $30,000,000
Less: Vacancy (1,500,000)
Other Income (7) 210,000
Parking (8) 2,520,000
Total Income $31,230,000
Expenses:
5.00% Management Fee (7) $ 1,561,500
4.10% Other Amin. (7) 1,230,000
Sub-Total Admin. $ 2,791,500
16.50% Oper. Expense (7) $ 5,550,000
7.30% Maint. Expense (7) 2,190,000
10.00% Tax/Ins. Exp. (7) 3,000,000
5.00% Other Expenses (7) 1,500,000
25.00% Parking Expense (8) 630,000
Total Expense $15,661,500
Net Operating Income $15,568,500
Sante Harbor Financial Feasibility
Rental Alternative 1
Assumptions:
Acquisition Cost (1)
Site Premium Cost (2)
Number of Units (3)
Avg. Unit Size (3)
Bldg. Efficiency - %
Total Square Feet
Construction Cost/SF (4)
Total Const. Cost
Parking Spaces/Unit
Const. Cost/Space (5)
Total Parking Spaces
Total Parking Cost
Soft Costs (6)
Soft Cost/SF 30% TCC & P
Total Dev'l Cost
Avg. Cost/Unit
Unit Cost/SF
Total Cost/SF
Operating Assumptions:
Rental Income/Unit/Mo.
Vacancy Rate
Other Income: % GRI
Parking: $140.00/Mo./Space
Management Fee
Admin. Exp.: % GRI
Operating Exp.: % GRI
Maint. Exp.: % GRI
Tax/Ins. Exp.: % GRI
Other Expenses: % GRI
Parking Expense: % PI
0
0
1,000
1,200
85%
1,411,765
$65.00
$91,764,706
1.5
$15,000
1,500
$22,500,000
34,279,412
CC $24.28
$148,544,118
148,544
$123.79
$105.22
$2,500
5.00%
0.70%
5.00%
4.10%
18.50%
7.30%
10.00%
5.00%
25.00%
Financial Feasibility Model
Gross Income $32,730,000
- Vacancy & Expenses 17,161,500
Net Oper. Income $15,568,500
/ Debt Coverage Ratio 1.2
Annual Debt Service $12,973,750
/ Mortgage Constant (9) 0.1
Mortgage Loan Amount $129,737,500
Net Operating Income $15,568,500
Less: Annual Debt Svc. 12,973,750
Cash Flow Before Taxes
to Equity $ 2,594,750
/ Desired Rate of Return
on Equity 12.00%
Maximum Equity Invest. $21,622,917
Plus: Mortg. Loan Amt. 129,737,500
Project Value $151,360,417
Return on Asset (ROA) 10.48%
Equity Required $20,687,279
Cash Flow Before Taxes 2,594,750
Return on Equity 12.54%
Total Development Cost
Total Income
Total Expenses
Net Operating Income
Gross Yield (ROA)
$148,544,118
31,230,000
15,661,500
15,568,500
10.48%
NOTES:
1. Assumes no acquisition cost.
2. Assumes no site premium cost.
3. Assumed Market analysis.
4. Chief Estimator, Vappi and Co.
5. Piers 1,2,3 projections.
6. Jim McKellar
7. Institute of R.E. Mgmt; "Income/
Expense Analysis, Apartments,
Boston, Unfurnished Elevator Bldgs.
8. Meyers Parking Systems, Boston,
North End Garage estimate.
($25.00/SF/YR [URSF])
9. John Fowler, current participating
debt terms: 10% interest plus
50% participation.
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Pro Forma Operating Statement
Rental Alternative 2
Income:
Gross Rental Income $30,000,000
Less: Vacancy (1,500,000)
Other Income (7) 210,000
Parking (8) 2,520,000
Total Income $31,230,000
Expenses:
5.00% Management Fee (7) $ 1,561,500
4.10% Other Amin. (7) 1,230,000
Sub-Total Admin. $ 2,791,500
18.50% Oper. Expense (7) $ 5,550,000
7.30% Maint. Expense (7) 2,190,000
10.00% Tax/Ins. Exp. (7) 3,000,000
5.00% Other Expenses (7) 1,500,000
25.00% Parking Expense (8) 630,000
Total Expense $15,661,500
Net Operating Income $15,568,500
Sante Harbor Financial Feasibility
Rental Alternative 2
Assumptions:
Acquisition Cost (1) $30,00
Site Premium Cost (2) 17,85
Number of Units (3)
Avg. Unit Size (3)
Bldg. Efficiency - %
Total Square Feet 1,41
Construction Cost/SF (4) $
Total Const. Cost $91,76
Parking Spaces/Unit
Const. Cost/Space (5) $1
Total Parking Spaces
Total Parking Cost $22,50
Soft Costs (6) 34,27
Soft Cost/SF 30% TCC & PCC $
Total Dev'l Cost $196,39
Avg. Cost/Unit 19
Unit Cost/SF $1
Total Cost/SF $1
Operating Assumptions:
Rental Income/Unit/Mo.
Vacancy Rate
Other Income: % GRI
Parking: $140.00/Mo./Space
Management Fee
Admin. Exp.: % GRI
Operating Exp.: % GRI
Maint. Exp.: % GRI
Tax/Ins. Exp.: % GRI
Other Expenses: % GRI
Parking Expense: % PI
0,000
4,412
1,000
1,200
85%
1,765
65.00
4,706
1.5
5,000
1,500
0,000
9,412
24.28
8,529
6,399
63.67
39.12
$2,500
5.00%
0.70%
5.00%
4.10%
18.50%
7.30%
10.00%
5.00%
25.00%
Financial Feasibility Model
Gross Income
- Vacancy & Expenses
Net Oper. Income
/ Debt Coverage Ratio
Annual Debt Service
/ Mortgage Constant (9)
Mortgage Loan Amount
$32,730,000
17,161,500
$15,568,500
1.2
$12,973,750
0.1
$129,737,500
Net Operating Income $15,568,500
Less: Annual Debt Svc. 12,973,750
Cash Flow Before Taxes
to Equity $ 2,594,750
/ Desired Rate of Return
on Equity 12.00%
Maximum Equity Invest. $21,622,917
Plus: Mortg. Loan Amt. 129,737,500
Project Value $151,360,417
Return on Asset (ROA) 10.48%
Equity Required $73,327,132
Cash Flow Before Taxes 2,594,750
Return on Equity 3.54%
Total Development Cost
Total Income
Total Expenses
Net Operating Income
Gross Yield (ROA)
$196,398,529
31,230,000
15,661,500
15,568,500
7.93%
NOTES:
1. $25/Salable square foot.
2. 10% of Total Dev'l Cost
(Piers 1,2,3)
3. Assumed market analysis.
4. Chief Estimator, Vappi and Co.
5. Piers 1,2,3 projections.
6. Jim McKellar
7. Institute of R.E. Mgmt.; "Income/
Expense Analysis, Apartments,"
Boston, Unfurnished Elevator
Buildings.
($25.00/SF/YR [URSF])
8. Meyers Parking Systems, Boston,
North End Garage estimate.
9. John Fowler, current participating
debt terms: 10% interest plus
50% participation.
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Pro Forma Operating Statement
Condominium Alternative 1
Acquisition Cost $ 0
Site Premium Cost 0
Construction Costs (1) 100,941,176
Parking Cost (2) 22,500,000
Soft Costs (3) 37,0329353
Hard Cost Contingency (4) 6,172,059
Sub-Total 166,645,588
Carrying Cost (5) 13,3319647
Total Development Cost $179,977,235
Total Number of Units (6) 1,000
Unit Size (6) 1,200
Price/SF (6a) $200
Sub-Total Condominium Sales $240,000,000
Total Parking Spaces (?) 1,500
Less: Guest Parking: 1 Space/5 Units 200
Parking Spaces to be Sold 1,300
Cost/Space $22,500
Sub-Total Parking Sales $ 29,250,000
Total Project Sales $269,250,000
Gross Potential Profit $ 89,272,765
Return on Asset (8) 49.60%*
Total Project Sales $269,250,000
Total Development Cost 179,977,235
Net Profit $ 89,272,765
Net Profit on Sales (Profit/Sales) 33.16%*
Assumptions:
Number of Units
Avg. Unit Size
Bldg. Efficiency - %
Total Square Feet
Construction Cost/SF
Total Const. Cost
Parking Spaces/Unit
Const. Cost/Space
Total Parking Spaces
Total Parking Cost
Soft Costs
Soft Cost/SF 30% TCC & PCC
Total Dev'l Cost
Avg. Cost/Unit
Unit Cost/SF
Total Cost/SF
Carrying Cost: % Total
Hard Cost Contingency
Sale Price/SF
Parking Space Price
Infrastructure: % of Cost
Land Cost: $/Salable SF
1,000
1,200
85%
1,411,765
$7-1.50
$100,941,176
1.5
$15,000
1,500
$ 22,500,000
37,032,353
$26.23
$160,473,529
160,474
$133.73
$113.67
8.00%
5.00%
$200*
$22,500
0.00%
$0
NOTES:
1. $71.5/SF (10% higher than
rental alternative).
2. $15,000/space (Piers 1,2,3
projections).
3. 30% of hard costs (Jim
McKellar)
4. 5% of hard cost (The Heritage
projections).
5. Sales period interest, taxes,
operating expenses (Total
development cost X 8%).
6. Assumed market analysis.
6a. Piers 1,2,3 projections are
$300/SF
7. 1.5 spaces/dwelling unit
8. Total condo sales less total
condo development costs
divided by total condo
development cost (no land or
site premium cost).
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Pro Forma Operating Statement
Condominium Alternative 2
Acquisition Cost (1) $ 30,000,000
Site Premium Cost (2) 19,664,559
Construction Costs (3) 100,941,176
Parking Cost (4) 22,500,000
Soft Costs (5) 37,032,353
Hard Cost Contingency (6) 6,172,059
Sub-Total 216,310,147
Carrying Cost (7) 17,304,812
Total Development Cost $233,614,959
Total Number of Units (8) 1,000
Unit Size (8) 1,200
Price/SF (8a) $200
Sub-Total Condominium Sales $240,000,000
Total Parking Spaces (9) 1,500
Less: Guest Parking: 1 Space/5 Units 200
Parking Spaces to be Sold 1,300
Cost/Space $22,500
Sub-Total Parking Sales $ 29,250,000
Total Project Sales $269,250,000
Gross Potential Profit $ 35,635,041
Return on Asset (10) 15.25%*
Total Project Sales $269250,000
Total Development Cost 233,614,959
Net Profit $ 35,635,041
Net Profit on Sales (Profit/Sales) 13.23%*
Assumptions:
Number of Units
Avg. Unit Size
Bldg. Efficiency - %
Total Square Feet
Construction Cost/SF
Total Const. Cost
Parking Spaces/Unit
Const. Cost/Space
Total Parking Spaces
Total Parking Cost
Soft Costs
Soft Cost/SF 30% TCC & PCC
Total Dev'l Cost
Avg. Cost/Unit
Unit Cost/SF
Total Cost/SF
Carrying Cost: % Total
Hard Cost Contingency
Sale Price/SF
Parking Space Price
Infrastructure: % of Cost
Land Cost: $/Salable SF
NOTES:
1,000
1,200
85%
1,411,765
$71.50
$100,941,176
1.5
$15,000
1,500
$ 22,500,000
37,032,353
$26.23
$160,473,529
160,474
$133.73
$113.67
8.00%
5.00%
$200
$22,500
10.00%
$25
1. $25/salable square foot.
2. 10% of total condo development
cost less site premium plus
carrying costs.
3. $71.5/SF (10% higher than
rental alternative)
4. $15,000/space (Piers 1,2,3
projections).
5. 30% of hard costs (Jim
McKellar)
6. 5% of hard cost (The Heritage
projections).
7. Sales period interest, taxes,
operating expenses (Total
development cost X 8%).
8. Assumed market analysis.
8a. Piers 1,2,3 projections are $300/SF
9. 1.5 space/dwelling unit.
10. Total condo sales less total
development costs divided by
total condo development cost.
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Outline for a Market Study of Sante Harbor
A complete market analysis will produce revenue forecasts for a series
of alternative economic scenarios over the projected ownership cycle. The
revenue forecasts will in turn constitute data to be used in the investorts
return/risk analysis. Typically, the investor's return/risk analysis will
consider the proposed investment under realistic base (most likely), best
(optimistic), and worst (pessimistic) case scenarios. The market analysis
should, in a professional feasibility study, feed directly into the
return/risk analysis by generating base, best and worst case revenue
forecasts.
This chapter analyzes each of the steps in the market analysis process.
For each step, we summarize the underlying theory (why the step is useful),
the methodology (how the analysis is performed) and the output. This
section constitutes a primer on the theory and practice of market analysis,
including both macro and micro (project-specific) elements.
It is our view that such an analysis need not be performed for every
project, and that in fact a full-scale analysis will seldom be necessary or
even desirable. If one has identified a site and an intended use, there
will obviously be no need to select a target SMSA (although one may want to
perform a growth forecast on that SMSA as part of the "go-no go" decision).
The where and what having been answered a priori, the market analysis will
be concerned simply with yes-no, how much, for whom and when.
Selecting Target SMSAs
The underlying theory here is that, ceteris paribus, it is better to
invest in cities and regions that are growing than in those which are stable
or declining. Growth is measured by population, jobs and income. Real
estate developers would ordinarily be more concerned with the measure of
-154-
growth that is most likely to influence the particular products they intend
to develop -- housing specialists are interested in population growth;
office developers, job growth, etc. The sheer size of an SMSA, together
with the diversity of its employment mix, furnish fairly reliable evidence
of its general immunity or at least resistance to both short-term cyclical
fluctuations and long-term structural decline. Even if a region will not
grow, if it is resistant to a generalized decline the developer will feel
justified in believing that his investment has a measure of protection on
the downside. Particularly if a developer is contemplating a major
investment which cannot be built and sold during the expansionary phase of a
single economic cycle, he should seek to make his investment in a stable
metropolitan area. Stability is reflected in "universities and research
parks, sophisticated engineering firms and financial institutions, public
relations firms and advertising agencies, transportation networks and
utilities systems."I Broadly speaking, such instrumentalities are
transaction facilitators and producers of innovation which in critical mass
will at the least "soften the shock of exogenous change by minimizing the
impact of a dying industry on the metro area."2
Having explained briefly what the developer should be looking for, we
now turn our attention to how he might find it. The goal at this stage is
to identify those metro area statistics which will permit us to compare and
evaluate SMSAs to select a target for additional market studies and
marketability analyses. It is apparent that this discussion is not directly
applicable to the Sante Harbor project, since we have answered the where and
the what questions a priori.
The key measures of SMSA growth are:
-- Population. The growth or decline of an SMSA's population may not
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be as important as its source. An increase in births relative to deaths
will create little immediate demand for new real estate product; but a
significant inmigration of adults, such as has been occurring in Florida for
many years, will. Note also that it is not an easy matter to forecast
population growth - the results can vary widely depending on assumptions
about inmigration, household size, birth rates, death rates and fertility
rates.
-- Birthrates. The birthrate will be affected among other things by
social mores, which are difficult to forecast, and by the age cohort of the
population over time. For example, because the baby boom generation is now
in its peak reproductive years, household formation rates can be expected to
be temporarily robust, and housing and related goods in great demand, so
long as the high rates of household formation persist.
-- Fertility is basically a measure of the number of births over a
woman's lifetime. During the baby boom years American families expected to
have three plus children. Today, the expectation is for about two. That is
a change of epochal dimension which has far greater long-term significance
than the birthrate at any one time.
-- Death rates. The gain in life expectancy has been dramatic in the
twentieth century. This has been achieved mainly by reducing the incidence
of mortality during childhood and before the age of fifty. To achieve
significant further declines in death rates will depend upon progress
against the diseases of the old. Regardless, however, sub-replacement
fertility rates and the present age distribution of the population assure a
continuation of the widely noted "graying of America".
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-- Inmigration. The United States has always been a magnet for the
poor and disaffected of other countries. What may not be generally
understood is that "The [current] ratio of total net migration to total
growth . . . nearly 40 percent . . . is . . . greater . . . than than
reached at the peak European inmigration a century ago."3 Although there is
much debate about the significance of this phenomenon, the weight of
informed opinion is that it contributes to economic ferment and vitality
provided it does not become totally uncontrolled.
-- Household composition. Housing developers, in particular, are
vitally concerned with the demand for net new dwelling units. This measure
of housing demand is highly sensitive to changes in average household size.
Where the age and income distribution of the population point toward smaller
household units, housing investment should produce superior returns
(particularly since the profit on smaller units is higher per foot of
developed space).
-- Overall measures of employment and new-job formation. An SMSA with
high employment, low unemployment and a high rate of new job formation would
appear to be well-positioned for future growth. Yet such a location could
be undercut by its own success if labor shortages develop and the wage rate
and cost of doing business rise so quickly that business expansion is choked
off.
As this recital of the factors underlying growth should indicate,
targeting an SMSA is an art, not a science, and furthermore one in which the
goal is careful risk management rather than optimization. There is
assuredly no sense in rank ordering any substantial number of SMSAs as
candidates for investment, though a better case can be made that SMSAs can
be usefully grouped into broad categories such an highly desirable,
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desirable or undesirable. It must be emphasized that investment in a highly
desirable SMSA could prove disastrous; while a mature, stable SMSA, or even
a declining one, will surely present numerous opportunities for locating an
unappreciated gem. The process of choice cannot be reduced to an equation
or formula, but rather requires a healthy dose of developer's intuition.
The acuity of a developer's feel, however, will likely improve if he is
fully informed about the relevant SMSA's prospects for growth or decline.
Identifying Investment Opportunities
We are now concerned with determining what sorts of real estate
investment are most appropriate in the target SMSA, and what levels of
pricing and production of that use are consistent with predicted rates of
absorption. We are still at the "macro" level in that we are not attempting
to forecast the market acceptance of a particular idea in a specified
location. Instead we are testing a range of possible uses and locations
against the existing and forecast stock of those possible uses and the
demand for them. A real estate market study is a demand oriented macro
analysis which studies the existing economic base of a specified market area
(like an SMSA) to distill the determinants of demand. The product of this
analysis is a compilation of aggregated data whose presentation and
interpretation gives a highly representational "snapshot" of the target
market. How the real estate investor may most effectively exploit the
opportunities revealed by the market study for acquisition or development of
real estate assets is the focus of the marketability (micro) phase of the
analysis. The market study will be flawed if it is limited strictly to
economic activities. An area's attitudes toward growth, the ability and
depth of its political leadership, the honesty and competence with which it
seeks to identify and attack its problems, the quality of its educational
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system at all levels, the age, maintenance and upkeep of its transportation
and utility infrastructure, its tax environment and attitudes toward public
spending, all play a role in predicting the potential for orderly and
sustained growth, as opposed to spasmodic boom-bust fluctuations.
The elements of a market study include:
- an economic base analysis which delineates the market area and
catalogues basic (production of goods and services for export) and non-basic
(supportive activities) economic activities. These furnish the bases for
the forecasts of population, employment, personal income, earnings, etc. of
the SMSA and the interpretive ratio analyses which are derived from them.
Ratio analysis is really a simplified form of econometric modelling. It
seeks to derive meaningful multipliers relating the export base segment of
the given market to the other sectors of the economy, and then to population
growth as well. For the large-scale development whose implementation is
expected to require seven to ten years or more, it may be advisable to
engage a firm with expertise in econometric forecasting (like Data Resources
or Chase Econometrics) to perform the desired analysis. The economic base
analysis will certainly contain:
- projections of total employment during the forecast period.
- projections of future population, based in part upon an observed
ratio between employment and population in the base year.
- projections of future housing need, based on the previously
identified trends in fertility, birthrates, household formation and
inmigration.
This list might be extended, but the important point is to "convert
employment and population growth into gross crude indicators of the overall
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demand for land use in the appropriate residential, retail and industrial
categories." 4
Several matters of technique bear special mention. First, to maintain
comparability between SMSAs, the study should use Standard Industrial
Classifications (SIC) to identify basic and non-basic sectors. Second, the
developer should understand the analyst's choice of the SMSA, the labor
market area or the primary-secondary-tertiary retail trading area as the
analytical unit. Finally, if the developer is performing his own analysis
based on existing sources of data, he should be especially wary of
population projections that are sometimes "a product of the rich imagination
of community boosters seeking to realize self-fulfilling prophecies." 5
Accepting ill-considered rosy forecasts at face value contributes to the
unfortunate prevalence of periodic over - or underbuilding that continues to
bedevil real estate investors.
The market study may cover as well the following elements. There will
be a supply and demand analysis showing current inventory for the defined
use, current occupancy levels, vacancies, annual production and absorption
for a period of years, and current asking rents or land prices. The raw
data of the supply and demand analysis must be sifted and subjected to the
analyst's informed judgment. Vacancies, for example, should be categorized
by rent levels and income classes. The vacancy level in the target market
is the investor's real concern. The analyst must be sensitive to
potentially significant nuances such as the degree of substitutability
between apparently stratified rent levels. If class A property is in short
supply but class B is glutted, the softness in the B market may act as a
depressant on class A rents (if the market is one in which certain tenants
will accept a lesser product). A qualitative analysis of the nature of the
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vacant or unsold inventory may reveal facts, such as an inappropriate
amenity package or unsuitable building materials, which will help to assure
that serious design flaws do not occur.
The product of the supply and demand analysis is the market absorption
rate in the targeted submarket. It should be a simple matter to determine
how long it will take for the market to absorb current unsold or unleased
inventory at recent historic absorption rates. If this analysis suggests
that significant overbuilding has occurred or is occurring, the developer's
margin for risk may be unacceptably tight, in that even the best location
and superior design may fail to command the required rents or sales prices.
The final element of the market study is a careful survey of the
competition. This element may have somewhat less utility for a
multi-phased, multi-year project since some of the competition may not even
be in the planning stage when the study is performed; and yet the developer
should care greatly about which projects in his target market have been
notably successful and why. There is no patent on good ideas; and with
appropriate adaptations, the developer may profitably reprise aspects of his
competitors' projects that have proved their worth in the market. We intend
to use the existing Condex database on condominium sales in Boston (Suffolk
County) to isolate those amenity and product packages that have the greatest
appeal, in terms of willingness to pay, for our target markets.
Project - Specific Analysis
We are now at the level of location - specific micromarket analysis.
The previous level of analysis generated a predicted market absorption rate
for the proposed use - for example, how many rental or for - sale housing
units can be absorbed, at specified rent or sales prices, within the Boston
SMSA or the city of Boston. Here we narrow our focus to our specific site.
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We want to know how many units, of what type and price, can be rented or
sold there, containing what features and amenity packages, during each phase
of the projected development period. The answers to these questions may be
seen, broadly, as illuminating issues of quality (price or rent), quantity
(absorption over time) and specific selling ideas or requirements. In
recognition of the irreducible component of uncertainty in real estate
development, particularly that which has a long lead time before
construction start, and multiple phases, a marketability analysis should
generate capture and absorption rates, as well as revenue forecasts, under
most likely, optimistic and pessimistic scenarios.
The discrete elements found in a typical marketability analysis
include:
- neighborhood delineation and analysis. The study will often begin
with a map identifying the site, the boundaries of the neighborhood and the
setting of the neighborhood within the metro area. Preferably, the map will
pinpoint road and public transportation access to the site, the location of
schools, shopping districts, hospitals and other uses pertinent to the
(housing) use contemplated. The neighborhood will be described by income,
education, occupation, age and population trends. Major natural and
man-made features, both favorable and problematic, should be identified.
The history of the neighborhood, if pertinent, should be included. An
economic and demographic profile of the neighborhood, and a description of
its principal uses and locations, only scratches the surface of what is
needed. This report, if expertly done, should enable a stranger who reads
and absorbs its contents to engage a longtime resident in conversation so
that the resident might be moved to inquire "Why haven't I seen you around
before?".
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Some of the issues which the neighborhood analysis should address
include: the area's reputation and the reasons for it; any signs of blight
or deterioration; conversely, evidence of pride of ownership and the quality
of routine maintenance; any evidence that lenders are reluctant to extend
loans to homes or businesses in the area; are utilities and other
infrastructure requirements in place for the planned use; a report on
vacancy and occupancy rates by use, tenure and price; environmental and site
constraints to further development - noise, air and water pollution, traffic
congestion and inharmonious adjacent uses. It should be noted that much of
the typical neighborhood delineation and analysis appears in the body of
this thesis.
-- site analysis. This is a detailed extension of neighborhood
analysis, with a particular focus on physical and geological conditions and
terrain. The highest-and-best-use concept, developed by appraisers, asks
whether a proposed use on a site is reasonably probable, legally
permissible, physically possible, adequately and appropriately supported by
the market and financially feasible.6 All except the last question are part
of the site analysis.
-- survey and analysis of the competition. It is vital for an investor
to determine not only "how competitors are currently serving the area . . .
[but] how additional competitors are planning to serve it in the immediate
future." (emphasis in original) A residential survey checklist might
include the following: location map showing the subject site and
competitive projects; a physical description of the competition: breakdown
of units, bedrooms, square feet; unit and project amenities; sales and
rental ranges; absorption of existing, new units and pre-sales; vacancies
stratified by unit mix and price/rent; quality of merchandising (model
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units, architectural models, advertising, signs); lease and/or sales terms
for recent transactions; demographic profile of buyers/renters; a
qualitative judgment of the reviewer on a 10 point scale.
-- marketing strategy and management plan. The key element of the
marketing strategy is a clear and precise description of the characteristics
and preferences of the "target market", which is a "sophisticated" way of
describing your customers. The investor must have a very clear picture of
the kinds of people he hopes to attract. Whether based on long and intimate
familiarity with the area and its people, or on the commissioning and
detailed analysis of a study of the type discussed here, the merchandising
should unmistakably demonstrate that its creator knows the people who live
there, their likes, dislikes, manias, phobias, mores, everything which makes
them New Englanders or Bostonians or residents of one of Boston's highly
distinctive, prideful, turf-conscious neighborhoods. The marketing strategy
should carefully attend to such details as "the signage program, . . . the
way prospective user traffic will be handled, how sales models will be
shown, and . . . the sales/lease closing rooms."8 Considering how difficult
and expensive it may be to attract a prospect to the site, it would be most
unfortunate to lose him because of inept or unprofessional sales
ministrations.
The investor must also consider, even at the predevelopment stage, how
he will handle the property management function. There are at least two
good reasons for this: buyers and/or tenants will frequently inquire about
it and the absence of a clear, well-articulated policy may be harmful to the
marketing effort; and the marketing effort will, except in the rare instance
of a 100% presold property, continue while some persons are in occupancy and
the property is in fact being managed. The quality of management will
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therefore affect the success of the merchandising effort. The property
management function will typically encompass promotion policies; tenant
screening and lease execution; maintenance and replacement policies;
accounting and reserve controls; and policies for the operation of the
property.
Aspects of the Market Analysis that are peculiar to Apartment Investing
The site plan for Sante Harbor will probably entail 4-6 high-rise
apartment structures (9-14 stories each), containing between 200 and 300
units. Each building is proposed to have a variety of apartment types
distinguished not only by number of bedrooms and baths, but by an explicit
sensitivity to the special requirements and desires of the various
sub-markets to which we are attempting to appeal. The first building will
be weighted in the direction of prudence and safety; that is, we will reach
out to the family market, where we are admittedly experimenting, only to a
limited degree. If our experiment vindicates the judgment that the market
is ready to reward our determination to meet a previously unappreciated,
inadequately served need, we will program the later phases to reflect a mix
of unit types more in keeping with our entrepreneurial instincts.
We will study existing high-rise complexes, both rental and
condominium, to determine the nature and extent of supporting amenities that
are typically provided. Our judgment is that a higher level of service is
generally provided in condominiums. One explanation for this is that the
expense of providing those services is billed directly to the unit owner and
therefore does not reduce the developer or condo sponsor's net profits.
Note, however, that during the selling period, the developer will indeed
have to bear the share of total common area operating expenses attributable
to the unsold units. Since a high level of amenities and services appears
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to be characteristic of upscale condominiums, the developer must be willing
to assume his share of the resultant costs during the marketing phase.
The supporting amenities found in high-rise apartments and condominiums
may include concierge service, maid service, uniformed doormen, attended
garages or valet parking, in-building or easily accessible health
facilities, convenience retail, on-call workmen for unit maintenance and
repair, and even room service (for those residential projects tied in with
hotel developments). Our judgment is that some of these amenities are
typically included in a given project because "the competition" provides
them and it is feared that the failure to do so may cause sales or vacancy
problems. We will not include an amenity without carefully considering what
it adds, or more particularly, what the "willingness to pay" regression
study and in-depth survey results suggest it may contribute in the form of
higher rents or prices. Furthermore, we intend to test our judgment that a
project will experience superior market acceptance if it allocates dollars
toward the design and construction of the units themselves as opposed to the
imitative inclusion of amenity packages whose inappropriateness may be seen
in their near-total disuse.
We believe, for example, that the production of units which effectively
screen out noise from the street and from other apartments would answer a
frequent and strongly felt criticism of apartment living. It will be costly
to do this, certainly; and may require the reduction or elimination of
certain amenities. We believe, however, that the successful urban
residential developer must attempt to create and sustain the illusion that
his high-rise apartments have more in common with private homes than they do
with tenements. Toward that end, noise control is one highly effective way
of helping the tenant or buyer to forget that he may have intrusive and
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uncongenial neighbors above, below and to either side of him. We will be
looking for other devices and techniques to help support Sante Harbor's
appeal to not only confirmed urbanites but to those who might be attracted
to urban living for the first time, if it could be made more like what they
are used to. City living need not give up on providing at least some of the
benefits for which suburbia is so much extolled -- most prominently,
privacy, quiet and individualized outdoor space.
Conducting an Apartment Oriented Demand and Supply Analysis
1) Data must be gathered on the local housing stock and the short-run
changes that are expected from new construction, rehabilitation, demolition
and abandonment.
2) Information on access, infrastructure, and availability and quality
of complementary facilities - schools, shopping, hospitals, recreation -
must be obtained. The intent is to determine whether the urban fabric which
supports and sustains residential development is firmly in place. If there
are significant gaps in this fabric, the development must be viewed as
risky.
3) Stratified vacancy data must be obtained and analyzed. The goal is
to determine, geographically and by rent class, what parts of the market are
tight and what parts are glutted. It is dangerous to draw conclusions from
the raw numbers alone. One must attempt to understand the causes for the
observed vacancy disparities.
4) The economic and demographic characteristics of the target
neighborhood must be understood. The intent is to construct a user profile
-- age distribution, household size, household income, mobility, race and
ethnicity, household characteristics; in short, "any unique characteristics
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or attributes of the occupants of the target or surrounding neighborhood
that will have an impact on demand."9
5) The competitive sales inventory is assessed. If one is proposing
urban, high-rise luxury rentals and if one is further targeting families and
empty nesters as at least two of the potential user groups, the range of
competitive alternatives may be large indeed. It would appear to encompass
other urban rentals, both high-rise and townhouse; luxury suburban rentals,
including high-rise, garden and townhouse; suburban single-family
subdivisions and multi-family, cluster ownership; and urban condominiums of
all types. The potential for guessing wrong with respect to part of one's
target market cannot be discounted; but the advantage of casting a wide net
is precisely that it cushions the downside risk. If one aims at a broad
range of user groups, one is unlikely to miss the mark with all of them. We
must be careful, however, to understand that there is a potential for
friction -- and consequent market resistance -- in appealing to disparate
groups that may not view each other with unmixed glee. Empty nesters, for
example, may display considerable resistance to living next to families with
young children. To the extent that problems of this sort are identified in
the predevelopment stage, good design, sensitive management and foresighted
marketing should help to mitigate the problem.
6) A detailed field survey is performed. The output is a summary
which includes the quality, quantity, vacancy, turnover, occupational mix,
amenities, etc. of whatever projects are judged to be competitive. The
intent is to produce data which will assist in forecasting the market
absorption rate of the new and planned rental units, including the subject
property.
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Projection of Operating Income and Expenses
An apartment developer who forecasts his income with uncanny accuracy,
but is sloppy or haphazard in anticipating expenses, will find that the
excellence of his market judgment is for naught. If expenses exceed
projections and rents cannot be raised, the unpleasant choice is deferral of
maintenance or other "discretionary" items, or the acceptance of
lower-than-expected yields. Operating expense projections should take
account of all of the following items: maintenance and repair, including
apartment cleaning and redecorating for new tenants, repair of all building
systems and (a major problem in Boston, particularly for waterfront
property) extermination expense; payroll for on-site staff; the cost of
apartments used by staff; prorata apportionment of off-site administrative
expenses; fixed expenses, including taxes and adequate insurance; utilities,
including solid waste hauling; reserves; and management fees, usually
between 3 and 6 percent of effective gross income. The Institute for Real
Estate Management (IREM) publishes an annual Income/Expense Analysis for
apartments, stratified by city and type of dwelling. This source is an
excellent check on the realism of one's expense projections.
Footnotes
1. Real Estate Investment, Stephen A. Phyrr and James R. Cooper, John
Wiley and Sons, 1982, p. 83.
2. Ibid., p. 83.
3. Ibid., p. 88.
4. Ibid., p. 103.
5. Ibid., p. 106.
6. Ibid., p. 126.
7. Ibid., p. 131.
8. Ibid., p. 136.
9. Ibid., p. 530
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